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In this thesis I have two main concerns. The first is with the metaphysics of time, and 
the second is with the metaphysics of causation and laws. First, with regard to the 
metaphysics of time, I consider all the extant metaphysical view - (i) presentism, (ii) 
B-theory eternalism, (iii) the moving spotlight view, and (iv) the growing block view. 
By considering the historial and current literature on these topics in detail I argue that 
each of (i)-(iii) should be rejected, but that (iv) should be accepted. Then, with regard 
to the metaphysics of causation and law, by considering the arguments of David 
Hume, I argue in favour of a Humean view according to which the laws of nature 
supervene upon the temporal extent of what exists. This will then provide a 
challenge: can the growing block view of time be combined with the Humean view of 
causation and law? I finish by arguing that, despite the fact some have thought it 
problematic, these two views can be combined. I develop a novel account of how 
this is to be done, which I argue is the most satisfying account that has so far been 
given. In this thesis I thus defend growing block Humeanism, a unified view of time, 
causation and the laws of nature. 
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Introduction 
In this thesis I have two main concerns. The first is with the metaphysics of time, and 
the second is with the metaphysics of causation and laws. The two areas are nearly 
always dealt with independently of each other, but (as I will argue) they intersect at a 
crucial juncture. More specifically, there is a difficulty with combining certain views in 
the metaphysics of time with certain views in the metaphysics of laws. More 
specifically still, there is a difficulty with combining a view known as the growing 
block view in the metaphysics of time with a view known as Humeanism in the 
metaphysics of laws. I will argue in this thesis that both of these views are true, and 
so that this difficulty must be answered. And it is answering this difficulty that will 
form the major original contribution of this thesis. 
 I start, then, with an overview of the structure of the rest of the thesis as a 
whole. In giving this overview I will briefly mention the arguments that I will rely upon, 
but will not go into detail regarding them. As such, I do not pretend that in this 
introduction my view will be presented in a fully-formed way. But it should give the 
reader an idea of what that fully-formed view is. The rest of the thesis will then be 
concerned with fleshing out the arguments and my view in more detail. 
 The thesis can be thought of as being split into two broad sections. The first 
encompasses chapters 1-5, which deals with the metaphysics of time, and is of 
much greater length than the second, which encompasses chapters 5-6 and deals 
with the metaphysics of causation and laws. In the first section I argue in favour of 
the growing block view of time. In the second I argue in favour of the Humean view 
of causation and laws, and consider how this view can be combined with the growing 
block view. The first section is of greater length than the first because, in a certain 
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sense, unlike in the metaphysics of causation and laws, there can be no “direct” 
argument in favour of any metaphysical view regarding the nature of time. That is to 
say, there are many competing views in that area, and in order to establish which 
one is true, requires a careful examination of each, and their relative pros and cons. 
In the metaphysics of causation and laws, however, there is a direct argument 
available for the truth of one particular view (i.e. one that I endorse). So, in more 
detail then, the structure of this thesis is as follows: 
In chapter 1 I consider the view in the metaphysics of time that is often thought to be 
the most intuitively plausible (i.e. the one most amenable to so-called “common 
sense”). This view is known as ‘presentism’, viz. the view that only the present time 
exists. I outline this view in detail and argue that it fails, because it is unable to 
account for the truth of past-tense sentences. That is, I rely upon an argument 
known as the Truthmaker argument, to reject presentism. So, this chapter has as its 
conclusion that presentism is false. 
In chapters 2 and 3 I then turn to considering what is known as the ‘B-theory’ of time, 
a view according to which time itself does not in any sense have a genuine flow to it. 
In chapter 2 I argue that we have good reason to believe that time does indeed flow, 
and so argue that a theory which can explain this is more plausible than one that 
cannot. I argue further that the B-theory cannot explain this, but that the A-theory 
can, and so that the A-theory is more plausible in this respect. In chapter 3 I then 
bolster this argument by considering another fundamental aspect of temporality, i.e. 
the issue of how material objects persist over time. 
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At the end of chapter 3, I will have argued that presentism is false, and that the B-
theory should be rejected. This will leave us with two A-theory views still remaining, 
the moving spotlight view, and the growing block view. The former view is the view 
that the past, present and future are all real, but that there is a privileged present 
moment that moves along the timeline such that, as time flows, different moments 
become successively present. The latter view is the view that the past is real, but the 
future is not, and that as time flows new states of reality come into existence. The 
present moment, on this view, is the last moment currently in existence, i.e. the 
“edge” of the growing block of time. In chapter 4, I consider the moving spotlight 
view, arguing that it fails because… 
In chapter 5 I then consider the only view of time still remaining, i.e. the growing 
block view, and argue that it can overcome the problems facing the other views of 
time. I therefore conclude that this view is true. 
In chapter 6 I turn my attention to the metaphysics of causation and laws. I focus on 
David Hume’s argument… I consider and reject objections to Hume’s account, and 
so endorse his argument and position. I thus conclude that a Humean theory of 
causation and the laws is true. 
Finally, in chapter 7 I consider the issue of whether the growing block view of time 
can be combined with a Humean theory of causation and laws. I draw out a difficulty 
for this combination, and consider the one extant discussion of it due to Smart 
(2018). I then argue that Smart’s account is problematic, because of the fact that he 
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compromises the Humean theory by accepting laws of nature, which turns out to be 





My focus in this chapter is on presentism. I argue that it fails because it cannot 
overcome what is known as ‘the truthmaker objection’. I start with a brief 
presentation of the basic objection to presentism to be developed throughout this 
chapter: 
Presentism, roughly speaking, is the view that only present things exist. According to 
the view, although present, past, and future tense sentences can be true, only the 
former is about the realm of existing things (which, of course, on their view is the 
realm of all there is). So, on this view, any sentences that contain terms (putatively) 
referring to past- or future- objects cannot be true, as they are not existing presently. 
However, this claim is apparently problematic because ordinarily we would say that 
past-tense sentences are about things that did exist. For instance, it is common 
sense that the dinosaurs once inhabited this planet, and so common sense that they 
existed. It is common sense to say, therefore, that past tense sentences that mention 
dinosaurs are about dinosaurs, and to say that dinosaurs are things that used to 
exist. That is, it seems we want to say there are some things, namely dinosaurs, that 
dinosaur-sentences are about, and that they are things that used to exist but do not 
now exist. So, given that presentists deny that such objects have any kind of reality, 
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it is hard to see how this can be so. On their view there simply is nothing that 
dinosaur-sentences are about. 
I think this basic objection is, in the end, fatal to presentism. But in order to show why 
a more precise account of what presentism is needs to be given, and the objection 
developed in light of it. So, in section 1 I begin by getting clear about the meaning of 
presentism. Then, in section 2 I elaborate on the presentist’s understanding of past 
tense sentences. In light of this, in section 3, I introduce the Truthmaker objection, 
and outline why the argument shows presentism is false. I endorse this conclusion in 
a preliminary fashion, but note that there are three possible responses that 
presentists could make to it. In sections 4-6 I consider these three objections in turn, 
and reject them. I then briefly conclude by rejecting presentism outright. 
Section 1: Understanding Presentism 
First, then, how are we to define presentism more precisely? The rough 
characterisation of the view given above can be captured as follows: 
Presentism: Only present things exist. 
But what, more precisely, does this statement mean? In order to better understand 
this it is worth reflecting upon the opposing view of eternalism, which can be 
captured (again roughly) as follows: 
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Eternalism: Present things, past things, and future things exist. 
The reason it is worth reflecting upon this is because there is a sceptical line of 
thought according to which there is no way to frame the disagreement between 
presentists and eternalists that makes it an interesting disagreement. According to 
this line of thought, presentists and eternalists must agree that their own view is 
obviously true and their opponents’ clearly false, or vice versa. And, moreover, they 
must also agree that their apparent disagreement about particular examples is 
‘merely linguistic’. In more detail, the line of thought focusses on the term “exist” and 
argues that it is ambiguous between two different senses, but that no matter how the 
term is disambiguated, neither can express their views in a way that makes them in 
any way interesting - i.e. their views, even by their own lights, will come out as either 
obviously true or clearly false. And, in fact, no matter how the term is disambiguated, 
presentists and eternalists will actually agree with each other about the truth of all 
existence sentences, and  
In order to appreciate this line of thought, consider that the two ways of 
disambiguiting “exist”, according to this line of thought, can be presented in the form 
of a dilemma: 
Dilemma: When we say that something x exists, we either mean to use the 
present tense form of the word ‘exists’, and so if we put it more explicitly it 
means that x exists now in the present. Otherwise, we do not mean to use the 
present tense form of the word, but in such a case it covers all three tenses, 
and so if we put it more explicitly it means that x existed in the past, exists 
now in the present, or will exist in the future. 
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So, first, to see that this line of thought, if correct, means that there is no way of 
framing presentism or eternalism that makes them interesting views, consider that, if 
it is correct, we must understand the term ‘exists’ as given in the definitions of 
presentism and eternalism to be taken in one of these two senses, i.e. as expressing 
the present tense, or as covering all three senses. If we explicitly substitute them into 
the rough definitions given we get: 
Presentism: 
(i): Present tense use of “exists”: Only present things exist now in the present. 
(ii): All tense use of “exists”: Only present things existed in the past, exist now 
in the present, or will exist in the past. 
Eternalism: 
(i): Present tense use of “exists”: Present things, past things, and future things 
exist now in the present. 
(ii) All tense use of “exists”: Present things, past things, and future things 
existed in the past, exist now in the present, or will exist in the future. 
The problem now becomes apparent. The definition Presentism (i) is an obvious 
truth that presentists and eternalists will both agree upon, and Presentism (ii) is a 
clear falsehood that presentists and eternalists will both reject. By contrast, the 
definition Eternalism (i) is a clear falsehood that presentists and eternalists will both 
reject, and Eternalism (ii) is an obvious truth that presentists and eternalists will both 
agree upon. So, either “exists” is used in the present tense sense, in which case 
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presentism is obviously true and eternalism clearly false, or it is used in the all tense 
sense in which case presentism is clearly false and eternalism obviously true. And 
crucially, presentists and eternalists will agree about this. So, there is no way to 
frame the debate that makes it an interesting one. 
 Second, to see that presentists and eternalists will actually agree with one 
another about the truth of all existence sentences, consider a specific example 
involving dinosaurs: 
Dinosaur-sentence: Larry the dinosaur exists. 
It is tempting to say that presentists will deny that this sentence is true because of 
the fact dinosaurs are not presently existing things, but that eternalists will think it is 
true because they think that despite not being presently existing things, dinosaurs do 
exist in the past. But, according to the line of thought we are considering, “exists” in 
this sentence must be understood in either the present tense sense or the all tense 
sense. Again, substituting them in we get: 
Dinosaur-sentence: 
(i) Present tense use of “exists”: Dinosaurs exist now in the present. 
(ii) All tense use of “exists”: Dinosaurs did exist in the past, exist now in the present, 
or will exist in the future. 
But, clearly, both presentists and eternalists will deny that reading (i) is false, and 
agree that reading (ii) is true. And so, if they do disagree, on this line of thought all 
that is happening is that presentists are reading the sentence in terms of (i) and 
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eternalists in terms of (ii). But then, they are not really disagreeing at all, but merely 
reading the sentence in two different ways. As this generalises to all “existence” 
sentences, it follows that presentists and eternalists do not really disagree about the 
truth of any “existence” sentences at all. 
Now, I do not wish to argue that all of the above is right if the line of thought 
presented is itself correct. But I deny that the above line of thought is in fact correct. 
According to it, we must read the term “exists” in either the present tense or the all 
tense way. That is, according to it, there is no other way of reading the term “exists”. 
But this is false. There is another alternative way of reading the term “exists”, and 
that if we read the term “exists” in that way, then there is a way of framing the two 
views that makes them interesting, and a way of reading “existence” sentences upon 
which presentists and eternalists will genuinely disagree. To understand what this 
alternative reading is requires two steps. 
The first step to understanding the alternative reading is to note that we 
sometimes use sentences in a tenseless way, i.e. in a way that is not supposed to be 
in the past, present or future tense. For example, this is plausibly so when we say 
that 2+2=4. In asserting this we do not mean to say only that 2+2=4 is true now in 
the present. But nor do we mean to say that it was true in the past, is true in the 
present, and will be true in the future. Mathematical truths are not the kinds of truths 
that are subject to temporal qualification, so what we mean to assert when we assert 
this is that 2+2=4 is, so to speak, just true. (Of course, this entails that they were true 
in the past, are true in the present, and will be true in the future, but this is not part of 
what we assert when we assert them.) So, the alternative reading of “exists” will 
involve the idea that existence-sentences can be read in a tenseless way, and are 
thus true iff it is tenselessly true that the thing in question exists. 
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The second step to understanding the alternative reading requires us to 
consider the notion of quantification. When we utter an “existence” sentence, we are 
saying that there exists some kind of object or other. We are therefore using 
existential quantification. But when we use existential quantification, what we are 
doing is considering a range of quantification, i.e. a domain or set of things, and we 
are saying that within that range there is something that is that kind of object. This 
idea is familiar to anyone who has done a first year course on logic. When 
interpreting an existential sentence we must first specify the domain of quantification, 
and then parse the sentence using the existential quantifier. For example, consider 
the following sentence: 
Someone-sentence: Someone is tall. 
As this sentence is usually interpreted, “someone” functions as a quantifier that is 
restricted to persons only, i.e. it has as its range the domain of persons only. Thus, 
the standard interpretation of it is as follows: 
Domain: Persons 
Translation: ∃x (Tx) [where ‘T’ stands for the property of being tall] 
And so, when I say that someone is tall, my sentence comes out as being true only if 
there is some person within the domain that is tall. It is irrelevant to the truth of the 
sentence whether there is some other kind of thing outside of the domain that is tall, 
e.g. the Eiffel Tower. 
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 What the above illustrates is that we often use restricted quantification - that 
is, the domain to which our quantifiers apply do not include absolutely everything that 
exists. But, we can also use quantifiers in an absolutely unrestricted way, i.e. in a 
way that includes absolutely everything that there is. Used in this sense, our 
quantifiers pay no attention to matters of tense, for existing in the past, present or 
future are not special ways of existing. If something exists in the past, for example, 
then it is tenselessly true that it exists. 
Putting these two steps together, we can understand the term “exists” in the 
definitions of presentism and eternalism to be given in terms of absolutely 
unrestricted quantification, and therefore to be tenseless uses. This sense has been 
called “existence simpliciter” in the literature, and I follow suit here. Putting this 
explicitly in terms of quantifiers then, and substituting into our previous definitions, 
presentism and eternalism are to be defined as follows: 
Presentism: Only present things exist simpliciter. 
Eternalism: Past things, present things and future things exist simpliciter. 
What is important here is that presentism and eternalism are now in opposition to 
each other, with neither of them being obviously true or clearly false. Moreover, both 
presentists and eternalists understand “exists” in the same way, but disagree with 
each other about the truth of certain sentences. Consider once more, the dinosaur 
sentence from above, now understood in terms of “existence simpliciter”: 
Tenseless dinosaur-sentence: Larry the dinosaur exists simpliciter. 
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This sentence uses unrestricted quantification and so says that, if we consider the 
domain absolutely everything that there is, with no regard to matters of tense, Larry 
is amongst the things in the domain. And so, we now get a disagreement between 
presentists and eternalists. Eternalists will think this is true (assuming they have 
some particular past dinosaur in mind when they use the name “Larry”), but 
presentists will think that it is false. 
 It is in terms of existence simplicitier, then, that presentism must be 
understood. Their view is that, even if we quantify absoutely unrestrictedly, and so 
tenselessly, there do not exist any past or future things. 
 This completes my comments on how we are to understand the basic 
presentist thesis. In the next section I develop this account to make sense of how 
they have traditionally understood past and future tense sentences. 
Section 2: Primitive Tense Operators, Presentism, and Past and Future 
Tense Sentences 
In the above I have described the basic presentist view, according to which they 
believe that no past or future things exist simpliciter. But this now raises the question 
of how they understand past and future tensed sentences. Again, I focus on the past 
tense, but all of what I will say will apply to the future tense too. As mentioned, they 
do not want to deny the truth of past tense sentences, for example, those about the 
past existence of dinosaurs. So, although they deny that Larry the dinosaur exists 
simpliciter, they want to say that when we do use the past tense and say that Larry 
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the dinosaur did exist, this is true. That is, they want to say the following past-tense 
existence sentence is true: 
Past tense dinosaur sentence: Larry the dinosaur did exist. 
But, how are they to understand such existence sentences? After all, they seem to 
involve the quantifier “exists”, and as such, doesn’t this commit them to the existence 
of Larry after all? In fact, they claim, it does not. In order to see why it is useful at this 
point to once again consider how an eternalist might understand past-tense 
existence sentences such as the one above. 
 Eternalists can, in fact, understand past tense existence sentences such as 
the past tense dinosaur sentence in terms that we have already introduced. They 
can say that past tense existence sentences are, in fact, sentences that express 
restricted quantification over past things. They can thus give an interpretation of the 
past tense dinosaur sentence in the following way: 
Domain: the past 
Translation: ∃x(Larry = x) 
It seems that this interpretation of the sentence is not available to presentists. 
Instead, it seems, they must give a different interpretation using a different device 
that we have not yet considered. And traditionally, presentists have done just this. 
 The device that has traditionally been used is one that was introduced by 
Arthur Prior, one of the first defenders of presentism in modern times. The device he 
introduced is known as a ‘primitive tense operator’. This is, to put it simply, a bit of 
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language that attaches to a tenseless sentence and turns it into a tensed one. For 
example, consider the tenseless dinosaur sentence from above once more: 
Tenseless dinosaur-sentence: Larry the dinosaur exists simpliciter. 
Now consider attaching to it the term “IT WAS THE CASE THAT” which functions to 
turn sentences into past-tense sentences: 
Past tense operator dinosaur sentence: IT WAS THE CASE THAT: Larry the 
dinosaur exists simpliciter. 
This, according to Prior, expresses the same content as was expressed by the past 
tense dinosaur sentence above, i.e. as: 
Past tense dinosaur sentence: Larry the dinosaur did exist. 
And so, the past tense dinosaur sentence is not understood as a sentence in which 
restricted quantification is used (i.e. as eternalists understand it), but rather as a 
sentence built up from a past tense operator and a sentence that used unrestricted 
quantification. And this account generalises to all past and future tense sentences. 
 There are two important points to note about Prior’s use of primitive tense 
operators. First, Prior says that they cannot be defined in any more basic way. That 
is why they are called “primitive” tense operators. Second, he says that whenever a 
sentence is within the scope of a past- or future- tense operator, then it is not 
existentially committing. That is, he claims that although present tense and tenseless 
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sentences containing quantifiers commit one to the existence of the things asserted 
to exist, sentences with past and future tense operators attached to them do not. And 
so, in this way, Prior thinks (and many presentists have since agreed) presentists are 
not committed to the existence of dinosaurs when they admit that existence 
sentences such as the past tense dinosaur sentence are true. In the next section I 
introduce an argument that I believe shows that this view cannot be maintained. 
Section 3: The Truthmaker Objection 
In this section I begin to clarify the line of argument against presentism that I began 
the chapter with. There I said that, it seems, past tense sentences such as the past-
tense dinosaur sentence are about the things they mention - in this case, about a 
specific dinosaur called “Larry”. But, I said, presentists have to maintain that there is 
nothing such sentences are about. We can now understand this claim a bit more 
precisely. Presentists, it seems, must maintain that there does not exist simpliciter 
anything that such sentences are about. They may well say, as Prior does, that they 
are not committed to the existence simpliciter of past things in asserting past-tense 
existence sentences. But this does nothing to take away the worry that such 
sentences aren’t about anything, on their view. Indeed, it seems to be basically an 
admission of that fact there is nothing they are about. But how are we to make the 
worry itself more precise? At this point it is useful to introduce the notion of a 
“truthmaker”. 
 A truthmaker is an entity of some kind or other that serves as an ontological 
ground for truth. The basic idea is that if a sentence, i.e. some words on a page or 
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spoken out loud, are to possess the semantic property of being true, then there must 
be some explanation of why they possess that property (rather than the property of 
falsehood). Sentences by themselves, it seems, cannot be true in the absence of 
some relation between their parts (i.e. the words and phrases that make them up) 
and something else. This basic mataphysical idea can, and has been, captured in 
terms of the following principle called the ‘Truthmaker Principle’: 
Truthmaker Principle: For every true sentence, there must be a state of affairs 
existing in the world that necessitates and/or grounds its truth.  
In order to clarify what this means, a good example is that if the sentence ‘Tigers live 
in Asia’ is true, then there must be some things that exist in reality that makes it true. 
In this case, as this is a present tense sentence, both presentists and eternalists can 
easily say what it is that exists in reality and makes it true. It is simply: Tigers - i.e. 
real, flesh and blood animals. The existence simpliciter of these creatures serve to 
ground the truth of this sentence in line with the Truthmaker Principle. But now, 
return to our past-tense dinosaur sentence once more: 
Past tense dinosaur sentence: Larry the dinosaur did exist. 
This sentence, we are supposing, is true. But then the Truthmaker Principle requires 
that there is something that exists simpliciter to ground its truth. Eternalists can say 
what this is, in exactly the same way that they can say what makes the sentence 
about tigers true. They can say that it is existence simpliciter of Larry the dinosaur, 
who exists as a real, flesh and blood creature, in precisely the same way that tigers 
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exist as flesh and blood creatures. The only difference between Larry and tigers is 
that Larry exists in the past, and tigers exist in the present. The problem for 
presentists is that they do not believe that Larry exists simpliciter, and so clearly 
cannot appeal to his existence simpliciter to ground the truth of the sentence. As a 
consequence, it seems they must violate the Truthmaker Principle, which, as has 
been mentioned, is thought to be basic metaphysical priunciple. And so, as they 
violate a basic metaphysical principle their view must be rejected. 
 I think that the above objection is fatal to presentism. But we cannot rest 
content with merely stating it, because there have been responses to it made by 
presentists. There have been three broad kinds of reply. The first reply has been an 
attempt to modify the Truthmaker Principle to make it “presentist-friendly”. The 
second has been to maintain that there are some things existing in the present that 
make past tense sentences true. And the third has been to modify presentism itself 
to make it amenable to the Truthmaker Principle. So, in the remainder of this chapter 
I consider these responses and reject them. My conclusion will thus be to endorse 
the objection wholeheartedly, and reject presentism on its basis. 
Section 4: Presentist Reply 1 -  Modifying the Truthmaker Principle 
In making this reply the presentist agrees that the Truthmaker Principle is a basic 
metaphysical principle, but disagrees with how it is stated. Their idea is to 
reformulate the principle so that it can allow past tense sentences to be true even if 
there does not exist simpliciter anything to make it true. How can they do this? The 
basic move they make is to note that the Truthmaker Principle, as stated above, is 
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stated using the present-tense, and then argue that as stated it does not take 
account of the fact that past-tense and future-tense sentences may have different 
kinds of grounds from present-tense sentences. That is, they argue that although 
present-tense sentences need there to exist simpliciter things that make them true, 
past-tense and future-tense sentences do not. Instead, they argue, past-tense 
sentences need there to have been things that exist simpliciter to make them true, 
and future-tense sentences need there to will be things that exists simpliciter to 
make them true. There have been a number of attempts to reformulate the 
Truthmaker Principle along this line, but the basic idea is always the same. So, we 
can consider just one illustrative example here. I pick the first extant suggestion of 
this kind, made by Andre Gallois. He suggests: 
Presentist Truthmaker Principle: ‘What is true supervenes on what objects 
exist [simpliciter], have existed [simpliciter], or will exist [simpliciter], and what 
properties are, have or will be possessed by things that exist [simpliciter], 
have existed [simpliciter] or will exist [simpliciter], and what relations hold 
between those things.’ (Gallois, 2004: 649) 
To illustrate, consider once again: 
Past tense dinosaur sentence: Larry the dinosaur did exist. 
Using Gallois’s suggestion, presentists can now say that although nothing does now 
exist simpliciter that makes this sentence true, it is nonetheless true because it was 
the case that Larry the dinosaur existed simpliciter. 
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 I think this kind of response cannot succeed. The reason is that what we are 
looking for is an ontological base for the truth of sentences now. That is, we must 
remember that although the past tense dinosaur sentence is a past tense sentence, 
it is true right now in the present. It is not merely the case that it was true in the past. 
My argument here is that the presentist might well be able to appeal to the fact that it 
was the case that dinosaurs existed in the past to account for the truth of the fact the 
present tense sentence ‘dinosaurs exist’ was true. But, I do not think they can appeal 
to the fact that it was the case that dinosaurs existed in the past to account for the 
truth of the fact that the past tense sentence ‘dinosaurs existed’ is true in the 
present. Another way to put this is to say that past truths may have past 
Truthmakers, but present truths must have present Truthmakers. And, despite being 
a past tense sentence, the past tense dinosaur sentence is a present truth, not a 
past one. 
 In order to bolster my argument above it is worth noting that even if 
presentists accept Gallois’s suggestion above, when they claim that a present tense 
truth is made true by what exists simpliciter in the present, they will make an appeal 
to an ontologically committing explanation. For example, consider what they would 
say about the following present-tense sentence that asserts a fact about one of the 
elephants in London zoo: 
Nelly sentence: Nelly the elephant has a trunk. 
Even if they accept Gallois’s suggestion, presentists will say of this sentence that it is 
true in virtue of the existence simpliciter of Nelly. That is, they will say its truth is 
grounded by the following: 
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Nelly grounding: There exists simpliciter some elephant, Nelly. 
And this, on their view, is an existentially committing sentence, and so they 
existentially commit themselves to there being a real ground of the truth of the Nelly 
sentence. By contrast, consider some past tense sentence that states a fact about 
Larry the dinosaur, e.g.: 
Larry sentence: Larry the dinosaur had big feet. 
Here they will say that this sentence is true in virtue of the fact that it was the case 
that Larry the dinosaur existed simpliciter. But this, on their view, is not existentially 
committing. In this case, the ground of the sentence will be: 
Larry grounding: IT WAS THE CASE THAT there exists simpliciter a dinosaur, 
Larry. 
And so, because the existence sentence is here embedded within the scope of a 
primitive tense operator, it is not existentially committing, and they do not commit 
themselves to there being a real ground of the truth of the Larry sentence. 
 The above point does nothing more than spell out the response in more detail. 
But it is a telling one. The reason is that presentists are happy to admit that present 
tense sentences need actually existing real grounds, but deny that past tense 
sentences do. But, this ignores the fact that present and past tense sentences are on 
a par with regards to their truth. They are both true now, i.e. in the present, and so if 
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we are to explain their present truth they should both be treated on a par, and so 
both should be provided with actually existing real grounds. As the presentist does 
not provide these by shifting to an alternative account of the Truthmaker principle, I 
conclude that this shift does not get them out of their difficulty, and so that this 
response fails. 
Section 5: Presentist Reply 2 - Appealing to Presently Existing 
Surrogates 
Another response that has been given to the Truthmaker argument by presentists is 
to admit that they must find actually existing real grounds for past tense sentences, 
but deny that those things must be the things we ordinarily think they must be. So, 
for example, they deny that in order to ground the truth of the past tense dinosaur 
sentence we must appeal to the existence simpliciter of Larry the dinosaur himself. 
Instead, they maintain, past tense sentences such as that one can be grounded by 
the existence of some surrogate entity that does, in fact, presently exist. As it has 
been put by Caplan and Sanson in their survey of the attempts that have been made 
in this direction, by taking this line presentists attempt to ‘equip the present with a 
perfect record of the past’. (Caplan and Sanson, 2011: 200) I think that none of these 
attempts succeed. But, in order to get a better grasp of them, I first outline some of 
the attempts that have been made and offer initial reasons for rejecting them. 
 The first attempt I outline is that made by, for example, Craig (2003: 400). It is 
to say that for each true past tense sentence there exists in the present some 
unstructured primitive past tense fact that corresponds to it. So, for example, there 
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will exist simpliciter the primitive fact that Larry the dinosaur existed, and the 
primitive fact that Larry the dinosaur had big feet, and so on for all the true past 
tense sentences. Even if we allow the general idea that there can be presently 
existing records of the past that make past tense sentences true, this view is wholly 
implausible. It is implausible because, on this view, the primitive facts are 
unstructured, and so there must indeed be one for each true past tense sentence. 
This means that there will be no internal connection between the primitive facts. So, 
for example, there will be a primitive unstructured fact that Larry had feet, and a 
primitive unstructured fact that Larry had big feet, but these will be two independent 
facts, and not linked in any way, and this is what is so implausible. Surely, if there are 
facts about the past, even if there existence is in some way primitive, there must be 
some story to tell about how they relate to the things that once existed, and to one 
another. Craig Bourne, himself a presentist (we will consider his view in the next 
section), in discussing the Truthmaker argument against presentism, puts the point 
here as follows: 
What are the constituents of the facts that make them true?... how is it 
possible for the proposition that Socrates taught Plato to be true? Which 
particulars can be invoked as the constituents of such a fact? Not Socrates or 
Plato – they don’t exist. Nor can we invoke a present past-Socrates – what a 
mysterious object that would be! The alternative is to invoke the primitive 
present fact that Socrates taught Plato. But without being able to say how this 
fact is structured (for its constituents are certainly not Socrates or Plato), this 
move is far from satisfactory. (Bourne 2006b: 3-4) [emphasis added] 
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Recognising this problem, others have attempted to say more about the structure of 
the presently existing facts that presentists suppose exist. The most fully developed 
is probably than given by Simon Keller (2004). Keller first argues that presentists can 
admit the existence of what are called ‘haecceities’. These are properties that are 
possessed essentially by all individuals, and are the properties that things have in 
virtue of being the individual things that they are. So, for example, Theresa May as 
the property of being Theresa May, London Bridge has the property of being London 
Bridge, my teapot has the property of being that particular teapot, and so on. Keller 
then argues that presentists can admit that properties can exist even if they are not 
instantiated. So, for example, even if we destroyed all the blue things in the world, on 
this view the property of being blue would still exist. This then allows the presentist to 
say that although past objects do not exist simpliciter (i.e. they do not presently 
exist), their haecceities do. So, for example, although Larry the dinosaur does not 
exist simpliciter, Larry’s haecceity, the property of being Larry the dinosaur, does. 
And now it becomes clear how they can respond to the Truthmaker problem. Once 
more, consider: 
Past tense dinosaur sentence: Larry the dinosaur did exist. 
This sentence, Keller’s presentist can say, is made true not by the existence 
simpliciter of Larry himself, but by the existence simpliciter of his haecceity, which 
exists in the present and is just as real as the tigers in Asia are. 
 There are some additional problems that Keller’s presentist must deal with. 
Consider the following sentence again: 
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Larry sentence: Larry the dinosaur had big feet. 
Here Keller’s presentist must say more than just that Larry’s haeccity exists 
simpliciter and grounds the truth of this sentence. They must also explain how 
Larry’s haecceity somehow makes it true, specifically, that Larry had big feet. This is 
a difficulty, because unlike Larry himself, who is (or was) an object capable of 
possessing feet, Larry’s haeccity is not an object but a property, and so not capable 
of having feet at all. But there do appear to be solutions to this. The solution that 
Keller suggests applied to this example would be somethig like this: Larry, when he 
existed, had the property of being Larry, and his feet, when they existed, had the 
property of being those very feet. These properties were related to each other in 
virtue of both being properties of Larry, and the property of being Larry’s feet, in 
addition, had the second order property of being the property of big feet. So, when 
Larry and his feet went out of existence, the property of being Larry and the property 
of being his feet stayed in existence, and continued to bear some kind of relation to 
each other and the same second-order properties. In fact, they still do exist in the 
present and bear that relation to each other, and have the same second order 
properties, and so the Larry sentence is grounded in the fact that these properties 
exist in the present, bear those relations to each other, and have those properties. As 
Keller himself says: 
Among the haecceities that presently exist, the presentist can say, are the 
[haecceity] of Anne Boleyn, of the sword with which Anne was executed, and 
of the swordsman who was specially brought over from France. These 
properties themselves, says the presentist, instantiate a relation that 
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somehow mirrors the relation that the four-dimensionalist claims to be 
instantiated by Anne, the sword, and the swordsman. (Keller 2004: 97) 
To be more specific about this statement by Keller, the four-dimensionalist believes 
that the relation is to be held between individuals, and cannot exist without the 
existence of the individuals involved, whereas the presentist is convinced that the 
relation exists between properties, in other words, the existence of the individual who 
possesses the properties does not necessitate the relation, it can still exist as long 
as there are the related properties. Whether or not the above further suggestion is at 
all plausible will not be my concern, for I think there is an insurmountable objection to 
the whole enterprise of providing presently existing surrogates of past things that 
applies to any possible suggestion that might be made (i.e. Keller’s, and any other 
that might be made). The objection is that any such surrogates, whatever they are, 
could exist even if the past tense sentences were in fact false, and so cannot act as 
grounds for the truth of past sentences. I spell this out in more detail in the next 
paragraph. 
 I focus on Keller’s suggestion, but my point is general. To make it I use God 
as a illustrative device (i.e. you do not have to think that God in fact exists for my 
point to hold, but it is a useful way of making the point). Suppose that, in fact, Larry 
the dinosaur had never existed, and so the past tense dinosaur sentence is in fact 
false. But now suppose that God decided to create Larry’s haecceity (i.e. without 
actually creating Larry). If God did this, then Larry’s haecceity would exist now in the 
present, in an uninstantiated state, and so would exist simpliciter. But then, because 
it is the existence of this haecceity that makes the past tense dinosaur sentence true, 
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according to Keller’s presentism, the presentist would be committed to the truth of 
the past tense dinosaur sentence, even though it is in fact false. What this simple 
line of thought establishes is that , if Keller’s presentist were right, Larry’s heacceity 
would ground the truth of the past tense dinosaur sentence even if that sentence 
were false. But, this is absurd. Nothing that would ground the truth of a true sentence 
even if it were false can ground its truth if it is in fact true, for there is no genuine 
connection between the actual truth of the sentence and the existence of its grounds. 
Although this has been put in terms of Keller’s presentist, it could be made in terms 
of any suggested presently existing surrogate. And so, I think, no response of this 
kind can possibly succeeed. 
I think the objeciton I have given here points to a general difficulty. To go back 
to my original way of stating the problem at the beginning of this chapter, the past 
tense dinosaur sentence is about Larry himself, not about any surrogate. So, it 
seems to me, only Larry himself can ground the truth of the sentence. If presentists 
attempt to ground the truth in terms of some surrogate, they turn the sentence into 
one that is about the surrogate itself, and not about the thing it is supposed to be 
about. But then, this breaks the connection between the truth of what the sentence is 
about and the existence of the surrogate. The reason the sentence can still be true 
even if Larry never existed is that the sentence, on the understanding of the 
presentist who insists on a surrogate, is not about Larry at all, but about his 
surrogate. And so, although presentists might ground the truth of some sentence (i.e. 
one about its surrogate) they change the topic, and so fail to ground the truth of the 
original sentence at all. And so, I conclude, this response to the Truthmaker objection 
also fails. 
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Section 6: Presentist Reply 3 -  Reformulating Presentism 
The final response that has been made has been to reformulate presentism. Above I 
mentioned Craig Bourne, and he is the main proponent of reformulating presentism 
to overcome the Truthmaker objection, and it his view that I consider in this section. 
 Bourne’s basic idea is to reject Prior’s primitive presentist formulation. 
Remember that according to that formulation, past tense sentences are to be 
understood in terms of primitive past tense operators so that past sentences are not 
existentially committing. Bourne rejects this idea and claims that past tense 
sentences are in fact existentially committing for the presentist, but that they are not 
therefore committed to the existence of concrete past times. To explain further, note 
that eternalists not only think that the past, present and future all exist, but they think 
that the past, present and future are all on a par in being concrete entities. To see 
what this means, consider that the present contains physical objects - people, rocks, 
buildings, and so on. The eternalists thinks the past and future are exactly the same 
in that they too contain objects that are physical in just the same way. This is what it 
means to say the past, present and future all contain concrete things. Bourne’s 
suggestion, therefore, is to say that one can still be presentist even if one denies the 
definition we have given of it, i.e.: 
Presentism: Only present things exist simpliciter. 
Bourne argues that the presentist can still be a presentist if he admits that past 
things do exist simpliciter, but denies that those things are concrete. Instead, he 
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suggests the presentist should say that present things are concrete, but that past 
and the future things are abstract things. Although he does not explicitly spell this 
out, he thus redefines presentism as follows (he calls the view ‘ersatzer presentism’): 
Ersatzer Presentism: Only presently existing things are concrete, whilst past 
and future things are abstract. 
If Bourne is right that this is an acceptable version of presentism, it certainly 
overcomes the Truthmaker objection, because the ersatzer presentist now has 
things that exist simpliciter in the past to make past tense sentences true. For 
example, once more (and for the last time now) take the two sentences that have 
been concerning us: 
Past tense dinosaur sentence: Larry the dinosaur did exist. 
Larry sentence: Larry the dinosaur had big feet. 
On Bourne’s version of presentism, both of these sentences are made true quite 
simply by the existence simpliciter of Larry. Larry really does exist in the past, on 
Bourne’s version of presentism, and he has big feet. It is just that he and his big feet 
exist as abstract entities rather than concrete ones. In other words, present tense 
sentences are about a concrete realm of existing objects, and so are grounded by 
the existence of concrete things, and past tense sentences are about an abstract 
realm of existing things, and so are grounded by the existence of abstract things. 
 Bourne goes to great lengths to develop this basic position in detail. He goes 
on, for example, to define past and future states of the world in terms of maximally 
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consistent sets of propositions, which he calls ‘u-propositons’, and proposes that 
they are ordered along a real dimension R, and linked to a description of the present 
state of the world (also given in terms of u-propositions), via a special relation that he 
calls the E-relation. In these terms he thinks he can give an account of what it is for a 
past sentence to be true: 
‘It was the case that p’ is true simpliciter iff p is a member of a set U of u-
propositions that is the first element of an ordered pair <U, ni∈R> actually E-
related to the currently instantiated ordered pair <v, nj∈R>, where v is the set 
of u-propositions that is true simpliciter, and ni<nj. (Bourne, 2006b: 13) 
Now, what all of this means precisely will not in fact concern us. The reason is that I 
do not think we need to engage with the details of Bourne’s account in order to refute 
it. That is, I think the whole approach can be shown to be misguided without 
considering those details. 
 The basic objection that shows Bourne’s view to fail is, in fact, an extension of 
my objection given in the previous section. Bourne thinks that the past is an abstract 
realm that presently exists. But, in turning the past into such an abstract realm he 
changes the subject just as much as those who seek currently existing surrogates for 
past objects. The past tense dinosaur sentence is about a concrete thing, Larry, and 
not some abstract thing such as a constutuent of a proposition. Once more, even if 
Larry did not exist, there is nothing to stop God creating an abstract realm in which 
an abstract Larry does exist, and setting up the abstract realm so that it is linked up 
with a description of the present concrete world via an E-relation. And if God did do 
this, it would make the past tense dinosaur sentence true, even though Larry never 
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existed. And so, Bourne’s view fails for the same reason that the view of those who 
seek surrogates for past things fails. 
Bourne does have a possible reply here. Bourne might say that if God did do 
this then it would not be true that Larry never existed, because Larry’s abstract 
present existence is precisely what makes it the case that Larry once existed. But 
this is wholly unsatisfactory. For suppose what would happen if God were to remove 
the currently existing abstract Larry from existence, or remove the E-relation link 
between abstract Larry and the present time. What would then happen? The past 
tense dinosaur sentence would go from being true to being false. But that a true 
sentence about the past could become false is absurd, or at the very least, goes 
against everything we believe about the past and so is so revisionary as to make the 
position untenable. And yet this is a possibility that ersatzer presentists are 
committed to. 
It is no good Bourne replying that this is not a possibility, for the simple reason 
that the fact the abstract past is linked via E-relations to the actual present is a 
contingent fact. There are a huge many possible abstract pasts, of which only one is 
the actual abstract past, on his view. But the only thing that grounds this fact is the 
existence of a contingent E-relation linking one of those abstract past to the present. 
And the holding of this relation is a mere contingent truth. Of course, what Bourne 
might want to say in response to this is that the E-relation that does in fact hold, 
holds because it correctly mirrors the actual past (i.e. that the E-relations that pick 
out the abstract past hold because the abstract past so picked out matches with the 
actual past of the world). But no erstatzer presentist can say this, for what the actual 
past is is supposed to be constituted by the holding of the E-relation, and so the 
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actual past cannot act as an independent constraint on what E-relation holds. I thus 
conclude that Bourne’s response to the Truthmaker objection also fails. 
Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that presentism cannot account for the truth of past 
tense sentences, i.e. that it falls prey to the Truthmaker objection. I have considered 
all the extant responses to this objection, and rejected them all. So, I conclude, 
presentism itself must be rejected. This will now serve as a fixed point in what 




Against the B-theory [Part 1] 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I argued that presentism faces irresolvable problems from the 
truthmaker objection, and so should be rejected. Presentism is an A-Theory view. In 
this chapter and the next I will consider the alternative view to the A-Theory, viz. the 
B-Theory, according to which there is no privileged present. The B-Theory entails 
eternalism, i.e. the view that all times are equally as real, and eschews the idea that 
there is any truth in the metaphor of time’s flow. (However it should be noted that 
eternalism does not entail the B-theory, for there is an eternalist version of the A-
theory, namely, the Moving Spotlight View, which I will consider in chapter 4.) 
Nonetheless, B-theorists think that they can account for the apparent flow of time, 
i.e. they argue that although there is no truth in the idea that time flows, they think 
they can explain why it seems to us that it does. Despite what many B-theorists 
maintain, however, in this chapter I will argue that the B-Theory’s account of the 
apparent flow of time is highly problematic. I will argue that we have good reason to 
think that the flow of time is a genuine feature of the world and that any account of 
time must take this into account. But, whilst I will argue that the A-theorist can 
account for this, the B-theorists cannot. In other words, I will argue that the A-Theory 
is more plausible in respect to the issue of the flow of time, and so the B-Theory 
must be considered a second best option when attempting to deal with this issue. 
That is, I will not argue directly for the falsity of the B-theory in this chapter, but 
merely present a problem for it, that shows the A-theory is stronger with regards to 
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the issue of the flow of time. In chapter 3 I will then consider how the A-theory and B-
theory can account for the persistence over time of physical objects. I will argue 
there that, once more, the A-theory has the upper hand, and that as a consequence 
we are justified in rejecting the B-theory. So, to emphasise, my argument in this 
chapter and the next is that the A-theory is in a better position with regard to two 
fundamental aspects of temporality, and that this is the reason the B-theory should 
be rejected. 
 At the end of chapter 3, therefore, the following position will have been 
reached. I will have rejected one version of the A-Theory (i.e. presentism) and the B-
Theory as a whole. This will leave two versions of the A-Theory left standing, viz. the 
growing-block view and the moving spotlight view. In chapter 4 I will consider the 
moving spotlight view, and reject that too. This will lead me to consider the growing 
block view in chapter 5, which I will endorse. 
 In more detail, then, my argument in this chapter proceeds as follows. In 
section 1 I outline the distinction between the A-theory and the B-theory in more 
detail, drawing upon McTaggart’s seminal dicussion of how moments in time can be 
arranged according to an A-series and a B-series. This will be related to the issue of 
the flow of time. I will argue that if the flow of time is to be thought a genuine feature 
of reality, then the B-theorist must account for it. In section 2 I consider an objection 
to the effect that the adding A-properties cannot make a difference to whether it 
appears to us that time flows, and reject it. In sections 3-6 I then argue that in order 
to account for the flow of time, the asymmetry of the B-relations must be 
demonstrated, and show how the A-theorist can do this whilst the B-theorist cannot. 
Finally, in sections 7-8 I discuss the B-theoretic rejoinder to this view, according to 
which we can reject the idea that time itself flows, and explain the apparent flow of 
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time in terms of it being mind-dependent. I argue that this position is implausible, and 
so conclude that the A-theory is able to account better for the flow of time than the B-
theory. 
Section 1: The A-series, B-series, A-theory and B-theory 
Instead of diving straight into my objections against the B-Theory of time, I think it is 
necessary to briefly go through the notions of the A-Theory, B-Theory and the flow of 
time first, with which clearly explained, there will be a more explicit picture about 
what is coming up in my argument against the B-Theorist. 
In order to disprove the existence of time, McTaggart offers notions that form 
the basis of the definitions of the A-theory and the B-theory in his 1908 paper ‘The 
Unreality of Time’. He starts with distinguishing two ways in which temporal positions 
can possibly be ordered, namely, the A-series and B-series. When the temporal 
positions possess the properties such as being three days future, being present, and 
being two days past, etc., these temporal positions are ordered by what McTaggart 
calls ‘the A-series’, and these properties are what McTaggart calls ‘A-properties’. As 
for the B-Theory, when there are the relations between the temporal positions, such 
as being three hours earlier than, being simultaneous with, and being one day later 
than, etc, and the series which is arranged by these relations is what McTaggart calls 
‘the B-series’, and these relations are what McTaggart calls ‘B relations’. 
McTaggart maintains the claim that the A-series is essential to the existence 
of time, but denies the reality of time by saying that the A-series is inherently 
contradictory, and that without the A-series, the B-series is not capable of 
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constituting time for it does not involve any genuine change. Although the pursuit of 
this chapter is not to discuss McTaggart’s rejection of the existence of time (but his 
claim that the A-series is inherently contradictory is part of the discussion in this 
chapter), his view on the A-series and B-series has certainly created a significant 
sphere in the study of the nature of time, and attracted various perspectives on the 
matter, such as the A-theorist view and its opposite, the B-theorist view.  
As mentioned above, McTaggart argues that arranging moments of time 
according to the B-series cannot constitute time, due to its lack of change. However, 
B-theorist proponents, such as D.H. Mellor and J.J. Smart, disagree with this 
consideration and claim that the B-series suffices for the existence of time. They 
maintain this because, they claim, there is no genuine change in time, and therefore 
our perception of the flow of time is nothing but an illusion caused by human 
consciousness. In other words, the B-theorist believes that ‘the flow of time is not 
objectively real.’ (Baron, 2017: 610) Contrary to this, the advocates of the A-Theory 
claim that there are genuine and irreducible A-properties such as being two days 
future, being present, and being three days past, which temporal positions gain and 
lose, and importantly, it is because of these properties and the temporal change 
involved, that the flow of time is a natural and genuine feature of the world. 
So far in this thesis, things do not look optimistic for the A-theorist, because, 
as concluded in the previous chapter, the only version of the A-theory considered, 
i.e. presentism, cannot account for the flow of time (simply because it is false). And 
admittedly, the B-Theory eternalist view does have intrinsic advantages in certain 
respects over presentism. For example, it can explain the causal relations between 
two temporal events, since all times are real and so the existence of the relata of 
causal relations is guaranteed. More importantly, its consistency with the Truthmaker 
 40
principle makes it look more reasonable than presentism. Despite these advantages, 
however, there is one question that we can ask B-theorists that is just as troubling for 
them as the Truthmaker objection is to presentists. This is: how the flow of time can 
be explained given there is no temporal change that can actually make a physical 
difference to the world, according to the B-Theory. If the B-theorist cannot provide a 
satisfying response to the challenge of temporal passage and change, then the A-
theorist will have a stronger case on this matter. We may have to reject presentism, 
but there are other A-Theory views that may be able to legitimately explain temporal 
flow without falling foul of the Truthmaker objection. So, the question we now face is: 
can the B-theoriest account for the flow of time? 
Section 2: Do A-properties make a difference? 
In response to the question of how to explain the flow of time, B-theorists must claim 
that there is no such a thing as genuine temporal passage, and therefore our 
experience of temporal passage should not be considered as an aspect of nature. As 
Price (2011: 276) puts it: there are two different directions that the enquiries with 
regard to time lead into, one considers human beings’ perception of time as 
reflecting a natural feature of the universe, while the other regards it simply as a 
human psychological experience rather than an objective character of the universe. 
To demonstrate this point against temporal passage, the B-theorist offers the 
argument as below:  
Suppose that time actually flows, in the actual world, there is a sequence of 
physical states, p1 ... pn, where each physical state corresponds to the total 
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way that the physical world is at a time. There is some world, call it W, in 
which a physical duplicate of each of the pn exists, p*1 ... p*n but in which 
there is no such thing as the flow of time. Assuming that the mental 
supervenes on the physical, the duplication of the pn is sufficient to duplicate 
our experiential lives. It follows that the flow of time cannot be making a 
difference to experience: the actual world in which time flows is experientially 
indistinguishable from W even though time flows actually but not in W. (Baron: 
2017:612) 
I have rejected presentism because it cannot overcome the Truthmaker objection. 
But I did allow that presentism could, if true, account for the flow of time. However, 
Baron’s objection here suggests that presentism doesn’t even have this advantage. 
To see this point made by Baron, leave aside for now the fact that presentism cannot 
provide an answer to the Truthmaker objection, and turn to the above argument in 
terms of the supposed fact that presentism can account for the flow of time. First, 
suppose that presentism is true and so that the world is a three-dimensional one in 
which events come into and go out of existence, putatively creating temporal flow. 
Next, imagine a four-dimensional B-theory world, where there is no temporal flow, 
and assume we map events-at-times in our three-dimensional presentist world to 
events-at-temporal locations in the four-dimensional world. According to Baron’s 
objeciton, our perceptions from the three-dimensional presentism world will also get 
mapped to the four-dimensional world. In this case, the B-theorist argues that surely 
our perceptions in the four-dimensional block universe are the same as our 
perceptions in the three-dimensional world, and for this reason our perceptions in the 
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presentism three-dimensional world do not play any role in explaining why it seems 
to us that time flows. 
However, advocates of the A-Theory have rejected this argument. According 
to Maudlin (2007: 122), it is not true that duplicates in the four-dimensional world 
possess the same perceptions as they do in a presentist world. The response, in 
effect, is to deny that there is any legitimate reason to grant such a mapping result. 
The A-theorist can simply argue that there are no reasons to allow that there is a 
such a mapping result because in a four-dimensional world, where there is no 
temporal flow, the natural states will be different from those in a presentist world. As 
such, one cannot presume that a world with lack of the flow of time would produce 
the same experiences in consious subjects as a world that possesses genuine flow. 
Thus, by claiming that the three-dimensional and four-dimensional worlds are the 
same in this respect the B-theorist begs the question. 
Of course, the above objection was put in terms of presentism, which has 
already been rejected. But the basis point applies even if some other A-theory view 
is true. The lesson here is that B-theorist cannot assume that if the universe is 
consisted of an A-theoretical reality, this does not make a difference to our 
experiences. Instead, they must show that this is so. They must do this by showing 
that, if the universe has only a B-theoretical reality, then our experiences of the flow 
of time can still be accounted for. I will turn to this attempt in section 8 below. 
However, what the above objection does also do is to point out that if the A-theory is 
to be plausible, they must in fact be able themselves to account for the flow of time. 
It is to this task that I turn in the upcoming sections. I frame the issue in terms of an 
objection that can be made against the B-theory. 
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Section 3: The Spatializing Time Objection 
The A-theorist cannot merely rest content with refuting argument from B-theorists like 
that given above. They must offer their own positive arguments against B-theorists. 
One such argument is to accuse B-theorists of being ‘guilty of “spatializing” 
time...and the theory, as so gross a distortion of reality with respect to time, therefore 
cannot be correct.’ (Craig, 2000: 149) To be more specific, the A-theorists can argue 
that conceiving of time as being laid out on a spatial line, with the B-relations such as 
‘later than’, ‘earlier than’ and ‘simultaneous with’ holding between temporal positions 
spatially along this line, is perfectly OK, so long as this picture is viewed as being 
purely metaphorical. But, they can argue, the B-theorist views these relations as 
literally holding between points along a dimension that is rightly conceived of 
spatially, i.e. as a line. This, A theorists can maintain, is a gross error. It conflicts with 
our intuitions about time in such a fundamental manner that it simply cannot be the 
right view, and indeed, on this view we cannot even legitimately think of the B-
relations as being genuine temporal relations at all. Time is supposed to be 
something that flows in a manner that a line cannot do, and so relations amongst 
points on a line cannot themselves be thought of as being temporal relations unless 
something more is said. And so, one cannot treat this picture literally and consider it 
as being a sufficient condition for the existence of time. To do so, the A-theorist can 
say, is to ‘spatialize time’. 
In order to avoid any confusion, the A-theorist’s accusation here is not to be 
understood to suggest merely that the B-theorist treats time just as another spatial 
dimension. What the A-theorist means here by ‘spatialization’ is that: 
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[I]n the absence of objective [A-properties], the temporal dimension has been 
robbed of that which makes it time, so that the ordering relations which obtain 
among putatively temporal particulars are only gratuitously labelled “earlier 
than/later than” and the resultant dimension if not a mere spatial dimension, is 
in any case definitely not time. (Craig, 2000:150) 
Another way of putting the point here is to point out that the B-theorist thinks they 
can explain the existence of time and the fact that there are temporal relations 
between temporal positions such as earlier than and later than, while denying the 
existence of an essential feature of time and temporal relations, namely, tense. For 
notice that the notions of earlier than and later than are tenseless notions. If one 
moment is ten years earlier than another, it is always true that it ten years earlier 
than it. But now note that if one moment is, say, earlier than another, then the facts 
that occur at the first can be described as having happened from the point of the 
view of the second, and the facts that occur at the second as such that they will 
happen from the point of view of the first. But given that neither of the two moments 
are in a priviliged position with regard to each other (they are simply two points on a 
line, which itself has no intrinsic direction), why is there such an asymmetry here? 
Why can’t the events at the second moment, for example, be described as having 
happened from the point of view of the first? Simply laying events out on a line gives 
us no asymmetry. Only the movement of time from future to past does. For these 
reasons, it is rational to seek out for the answers to the questions such as why these 
relations which do not possess any tense should be considered ‘earlier than’ or ‘later 
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than’; and why the B-theorist even regards these so labelled relations as temporal if 
they are tenseless.  
I endorse the above line of argument against the B-theory. However, it is 
crucial to note that although this line of argument tells agains the B-theory, it is not 
therefore automatically an argument in favour of the A-theory. This is because it still 
needs to be shown that the A-theoriest can themselves offer an adequate account of 
the asymmetry of the B-relations and so of the direction of time. It does, at first, 
seem that A-theorists can do this quite easily, in the following way: They can 
maintain that it is the objective flow of time that gives us an asymmetry. If one 
moment is earlier than another, this is because the first event was present whilst the 
second was future, and became past before the first became present. It thus seems 
they can explain why the events that occured at the first moment have happened 
from the perspective of the second and not vice versa. As Craig puts it: 
[T]he obtaining of the temporal relations earlier than/later than among 
temporal particulars can be derived from the objectivity of [A-properties] and 
the A-series. (Craig, 2000:150) 
This is to agree with what McTaggart (1968: 30) claims, that both the A-series and 
the B-series should be considered crucial to the existence of time, yet the B-series is 
to some extent dependent on the A-series. Indeed, McTaggart himself also says, the 
relation earlier than can be said to be definable in terms of the A-series:  
The term P is earlier than the term Q, if it is ever past while Q is present, or 
present while Q is future.’ (McTaggart, 1968: 271) 
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However, we cannot rest content with this line of argument, because there are 
serious problems with these kinds of definition. Put briefly, the trouble is that they 
rely upon our already having an account of tense. Consider, for example, what was 
said above once more, paying close attention to the italicised words: If one moment 
is earlier than another, this is because the first event was present whilst the second 
was future, and became past before the first became present. The italicised words 
express tenses. And so, it seems, the A-theory must assume that we can make 
sense of tense independently of the A-properties themselves. A similar problem is 
faced by McTaggart’s definition, which only makes sense if we read the ‘is’ contained 
within it as expressing the present tense. 
 I consider whether this difficulty can be overcome in the next three sections, 
and argue that it can. My starting point will be with the surprising fact that the B-
theorist D.H. Mellor himself seems not to recognise this difficulty for the A-theory. He 
says: 
The A series could easily distinguish earlier and later. To be earlier is to be 
more past or less future, to be later is to be more future or less past. 
Specifically, e is earlier than e* if e is sometime present when e* is future and 
sometime past when e* is present, whereas e* is never present when e is 
future or past when e is present. Earlier and later are clearly definable by the 
order in which things, events and dates cease to be future and become first 
present and then past; and the difference between them is that everything 
moves from future to past, not vice versa. (Mellor, 1981: 140) 
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Note, however, that Mellor here uses three different way of defining the B-relations in 
terms of A-properties. He seems to present these definitions as equivalent, but it is 
not clear that they are. But, at any rate, perhaps his thought is that at least one of 
these definitions overcomes the problem of assuming that we can make sense of 
tense independently of the A-properties themselves. Now, in fact, by drawing upon 
work by Craig (2000) I will argue that this in fact true. But, Mellor himself says no 
more than the above, and objections to his definitions can be found in the work of 
Gale (1966) and Oaklander (1987, 1996). So, as Craig himself notes, whether or not 
Mellor thinks his definitions do in fact overcome the problem, this fact cannot be 
merely assumed, but must be shown. And so we must say more than Mellor himself 
does. It is this that I turn to in the next three sections. 
Section 4: Defining the asymmetry of B-relations in terms of A-
properties: Mellor’s first definition 
Before I begin considering Mellor’s three definitions, and the objections that have 
been raised against them, I wish to clarify one thing. Above I said that the three 
definitions may be considered equivalent by Mellor, but didn’t answer whether they 
are or not. I do not, in fact, intend to discuss this at all. My strategy is to consider 
each of the definitions as if they are different from one another. However, different 
objections have been raised to each, and I will treat any successful objection to one 
of them as showing all of the definitions fail. That is, I will assume that if a successful 
objection can be made to one of the definitions, then the objection will carry across 
to all. This strategy is legitimate here because I will show that each of the objections 
in fact fails. So, in effect, I set a high bar for my defence of the view that we can 
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define B-relations in terms of A-properties. If it turns out that the objection to one of 
the definitions does not in fact carry across to the others, this is all well and good for 
my defence. But we do no harm by assuming each objection does carry across, if, as 
I do, we reject each of them. 
 With that explanation in place, then, I turn to Mellor’s first definition. Craig, in 
discussing this issue, calls this definition “D1”: 
D1 
to be earlier than = df. To be more past or less future than 
to be later than = df. To be more future or less past than 
(Craig, 2000:151) 
This characterization, according to Craig (2000: 152), entails that there is a 
restriction on the A-properties in this context, i.e. that they can only be attributed to 
relata in a tensed way. That is to say, to say that one event is more past or less 
future than another is equivalent to saying that, if one can get reference to the 
absolute present, then one can can say that the first is earlier than the second. That 
is, we must already presume that there is a privileged present if this definition is to 
work, which is to say we must already presume we can make sense of present tense 
utterences independently of our understanding of the A-properties. As such, 
according to this definition, if one cannot find a proper tenseless truth-bearers for the 
proposition, then the tenseless proposition ‘one event e is earlier than the other 
event e*’ does not really express the same meaning as the proposition ‘one event e 
is more past or less future than the other event e*’ in a present-tensed sense. 
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However, what Craig goes on to argue is that the way one analyses D1 should 
not be as offering a definition of the earlier than or later than relations, in the sense 
of providing the meaning of the terms, but rather, one should read D1 as offering a 
reductive analysis of the earlier than or later than relations in terms of A-properties. 
Furthermore, according to Craig (2000: 152), that the A-relations more past/future 
than and less past/future than can be truly and presently ascribed is a sufficient 
condition for the relations earlier than/later than to be truly and tenselessly ascribed. 
In other words, the proposition ‘e is more past/less future than e*’ being presently 
true is a sufficient condition for the proposition ‘e is earlier than e*’ to be tenseless 
true. As stated by Craig (2000: 152), these two definitions do not provide any 
evidence for one to figure out what the tense of e or e* is, as there are various 
combinations of different tenses that each event could possess. For example, event 
e could be present while the event e* is past. For this reason, Craig offers a modified 
version of D1, which is named D1’, and goes as below: 
D1’ 
e is earlier than e* = e is more past or less future than e* 
e is later than e* = e is more future or less past then e* (Craig, 2000: 153) 
Regarding D1’, Craig (2000:153) argues that considering there are disjunctions 
contained in the right part of the equivalences, it is not possible for the A-properties 
to be considered as something that is ontologically derived from earlier than/later 
than relations, given there are no necessary associations between these 
equivalences and A-properties. Yet, temporal relations exist if and only if the tenses 
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are genuine. As such, he argues, the only explanation the B-relations are reducible 
to A-properties.. 
However, there is a further objection at this point, due to Gale (1968). With 
regard to this explanation of the equivalences, Gale claims that such an explanation 
trivializes the view that B-relations are reducible to A-properties. To be more specific 
as to his argument against this, Gale first introduces the notions of ‘a pure A-series’ 
and ‘an impure A-series’ and distinguishes one from the other: the former is ‘a series 
which is determined only by unqualified [A-properties]’ (Gale, 1968: 93); while the 
latter is ‘a series which is also determined by the qualified [A-properties] more past 
and more future.’ (Gale, 1968: 93) With these notions proposed and differentiated, 
Gale then goes on to claim that rather than demonstrating properly that the B-
relations can be reduced to ‘a pure A-series’, D1’ only indicates that the B-relations 
are reducible to ‘an impure A-series’, therefore it makes the reduction from the B-
relations to the A-series trivial. 
What seems odd about Gale’s accusation is the distinction between ‘a pure A-
series’ and ‘an impure A-series’ that Gale draws in order to claim that it trivializes the 
reduction from B-relations to A-properties. According to Gale (1968: 93), a pure A-
series has three different components, namely, the unqualified past, present, and the 
future. However, according to the A-theorist, the A-series is formed of countless 
tensed positions, such as ‘ten years from now’, ‘three minutes from now’, ‘a second 
ago’, and ‘two days ago’, etc. It seems that what Gale calls ‘an impure A-series’ just 
is the A-series, and so the reason for calling it ‘impure’ is not clear and therefore 
unnecessary. As a consequence, the notion of ‘a pure A-series’ appears to be as 
suspicious as the impure.  
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If the distinction between the two versions of A-series is not proved legitimate, 
then it is necessary to offer some justification for the claim that this analysis 
trivializes the reducibility from the B-relations to the A-properties. In response to this 
enquiry, Gale (1968: 99) claims that the true A-properties are only past, present, and 
future; and that the A-properties such as ‘more past than’ and ‘more future than’ 
seem to be reducible properties. However, such reply does not make Gale’s 
complaint less vague, as there are several questions that arise immediately. For 
example, one can ask, even if others notions are reducible, why should one regard 
the A-properties other than ‘past, present and future’ as illegitimate’? One can also 
ask what expressions should be used to locate any events in the A-series and to 
show tensed facts, if nothing other than past, present and future is legitimate? The 
issue with Gale’s understanding of the equivalences is that he thinks that the A-
properties such as ‘more future than’ and ‘more past than’ might be an alternative but 
covert way of talking direct about ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’, which are B-relations. 
But, as Craig makes clear, ‘more future than is an A-relation which is ascribed 
absolutely: e is not more future than e* at some time t; rather e is more future than e 
*, period.’ (Craig, 2000: 154) Therefore, Gale’s concern can be rejected, and unless 
there is any other objection to Mellor’s definition (modified as Craig suggests) then 
we can endorse it. 
Section 5: Defining the asymmetry of B-relations in terms of A-
properties: Mellor’s second definition 
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As I have said, I am supposing that an objection to one of Mellor’s other definitions 
would count as an objection to all, so I now turn to his second definition and consider 
the objections that have been made to it. 
The second definition Mellor offers is different from D1’ in terms of the fact 
that rather than ascribing A-properties absolutely, this version attributes A-properies, 
relative to a specific time. And this version, which Craig calls “D2” is as follows 
D2 
e is earlier than e* = df. when e is present e* is future, and when e* is present 
e is past; and when e is present e* is not past and when e is future e* is not 
present 
e is later than e* = df. When e* is present e is future, and when e is present e* 
is past; and when e* is present e is not past and when e* is future e is not 
present 
(Craig, 2000: 151 - 152) 
The first thing to be noticed, according to this second definition, is that the 
definiendum and the definiens are both tenseless in terms of their truth value, with 
which some philosophers disagree. Gale, for example, states that if the definiendum 
and the definiens make tenselessly true or false propositions, then this definition 
should be rejected, for it is circular.  
In reply to this objection, Craig (2000: 155 - 156) argues that despite the fact 
that Gale is right that the definiendum and the definiens make propositions 
tenselessly true and false, it does not necessarily result in that the A-properties 
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cannot be demonstrated in the definiens. Moreover, he claims that he is able to show 
this point by slightly changing the second definition: 
[T]he proposition ‘e is earlier than e*’ is defined in the way that ‘there is some 
time t such that at t ‘e is present’ and ‘e* is future’ are true’; likewise, the 
proposition ‘e is later than e*’ equals to the definition ‘there is some time t 
such that at t the propositions e is present and e* is past are true’. (Craig, 
2000: 155 - 156) 
If the propositions are defined this way, the definiens then certainly represents an 
irreducible A-property. What Craig intends to say here is that there is a fundamental 
misunderstanding in Gale’s grasp of this definition. That is that Gale mistakenly 
presumes that a tenselessly true proposition cannot involve an A-property. Craig’s 
point is simply that it can. Therefore, this second definition also faces no objection, 
and so we still have no reason to deny that B-relations (and so their asymmetry) 
cannot be defined in terms of A-properties. 
Section 6: Defining the asymmetry of B-relations in terms of A-
properties: Mellor’s third definition 
The third and last definition (D3) offered by Mellor contains tenseless propositions as 
to the existence of objective temporal becoming, it goes like this: 
D3 
e is earlier than e* = df. e ceases to be future and becomes present first, and 
e* ceases to be future and becomes present second; and e ceases to be 
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present and becomes past first, and e* ceases to be present and becomes 
past second 
e is later than e* = df. e* ceases to be future and becomes present first, and e 
ceases to be future and becomes present second; and e* ceases to be 
present and becomes past first, and e ceases to be present becomes past 
second 
(Craig, 2000: 152) 
As stated, this definition suggests that there are tenseless propositions which 
indicate objective temporal becoming and that are involved in the definition. In other 
worlds, if these propositions are true, then the fact that objective temporal becoming 
exists itself gives rise to the existence of asymmetrical but tenseless B-relations. 
However, Craig thinks that there should be a simplified version of this definition that 
is supposed to make it clearer, so he reformulates D3 as D3’ as follows: 
D3’ 
e is earlier than e* = e becomes present first and e* becomes present second 
e is later than e* = e* becomes present first and e becomes present second 
(Craig, 2000: 157) 
By offering this simplified version of D3, Mellor seems to be on the right track to 
explaining the B-relations through the tensed facts of the A-Theory. However, 
Oaklander (1996: 211) argues that the right hand side of the definition must appeal 
to B-relations itself, meaning that the B-relations are not themselves fully defined in 
terms of A-properties themselves, but rely upon a prior understanding of the B-
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relations. More specifically, he argues that there is a hidden appeal to temporal B-
relation between e and e* and the ‘first’ and ‘second’ in the definitions appear to 
cover such a relation up. He says this because he thinks that saying that one thing 
comes “first” and another “second” must be interpreted as meaning that the former 
comes before the latter. And thus, Oaklander claims, B-relations (understood 
asymmetrically) have been smuggled into this definition. 
 However, there is a simple reply to this, that Craig (2000: 157) once more 
makes clear. The reply is that the ordinal numbers within the definition, i.e. ‘first’ and 
‘second’, can be understood atemporally, and so need not be understood in terms of 
B-series relations. He says this because they have ‘multi measuring’ functions, which 
means that not only can they be used to describe temporal objects, but also can they 
describe abstract and spatial objects (which, obviously, do not have temporal 
relations holding between them). For this reason, the mere reason the definition 
invoked numbers does not mean it invokes B-series relations, and for this reason 
Oaklander’s objection to Mellor’s third definition can be rejected. 
This completes my discussion of whether we can define B-relations in terms 
of A-properties. I conclude that we can (or at least, no good reason has been given 
for thinking that we cannot). And so, I conclude that the A-theorist is better placed 
than the B-theorist in accounting for the asymmetry of the B-relations, and so in 
accounting for the direction and flow of time. In other words, I have argued that the B 
theorist needs to explain ‘why... so-called B-relations will still obtain among events 
once the detenser has robbed time of all [A-properties]’ (Craig, 2000: 157) and 
argued that they cannot, but that the A-theorist can. 
It is worth emphasising at this point that this conclusion is fully in line with that 
of McTaggart on this issue. Recall the descriptive statements given by McTaggart on 
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the A-series and the B-series, that the A-series is the essential feature of time, and 
that the B-series cannot exist without the A-series. What is more, since there can be 
no temporal series without the A-series, what is left is described as the C-series 
which, according to McTaggart (1908: 461 - 462), is an atemporal series of 
permanent relations. More precisely, there is a great deal of resemblance between 
the B-series and the C-series, not only the B-series and the C-series co-share all the 
events, but also the C-series have them in the exactly same order as arranged in the 
B-series. Despite being highly similar with each other, the C-series is not temporal, 
so the difference between the two series, defined by McTaggart (1908: 461 – 462), is 
that the content in the B-series is defined by genuine earlier than and later than, 
while the content in the C-series is ordered by something other than earlier than and 
later than relations, and this is why it cannot be considered a temporal series. What 
McTaggart (1968: 240) has in mind for the C-series to have is the relations described 
as ‘included in’ and ‘inclusive of’. By making this claim, McTaggart tries to prove that 
it is possible that the C-relations appear as earlier than and later than relations, and 
that C-series could lead to the B-series; but this is not possible, for the reason that it 
is clearly stated that the B-relations are not capable to exist without adding A-
properties to it. So, McTaggart concludes, in order to turn the C-series into the B-
series, we must also have A-properties. In effect, the discussion above demonstrates 
why this is so in greater detail. 
Section 7: Can the B-theorist deny there is a problem? 
At this point the B-theorist is still struggling to establish a theoretical base upon 
which he can claim that the B-relations suffice for the existence of time. However, 
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there is one response that we have not yet considered fully. That response is to 
simply deny that there is a problem here. It is open to the B-theorist to maintain that 
we can account for the flow and direction of time very simply in terms of the fact that 
human beings can discern it without the need of defining. We can look to Oaklander 
(1987: 17) again to make this point. He says that we do not require any 
demonstration of an actual direction to time, as the direction is given in our 
perceptions. If one event occurs before another, this just means that we perceive the 
first as happening first, and the second and happening second.  
     There is one simple comment to make about this. This is that it is somewhat 
ironic that the B theorist says that we can perceive the direction of time if it is not 
objective, intrinsic difference, because perception is usually taken to be veridical. If 
we perceive something as being the case, then it is the case independently of us. 
Oaklander does say that a ‘temporal relation of succession’ really does obtain (i.e. 
intrinsically and objectively) among the events, but that this is so seems to be equally 
baffling as the B-relations’ ability to obtain without the A-properties. So there really 
does seem to be a genuine problem for the B-theoriest to solve here. 
Section 8: Temporal Flow/Temporal Becoming: Illusion or Reality 
I have now gone through all three of Mellor’s definition over the relations ‘earlier 
than’ and ‘later than’ in terms of the A-Theory. Since these B-relations can be 
explained by the A-Theory and reduced into the A-properties, the debate upon the 
matter of spatializing time is now settled. Nevertheless, the B-theorists is a stubborn 
foe, and losing one argument is not really enough to stop them from arguing for the 
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other aspects of the B-Theory. In the next section, I will look into the B-theorist’s 
argument that, instead of being objective, temporal becoming exists dependently of 
human consciousness. (NB This is different to saying that we can perceive the 
direction, for unlike that claim, this claim does not suppose the difference is intrinsic 
to the timeline, i.e. “out there” to be discerned. Rather, our discerning of a direction is 
supposed to constitute it having that very direction.) 
Recall the B-theorist statement, according to Price (2011), that the A-theorist 
begs the question by assuming that our experiences of the flow of time are part of 
the features of nature while they are really not. In other words, the flow of time is only 
subjectively real and is not able to exist without experiencing subjects. Furthermore, 
in the absence of minds, there is no such thing as tensed facts or temporal 
becoming, the only thing that exists as time is the tenseless temporal relations. With 
regard to this claim, there are a number of important questions that have been 
brought up in order to justify the legitimacy of such account. For example, one might 
ask why it is possible for the B theorist to know that temporal becoming is only a 
mental ramification rather than a physical feature, or one might also ask whether the 
tenseless events exist as events of physical world, if that is the case, then whether 
temporal becoming should be seen as absent from both mental and physical worlds? 
All the questions are pressing for the B theorist, so what can they say? 
The B theorist starts his argument with the explanatory statement that 
‘temporal becoming exists in the mental realm, but is absent from physical 
reality.’ (Craig, 2000: 168) At first glance, this explanation could be legitimate, for it 
offers an account of the phenomenon of our perception of time. However, if one 
takes a closer look, it is not difficult to find that there are some significant problems 
with this view. For instance, it is explicit in this view that the reality of the experiences 
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of each and every one of us is divided into two different components by the B 
theorist, Firstly, our consciousness is supposed to itself exist temporally, i.e. to take 
place over time. Second, the world itself, within which our consciousness exists, is 
supposed to be a tenseless physical world. But to justify such separation of the 
reality of our temporal consciousness and the non-temporal physical world seems, 
on reflection, to make dubious sense. This separation of reality into the concious-
temporal and the physical-non-temporal is what Capek calls an ‘absurd dualism’. In 
order to explain Capek’s moniker, I appeal to Craig once more, and his example of 
two possible worlds. 
As described by Craig (2000: 168), we are to consider two possible worlds, 
one that involves only mental beings, which go through temporal becoming of 
consciousness; and the other is similar, but with some of its mental beings being 
embodied in physical form, say, human bodies, which exist tenselessly and do not 
experience temporal becoming. In the first possible world, since there is no physical 
being, it is safe to say that it is temporal becoming that defines the mental being in 
this world; and it demonstrates the contradiction of this separation by assuming the 
second possible world: 
The physical states of the body at some t tenseless induce mental states at t, 
but that time may not be present for the mind and so, as past or future, such 
states are non-existent. Conversely, the mind may will to cause a bodily 
movement now, but the effect is not produced now, but tenselessly, but then 
the effect exists even when the mind is not now producing it. (Craig, 2000: 
168) 
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This leads a discussion to Ferré’s criticism, expressed here by Grunbaum: 
Becoming is mind-dependent because it is not an attribute of physical events 
per se but requires the occurrence of certain conceptualized conscious 
experiences of occurrence of certain events. (Grünbaum, 1971:197) 
With regard to this statement Craig gives his comments and addresses a few issues, 
and among those issues, there are two concerns with this B theorist claim that are 
noteworthy. The first is the issue of temporal location and that of transiency. 
If time consists of only tenseless events arranged in a earlier than/later than 
relations, then the B-theorist is obliged to explain why one has constant perception of 
a dynamic temporal position. Let us call this constant perception ‘now-awareness’. 
For example: imagine there are two temporal events that happen at different 
moments, m1 and m2. One’s perception of time as the event at m1 happens is 
different from the same person’s perception at m2. Obviously, one’s now-awareness 
at m1 is different from the now-awareness at m2. However, according to the B-
Theory, all temporal events exist tenselessly, for this reason one’s now-awareness at 
m1 is supposed to be the same as it at m2. In other words, if one adopted the B-
theorist view about this, then it would cause a great deal of confusion as to the 
temporal locations of these events because the now-awareness of them are the 
same. Baker (1975: 230) replies to this inquiry in favour of the B-Theory by claiming 
that there is a simultaneity class of events associated with every temporal position, 
and one’s now-awareness should be considered as part of this simultaneity class. 
That is to say, one’s now-awareness at m1 is determined by the simultaneity of class 
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at m1, and due to the simultaneity of class at m1, one’s now-awareness at m1 cannot 
be perceived at m2. 
On the face of it, this reply seems reasonable and does explain why one has 
the now-awareness at m1 that is specifically associated with m1 rather than m2. Be 
that as it may, such a reply is only legitimate when the precondition is that every 
now-awareness at every moment must exist tenselessly and there is no temporal 
dynamics whatsoever between these now-awarenesses. With that being said, this 
reply turns out to be unsatisfying if one asks why one should not have the now-
awareness of (say) m1 simpliciter, given everything is tenseless. When one is having 
an awarenes of m1 it seems there is something special about this now-awareness 
compared to a now-awareness that one is not having (say, the now-awareness of 
m2). But what can make this special? The answerm, it seems, can only be that when 
one is having the now-awareness of m1, that m1 is present but m2 is not. 
The above point can be pressed further. If one has a now awareness of m1, 
when that it present, and then has a now-awareness of m2 when that is present, this 
entails that there is a transformation within the now-awarenesses at different 
moments. But the B-theorist cannot make sense of this transition, for they cannot 
allow that it takes place due to the flow of time from m1 to m2. But, without being 
able to offer such an answer, they can offer no answer at all. 
The other problem with the mind-dependence view is on the matter of 
ordering in transiency. On the thesis of mind-dependence proposed by Grünbaum, 
the ‘past, present and future status of events is not determined by any simple 
characteristics of sensations associated with it.’ (Baker, 1979: 348) This assertion 
implies that it does not necessarily require a specific order for different now-
awarenesses to be perceived in the tenseless world of the B-Theory. If this is the 
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case, then this implication directly causes a problem for the B-theorist. The problem 
is that, technically speaking, one should be able to experience any now-awareness 
at any random temporal position without a temporal ordering which arranges the 
sequence of one’s now-awareness, which is obviously dubious. However, Baker 
offers a reply, saying that there is a tenseless B-series that determines the order of 
one’s now-awarenesses, and such a series is supposed to be associated with the 
series of one’s physical states: 
[T]he order of those mental events which constitute awareness of physical 
events depends on the order of the physical events which cause them 
together with the distances and velocities of the influence chains reaching the 
percipient. (Baker, 1975: 225) 
Again, the assumption made here is that a tenseless B-series determines the 
sequence of one’s now-awarenesses, which are in close in association with the 
series of one’s physical states. Yet, Baker still owes the opponent of the B-Theory an 
explanation why it should be the case that the now-awarenesses at random temporal 
position correlated with one’s physical states is tenseless, rather than successively 
present. As a consequence, the B-theorist’s response to the problem of transiency is 
also unsatisfying. 
At this point I have gone through the noteworthy views and comments in 
terms of mind-dependence of becoming, and the B-theorist has not provided any 
adequate evidence to prove that temporal becoming exists only in the mental 
sphere. So far, I have found the explanations wanting. 
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The argument for mind-dependence of becoming is one approach the B-
theorist attempts to get through, and it has failed. However, there is one other 
approach the B-theorist has choosen to adopt for mind-dependence of becoming, 
and that is to reject the becoming of mental states. However, in my opinion, this 
strategy is invented out of desperation, as it claims not only that the objective flow of 
time is an illustion, but also that the apparent flow of time (i.e. in our experiences) is 
also an illusion. Consider one such philosopher, J.J. C. Smart, who has defended 
this approach. He says: 
Now most people do seem to be subject to the metaphysical illusion of an 
absurdity (flow of time, advance through time)... However, the description of 
this absurdity need not itself be done absurdly: the illusion of the septic sort of 
change may involve change, i.e., the sort of change that can be described 
four-dimensionally in terms of non-similarities of time-slices of the brain of the 
metaphysician who has the illusion of time flow. (1972: 11) 
This claim goes completely against the recognised facts of lived human experience. 
We are supposed to think that, rather than being a persisting single agent who 
experiences things, there are in fact a series of experiences had by different times 
slices of an agent. These time slices each have their own non-temporal experiences, 
but they each somehow fall into the illusion of thinking those seperate experiences 
are experiences of one thing that they take themselves to be (but are not), and so fall 
into the illusion of thinking that they are undergoing a single changing flow of 
experience (when they are not). This, I submit, is absurd. I don’t know quite how to 
argue for this absurdity, because it seems to me such an egegious error that it is 
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hard to say anything more than: this cannot be right. Perhaps the following quote 
from Eddington, who agrees with me on this matter, helps here: 
If I grasp the notion of existence because I myself exist, I grasp the notion of 
becoming because I myself become. (Eddington, 1964: 102 - 103) 
That is to say, our mental states, as an essential part of our existence, should be 
regarded as undergoing temporal becoming. That they do so seems to be such a 
central feature of our existence and experience that we simply cannot be mistaken 
about this fact, i.e. the fact that experience itself is subject to temporal becoming. 
That is, it would be too much of an ontological price to pay to deny mental becoming. 
Despite this, the B-theorist carries on his argument against this primary component 
of our existence, and the point he intends to argue for is, according to Grünbaum 
(173: 315 - 316), that it is true that there exists a diversity of the now-contents that is 
through consciousness, and the order of these now-contents is temporally arranged, 
but this does not suggest that there should be awareness of becoming or orientation 
of time that determine these now-contents to be perceived through consciousness. 
Furthermore, Grünbaum believes that not only do we have a continuum of states of 
awareness, but also have we an instant awareness of succession, which, according 
to Grünbaum, is an important component of the definition of now: 
 [T]he now-content, when viewed as such in awareness, includes an 
awareness of the order of succession of events in which the occurrence of 
that awareness constitutes a distinguished element’ (Grünbaum, 1973: 325)  
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All this is rather difficult to understand, and the B-theorist seems to be committing 
themselves to rather obscure positions in order to defend their view. That is, despite 
this attempt at clarificaiotn, it is still difficult to understand the B-theorist’s statement 
as to what mental becoming is, given that it is supposed to be happening tenselessly 
at instants. It is also unclear, why the B-theorist should want to defend this view, 
given how incredible it is, i.e. that mental becoming is just an illusion as we exist 
through time. What seems surprising to me is that, as a B-theorist, Grünbaum 
actually acknowledges the nowness of experience, as he states: 
...nowness of an event requires conceptual awareness of the presentational 
immediacy of either the experience of the event or...of the experience of 
another event simultaneous with it. (1971: 206) 
According to this description, Grünbaum explicitly accepts the notion of ‘the 
presentational immediacy of experience’, however, it is very odd that he does not 
really provide any explanation of how he, as a B-theorist, understands this concept. 
What is more, another comment on this matter made by Craig is that the way 
Grünbaum argues for the mind-dependence of becoming actually seems to entail 
that temporal becoming actually exists in mental states. As Craig puts it Grünbaum’s 
view is that: 
[T]he notion of an event’s occurring now is made in terms of its simultaneity 
with a sentient subject’s experiencing the event while being aware that he is 
experiencing the event. (Craig, 2000: 173) 
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The problem with it is that it makes explicit use of the present tense. If one reads this 
tenselessly, we get the problem that all events would be occuring now. It seems 
impossible that Grünbaum’s view can do a good job justifying the mind-dependence 
of becoming, given such an view can only be understood in tensed terms. Since the 
purpose of the view is to address what makes a specific event, say e, to be present, 
Grunbaum must avoid presupposing that one is (i.e. understood in the present 
tense) experiencing event e. For if he does presuppose this, being present is 
definitely more than just an illusion. However, Grunbaum does not avoid this 
difficulty, and nothing he says explains how it can be avoided. I think we can thus 
conclude that unless more is said, B-theorists cannot account for the idea that our 
experience of the flow of time is nothing but an apparent experience. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the A-theoriest can account for the flow of time, by 
explaining the direction of time and the asymmetry of the B-series. I have also 
argued that the B-theoriest cannot easily do this, and cannot account for the nature 
of our termporal experiences in any other plausible way. I do not claim that I have 
covered every possible response that the B-theorist could make here. But I believe I 
have made it plausible that the B-theorist faces considerable difficulties, and would 
have to adopt a less satisfying view if they were to maintain their position. Thus, 
unless there is good reason to think the A-theory fares worse when explaining other 
aspects of time, we have good reason to consider the A-theory to be true. In the next 
chapter I turn to another such aspect of time that I think is crucial - that of 
persistence over time. I argue that the A-theorist fares better here too, and so argue 
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that the combined weight of the conclusion of this chapter and the next mean we 
should reject the B-theory altogether. 
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Chapter 3 
Against the B-theory [Part 2] 
Introduction 
Despite the fact I have demonstrated in the last chapter that the B-theory is more 
implausible than the A-theory with regard to the issue of the flow of time, this does 
not show that the B-theory must be rejected. It still may be that the B-theory has 
some major advantages in other respects. In this chapter I examine what I consider 
to be the other major aspect of temporality that any adequate theory of time must 
account for, namely, the persistence over time of material objects. I argue that in this 
respect too, the A-theory is more plausible than the B-theory. And this, combined 
with the result of the previous chapter, thus gives us a sufficient reason for rejecting 
the B-theory in favour of the A-theory. 
In more detail, the two theories about persistence over time I discuss in this 
chapter are called ‘endurantism’ and ‘perdurantism’. Each of these theories offers us 
an analysis of how physical objects exist in a temporal sense. In this chapter I 
investigate these two theories, argue that we ought to accept endurantism, and 
argue that the B-theory is incompatible with that view. And so, I argue, in 
combination with the conclusion from the last chapter, we should reject the B-theory 
outright. 
Specifically, then, the structure of this chapter is as follows: In section 1 I 
introduce perdurantism and endurantism. In section 2 I then offer a positive 
argument for endurantism. In section 3 I consider the problem of temporary 
intrinsics, which some have argued necessitates that we in fact accept perdurantism 
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over endurantism. In section 4 I argue that we can reject this claim by accepting an 
endurantist solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. Finally, in section 5, 
drawing upon the discussion in the previous sections, I argue that the B-theory is 
incompatible with endurantism, and so conclude that it should be rejected outright. 
Section 1: Endurantism vs. Perdurantism 
I begin, then, with a brief overview of the two positions themselves. 
Endurantism is the view that objects exist wholly and completely at each time 
that they exist. This means that if an object x exists at any two times t1 and t2, then x 
is wholly present at t1 (there are no temporal parts of that object that do not exist 
then) and is wholly present at t2 (there are no temporal parts that do not exist then 
either). It also means that if an object x that exists at t1 and an object y exists at t2, 
then if x and y are in fact the same object, then x and y are literally numerically 
identical - x and y are literally one thing, and not two. To illustrate, consider a table 
that exists at t1. Suppose it is sanded down and painted red. As doing these things 
does not destroy the table it will survive to t2. If we label the table that exists at t1 
“T1” and the table that exists at t2 “T2”, endurantism has it that T1 just is one and the 
same thing as T2 even though T1 and T2 have different properties. And so, 
endurantism also entails that objects can remain literally identical over time despite 
undergoing a change in properties. 
Perdurantism, by contrast, is the view that objects do not exist identically over 
time in a literal sense. On this view, objects have temporal parts that exist at different 
times, and a single persisting object is made up from the sum of its temporal parts. 
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As such, if an object x exists at t1 and t2, it does so by having a temporal part of it 
that exists at t1 and a temporal part of it that exists at t2. Thus, the things that exist 
at t1 and t2 are not themselves literally identical. Instead they are merely parts of 
some extended thing, and it is the whole extended thing only that can be said to be 
literally identical with itself. Consider the table again. According to perdurantism, T1 
at t1 is not the same thing as T2 at t2. Indeed, T1 and T2 are not themselves tables. 
Rather they are parts of some larger temporally extended object that is a table. And 
so, perfurantism also entails that objects cannot literally exist identically over time 
despite undergoing changes. Rather, one object can be replaced by another with 
different properties, but these two objects can be part of some whole. 
Section 2: An Argument for Endurantism 
In this section I wish to offer a novel argument in favour of endurantism that is based 
upon considerations touched upon in the last chapter when discussing mental 
becoming. There I argued, in effect, that we ought to take it as a datum that we, as 
mental beings, exist identically over time and undergo changes in our experiences. I 
linked this idea there with the idea that there must be a flow of time within our 
experiences. But here I wish to put the issue of the flow of time to one side, and 
instead consider what this entails for our existence, as mental beings, over time. 
 Before I give my argument, I first want to make clear that I am not here 
adopting a dualist viewpoint (nor am I denying it). That is, when I describe us as 
being ‘mental beings’ I do not mean to suggest that we are not also physical beings, 
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and so that description is to be taken as being wholly compatible with the idea that 
our mental states supervene upon our physical states. 
 With the above said, then, what does it mean to say that we are mental 
beings that exist identically over time and undergo changes in our experiences? Is 
this compatible with the idea that do not literally exist identically over time as mental 
beings, but are rather made up from a series of time-slices (i.e. temporal parts) as 
the perdurantism maintains? I think it is not. As I said in the previous chapter, if we 
were in fact made up of such time-slices, we would be suffering a grand illusion in 
thinking of ourselves as being a single being that undergoes changes in our 
experiences. For on the perdurantist view we are not such beings. Instead we are 
many mental beings, one replacing the next, and each has its own mental 
experiences that are entirely seperate from the next. The mental experiences of 
these distinct beings are related by so-called links of memory and continuity, but all 
this means is that their experiences have some overlap in their content and are 
similar to each other in various respects. But this destroys our ordinary conception of 
ourselves entirely. On this view, each of us at any moment is as seperate, mentally 
speaking, from “ourselves” at any another moment as we are from each other. And 
this, I think, is an absurd view. 
To see what I mean by the above in more detail, and to see how implausible 
this perdurantist view is a consequence, consider what a person is once more, 
according to perdurantism. A person is a series of independent objects, person-
stages, that have their own experiences and are related to each other in various 
ways. Now, let us suppose that we can take each of the person-stages that make up 
a person over time, and let us now suppose that instead of having them arranged 
over time, we instead have them arranged across space at a single time. That is, 
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suppose we have what the perdurantist considers to be a “whole person” (i.e. all the 
different person-slices that make up a person) all stood next to each other in a long 
line. All of these person-stage, being more-or-less instantaneously existing things, 
exist for a mere instant, stood next to each other, and then go out of existence. It 
would be, on the perdurantist view, that we have a whole life occuring at one 
moment. 
If we arrange our person-slices in the order that they would have had were 
they to be arranged over time, putting the earliest stages on the left and the latest 
stages on the right, then each of the beings (except the leftmost) would seem to 
“remember” being the beings to their left. They would talk about their “past” and 
“future”, and consider the other beings in the line as “being them” in the past and the 
future. But despite this, it seems clear, each of these beings is radically mistaken. 
None of them has any past, and none of them has any future. Each is a mere 
instantaneous thing, and mistakenly believes that the other beings in the line are 
“them”. Their so-called “memories” are not memories at all, but illusions of 
memories. What they seem to remember never happened to them at all. Instead 
what they seem to remember is happening in another, entirely seperate sphere of 
consciousness, somewhere down the line to their left. 
So, the line of seperate experiencing beings, it seems to me, is obviously not 
a single person at all, but a long line of deranged beings with false beliefs about 
themselves, their past, and their futures. But now consider that if perdurantism is 
right, this is what we all are. It does not matter that the other temporal slices of us 
exist at different times rather than right now in different spatial locations, because we 
are just as distinct and just as seperate from those other slices as we would be if 
they did exist right now. And so, if perdurantism is right, none of us has a past or a 
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future either, and each of us, at each moment, is a deranged instantaneous being 
with false beliefs about ourselves, our futures, and our pasts. 
For the above reason, then, I think perdurantism is absurd. Although it is true 
that this absurd consequence only occurs for experiencing beings like ourselves, and 
not for ordinary material objects like tables and chairs, it nevertheless has this 
consequence for experiencing beings like ourselves, and so should be rejected. 
Endurantism, on the other hand, fits perfectly with how we consider ourselves to be. 
According to endurantism, each of us exists literally identically over time, so that one 
and the same subject has each of the experiences we undergo during our lives. We 
can rightly consider ourselves as having a past and a future, for we, the very thing 
that is now experiencing the present moment, also experienced past moments, and 
will experience future moments. We are not merely related to certain distinct past 
and future beings in virtue of having experiences that are similar to theirs in certain 
respects and overlap in their contents - we literally had and will have those very 
experiences with those very contents. None of us is deranged. Each of us had a 
past, and each of us has a future. 
Now, I think the above argument is a very strong one indeed for believing 
endurantism. But, I do not think it is absolutely conclusive. It may still be that 
endurantism can be shown to be somehow incoherent, and we may be forced to 
admit that we are, in fact, deranged, as perdurantism entails. I now turn to what is 
usually considered to be the main positive argument in favour of perdurantism. It has 
been supposed to show that endurantism itself must be rejected. I, however, will 
argue that it is a weak argument and, in light of the above argument, gives us no 
reason at all to reject endurantism. 
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Section 3: The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics 
The problem of temporary intrinsics was put forward by Lewis in order to defend 
perdurantism. According to him, the only solution to the problem is to adopt 
perdurantism and reject endurantism. An intrinsic property is supposed to be a 
property that an object has in virtue of how it is in itself and not in virtue of any other 
thing. A paradigm example of an intrinsic property is supposed to be its shape (e.g. 
being triangular) - objects have their shape purely in virtue of how they are in 
themselves (however, as we will see, the problem of temporary intrinsics puts 
pressure on this example being correct). By contrast, being a brother is supposed to 
be an extrinsic or relational property, because an object is a brother only in virtue of 
the existence of some other thing, namely, a male sibling of the object in question. 
The problem of temporary intrinsics itself is one of how to account for the possibility 
of the intrinsic properties of an object changing over time. For example, when a 
person drives a car, the shape of this person is bent; but when he stands next to the 
car, the shape of this person is straight. In the light of this example, this person 
possesses different intrinsic properties at different times, he has the property of 
being bent when he drives the car at one time, and has the property of being straight 
when he stands straight outside the car at another. What Lewis tries to achieve by 
presenting the problem of temporary intrinsics is to clarify how the change of these 
properties possibly takes place. One might think this is not much of a problem. But, 
once one realises that intrinsic properties are often incompatible with each other, and 
when a being changes in its intrinsic properties it can come to have an intrinsic 
property that is incompatible with the one it had before whilst remaining one and the 
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same thing as itself, it becomes one. To see why consider the following argument 
(adapted from Merricks, 1994: p168): 
The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics 
1. O at t is identical with O at t* [assume for reductio] 
2. O at t is bent. [premiss] 
3. O at t* is straight. [premiss] 
4. If O at t is identical with O at t*, then O at t is F iff O at t* is F. 
[Indiscernibility of Identicals] 
5. Therefore, O at t is bent and straight. [RAA, (1), (2), (3), (4)] 
The conclusion here serves to complete the reductio because being bent and being 
straight are incompatible intrinsic properties, and it is obviously impossible for an 
object to have two incompatible intrinsic properties. In order to deal with this 
contradiction, Lewis introduces three solutions that involve different approaches to 
the problem. He explicitly rejects the first two and accepts the third, which is to 
accept perdurantism. In what follows I go through them one at a time. But, I start with 
Lewis’s second solution first, for reasons that will become clear: 
Lewis’s second solution: 
Second solution: the only intrinsic properties of a thing are those it has at the 
present moment. Other times are like false stories; they are abstract 
representations, composed out of the materials of the present, which 
represent or misrepresent the way things are. When something has different 
intrinsic properties according to one of these ersatz other times, that does not 
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mean that it, or any part of it, or anything else, just has them - no more so 
than when a man is crooked according to the Times, or honest according to 
the News. This is a solution that rejects endurance; because it rejects 
persistence altogether. And it is even less credible than the first solution. In 
saying that there are no other times, as opposed to false representations 
thereof, it goes against what we all believe. No man, unless it be at the 
moment of his execution, believes that he has no future; still less does anyone 
believe that he has no past. (Lewis, 1986: 204) 
In giving this solution Lewis has in mind the presentist position. If presentism is true, 
then there are no other times at all, and so as objects exist only in the present, if they 
go from being bent to being stright, they are then straight, but there is no longer any 
time at which they are bent. (Interestingly, Lewis seems to suggest here something 
like the ersatzer presentist view which was discussed in chapter 1, many years 
before Craig Bourne defended it.) Now, I actually find Lewis’s remarks here to be too 
strong, for he seems to want to paint presentism as the view that persistence itself is 
impossible on the presentist view, and rejects the solution for this reason. But, 
clearly, his argument for this is far too quick here. From what he says it is far from 
clear that one cannot believe that one has past and a future if one is a presentist, as 
one will be right in believing that one did exist and that one will exist in the future. 
And, in fact, the presentist solution need not turn on the fact that other times are like 
‘false stories’, but instead on the idea that we must pay close attention to tense in 
our statement of the problem of temporary intrinsics argument. That is, we can re-
write the argument as follows (here, the ‘is’ is to be read throughout as expressing 
the present tense): 
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1. O existed at t and is identical with O that exists at t* (i.e. now) [assume for 
reductio] 
2. O at t was bent. [premiss] 
3. O at t* is straight. [premiss] 
4. If O existed at t and is identical with O that exists at t*, then O that existed 
at t was F, is F or will be F iff O that exists at t* was F, is F, or will be F. 
[Indiscernibility of Identicals] 
5. Therefore, O that existed at t is, was, or will be bent and was, is, or will be 
straight. [(1), (2), (3), (4)] 
But here, with addition of tense, 5 is perfectly possible, and there is no absurdity. 
However, be this as it may, I have already rejected presentism for independent 
reasons, and so I consider this solution no further. 
I now consider Lewis’s first solution, which I find far more plausible (although 
Lewis himself does not): 
Lewis’s first solution: 
[C]ontrary to what we might think, shapes are not genuine intrinsic properties. 
They are disguised relations, which an enduring thing may bear to times. One 
and the same enduring thing may bear the bent-shape relation to some times, 
and the straight-shape relation to others. In itself, considered apart from its 
relations to other things, it has no shape at all. And likewise for all other 
seeming temporary intrinsics; all of them must be reinterpreted as relations 
that something with an absolutely unchanging intrinsic nature bears to 
different times. The solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics is that there 
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aren’t any temporary intrinsics. This is simply incredible, if we are speaking of 
the presence of ordinary things.... if we know what shape is, we know that it is 
a property, not a relation. (Lewis, 1986: 204) 
As stated above, the core idea of this solution is to reject that shapes (and all other 
intrinsic properties that can be possessed at one time but not another) are in fact 
intrinsic properties, and instead affirm that they are relational properties, i.e. relations 
between objects and times. Thus, according to this solution a thing can change in its 
intrinsic properties over time by coming to bear a different relation to a different time. 
In the case of O in the argument stated, O bears the being-bent-at relation to t when 
he is driving his car at t, and then O bears the being-straight-at relation to t* when he 
is standing next to his car at t*. The idea is that, contrary to what we might think, O 
stays exactly the same intrinsically during this change, and that what changes is O’s 
relations to the times he exists at, therefore, intrinsic properties are not intrinsic but 
are instead a matter of the relation occurring between objects and specific times. 
What is rejected then, on this solution, is premises 2 and 3 of the problem of 
temporary intrinsics argument. In terms of that argument we can say: 
1. O at t is identical with O at t* [assume for reductio] 
2. O bears the being-bent-at relation to t. [premiss] 
3. O bears the being-straight-at relation to t* [premiss] 
4. If O at t is identical with O at t*, then O at t bears relation R to x iff O at t* 
bears relation R to x. [Indiscernibility of Identicals] 
5. Therefore, O at t bears the being-bent-at relation to t and the being-straight-
at relation to t*. [(1), (2), (3), (4)] 
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But here, 5 is perfectly possible, and not an absurdity, so we have a solution to the 
problem. Of course, Lewis himself rejects this solution. We will return to his rejection 
later. For now, I press on with the final third solution that Lewis endorses: 
Lewis’s third solution: 
Third solution: the different shapes, and the different temporary intrinsics 
generally, belong to different things. Endurance is to be rejected in favour of 
perdurance. We perdure; we are made up of temporal parts, and our 
temporary intrinsics are properties of these parts, wherein they differ one from 
another. There is no problem at all about how different things can differ in their 
intrinsic properties. (Lewis, 1986: 204) 
The perdurantist solution is clear. Things cannot literally undergo a change in their 
intrinsic properties - that is, one and the same thing cannot itself possess one 
intrinsic property at one time and another at another. Instead, one thing can possess 
an intrinsic property at one time, and another can possess another intrinsic property 
at another time, and these two things can be related to each other in various ways so 
that they are to be considered parts of some whole that contains both of these 
things. So, in this case, O at t is not literally identical with O at t*. Rather, O at t is 
one thing, and O at t* is another. And so here what is rejected is premise 1 of the 
problem of temporary intrinsic argument. Instead of saying that O at t is identical with 
O at t*, the perdurantist says that O at t and O at t* are parts of some whole. So, in 
terms of the argument we can say: 
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1. O at t and O at t* are part of some whole W [assume for reductio] 
2. 2. O at t is bent. [premiss] 
3. O at t* is straight. [premiss] 
4. If O at t and O at t* are part of some whole W then W has a part at t that is 
bent and a part at t* that is straight. [premiss] 
5. W has a part at t that is bent and a part at t* that is staight. [1,2,3,4] 
And 5 here is again perfectly possible, and so not absurd. 
 So, it is clear that Lewis’s perdurantist solution is indeed a solution to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics. But then, so is the relational properties solution 
considered above. The situation we are in then, is this: 
 I have presented an argument against perdurantism in section 2 that shows it 
to have an absurd consequence that we should want to avoid at all costs. We have 
considered the problem of temporary intrinsics which admits of two solutions. One of 
them is perdurantism, the other is the relational properties solution. But, because 
perdurantism has absurd consequences for the reasons I have given, we should only 
adopt the perdurantism solution if the relational properties solution can be shown to 
be incoherent in some way or have a consequence that is more absurd than the one 
that perdurantism has. In what follows, I argue that it is clear that neither of these 
things can be shown about the relational properties solution, and so that solution (or 
one related to it) should be adopted, endurantism endorsed, and perdurantism 
rejected. 
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Section 4: The Relational Properties Solution 
Before we assess the relational properties solution, it is worth pointing out that there 
are in fact alternative solutions along the same lines as it. This will be useful because 
the other alternatives turn out to be inadequate for reasons that do not related to the 
relational properties solution, and so considering them will give us a better 
appreciation of the relational properties solution itself. 
One alternative version of this solution attracts some philosophers’ attention 
and endorsement, namely, the time-indexed solution. Smith and Oaklander introduce 
this version by replacing the temporary intrinsic properties, such as being bent or 
being straight with time-indexed properties such as being-bent-at-t and being-
straight-at-t. These do not express relations, but are monadic properties with times 
built into them. As Craig puts it: 
The hyphens are meant to signal that what is at issue here is not a relational 
property specifying a relation between an object O and a time t, but rather a 
monadic property which is ascribed to O simpliciter. (Craig, 2000: 185) 
If we apply this solution to the original argument, we get: 
1. O at t is identical with O at t* [assume for reductio] 
2. O is bent-at-t. [premiss] 
3. O is straight-at-t* [premiss] 
4. If O at t is identical with O at t*, then O at t is F iff O at t* is F. 
[Indiscernibility of Identicals] 
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5. Therefore, O at t is bent-at-t and straight-at-t*. [(1), (2), (3), (4)] 
And once more, 5 is perfectly possible, and so not absurd. 
However, despite the fact it does solve the problem, this is not an adequate 
view. The main problem here is that if the properties being-bent-at-t and being-
straight-at-t* are not reducible to more simple intrinsic properties (which they cannot 
be if the solution is to be a genuine one) then this means the properties are primitive, 
and so simple and unanlysable. But then, there turns out to be no connection 
between, say, being-bent-at-t and being-bent-at-t*. Despite the fact these properties 
seem to share something in common, on this view they do not. These two properties 
are entirely separate primitive properties that bear no more relation to each other 
than being red and being square are usually thought to. This is an unacceptable 
view. 
 Another alternative solution is known as “adverbialism”. Again, Craig 
summarises this view succinctly as: 
[A] property is exemplified… temporally rather than timelessly. The time at 
which an object possesses a property is neither a relatum nor a constituent of 
the property, but characterizes the possessing of the property by the object, 
just as temporal adverbs modify verbs. (Craig, 2000: 186) 
As characterized in this description, the search for a way out of the contradiction is 
now focused on the adverbs, which are considered as ‘temporal qualifiers’. Johnston 
(1987: 128) defends this view, arguing that such qualifiers are closely connected with 
how an object has properties and quite frequently happen to be adverbs. To show 
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this with an example, consider a girl named Lucy who dies her hair brunette from 
blonde. Then we can say Lucy is presently brunette, but she is pastly blonde haired. 
By expressing things in this way, Johnston claims to be able to dodge the 
contradiction in the problem of temproary intrinsics argument. He thinks it is true that 
objects possess intrinsic properties at different times, but that it is ‘possessing’ that 
should be the subject that is modified instead of the object itself or the properties. To 
formulate this adverbialist solution in terms of the argument itself again we have: 
1. O at t is identical with O at t* [assume for reductio] 
2. O tly bent. [premiss] 
3. O is t*ly straight. [premiss] 
4. If O at t is identical with O at t*, then O at t is tly F iff O at t* is tly F. 
[Indiscernability of identicals] 
5. O at t is tly F iff O at t* is tly F. [1,2,3,4] 
Once more, 5 is perfectly possible, and so not absurd. 
Now, this solution is all well and good, but it turns out to reduce down to the 
relational account anyway, albeit a more complicated version of it. Lewis himself 
makes this point asking: ‘What does standing in some relation to straightness have 
to do with just plain being straight?’ (Lewis, 1988: 66) To be more specific as to this 
reply, Lewis (1988: 66) argues that being straight on this account is actually a three-
place relation that exists between the object O, being straight, and some time t. In 
short, it avoids temporary intrinsics by claiming that an object being a certain shape 
at a certain time is equivalent to saying that the object stands in certain relation to 
the property of being a particular shape and a time.  
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Jonathan Lowe finds this reasoning of Lewis’s dubious here as he claims that 
it is not a three-place relation standing between the object O, being a certain shape, 
and some time, but, as Craig puts it ‘the holding of the two-place relation of property 
exemplification like O’s being F is related to a time.’ (Craig, 2000: 188) Due to this 
statement, when related to time t the object O’s property of being bent obtains, and 
when related to time t* the object O’s property of being bent does not. What is more, 
another issue Lowe and Lewis disagree with each other on is the definition of ‘just 
plain being straight’ in Lewis’s question above-mentioned, Lowe thinks that what it 
means is that i t may ‘denote some atempora l mode of proper ty 
exemplification’ (Lowe, 1988: 73); and therefore does not see any reasons why one 
cannot reject the idea that there are ‘changeable, persisting physical objects can 
ever correctly be described as ‘just plain being straight’.’ (Lowe, 1988: 73) I do not 
think that Lowe offers a very convincing comment on Lewis’s objection to 
adverbialism, however, because it looks very likely that Lowe’s view is backed up by 
the relationalist view when he states that there is a relation between the object O’s 
being bent and some time. But, as above-mentioned, the relationalist view does 
indeed face the problem of giving up the intrinsic nature of shape properties. 
 Finally, then, let us consider the relational solution to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics itself. Lewis says simply that, if we know what an intrinsic 
property is, we know that shape properties are intrinsic, and rejects the solution on 
this basis. I admit that the idea that shape properties are intrinsic is an intuitive one. 
But I do not think the intuition is strong enough to reject this endurantist solution to 
the problem at hand. We do ordinarily think of shape properties as being intrinsic, but 
this can be explained by the fact that we view the world from a temporal perspective. 
We only ever see one time, as it were, and when we consider an object at a single 
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time, we need only look at the object itself at that time to tell that it has a particular 
shape. We don’t need, that is, to consider any other object existing at that time. And 
so, it seems to me, that we can explain our intuition that shape is intrinsic in such 
terms. We can even define a notion of being intrinsic at a time, as follows: 
A property P possessed by O is intrinsic at a time t iff O has P at t in virtue of 
how O itself is at t irrespective of how any other thing O* is at t. 
And this notion, it seems to me, is what we ordinarily mean when we say that shape 
is an intrinsic property. That it turns out that shape is not technically intrinsic when 
we consider time does not seem to me to cause any problems. We usually do not 
consider times to be ‘objects’ that things can bear relations to, and even if this is 
technically true it doesn’t enter into our usual thoughts regarding whether a particular 
property is intrinsic or not. So, I reject Lewis’s view that this intuition is strong enough 
to reject endurantism in favour of perdurantism. 
 There is one more point to be made to bolster the argument above. This point 
is that, as I argued in section 2, the consequences of accepting perdurantism are 
extremely counterintuitive - if it is true, it turns out that each of us possesses 
deranged beliefs about the future and the past and our own selves. Given this, the 
correct way of proceeding here is to weigh up the counterintuitive consequences of 
accepting perdurantism and of accepting endurantism. So, on the one hand, we can 
accept that shape is an intrinsic property, but then are foced to admit that each of us 
is deranged. Or, on the other, we can accept that properties are not strictly intrinsic, 
but relational, but allow that none of us is deranged. It seems quite clear to me the 
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latter option is by far the more reasonable, especially given my comments above 
regarding the status of our intuition regarding the intrinsicality of shape. 
 Thus, I conclude here that the problem of temporary intrinsics gives us no 
reason to reject endurantism in favour of perdurantism. As this is the main argument 
for perdurantism, I conclude that we ought to reject perdurantism outight and accept 
endurantism. 
Section 5: The incompatibility of B-theory and endurantism 
So far then, I have argued that we must reject perdurantism in favour of 
endurantism. This alone does not give us a further reason to reject the B-theory. But 
this reason is supplied by the claim that the B-theory is incompatible with 
endurantism. I now argue for this claim. 
To see why this is, first note that in order to adopt an endurantist view, one 
must conceieve of an object existing identically over time. This means that one and 
the same object literally exists at different points along the timeline. As mentioned, 
this applied to experiencing beings just as much as it applies to ordinary objects 
such as tables and chairs. Now, for the time being, let us put the problem of 
temporary intrinsics to one side and consider how we ordinarily think about 
experiential properties. We ordinarily think about them as being themselves intrinsic. 
For example, I am currently experiencing a computer in front of me, and this would 
ordinarily be considered an intrinsic property of me. And having this intrinsic 
experiential property is just as incompatible with having a different intrinsic 
experiential property as being bent and being straight are. I cannot have two sets of 
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experiences going on within my consicousness - there must be one, or the other. 
Suppose, for example, that O is looking at a blue wall, so blueness fills O’s vision. 
Then suppose he turns and looks at a red wall, so redness fills O’s vision. What we 
get here is what we might call the problem of temporary experiential intrinsic 
properties: 
The Problem of temporary experiential intrinsic properties 
1. O at t is identical with O at t*. 
2. O is having a pure blue experience at t. 
3. O is having a pure red experience at t*. 
4. If, for every experience F, O at t has an experience of F, iff O at t* has an 
experience of F, then O at t is identical to O with O at t*. [Indiscernibility of 
Identicals] 
5. O at t is having a pure blue experience and a pure red experience. 
As should now be clear, there are two solutions to this problem. One is to adopt the 
endurantist view that, in fact, having an experience is merely a relation between an 
object and a time. The other is to adopt a perdurantist view according to which there 
are in fact two experiencers involved in the above description having two distinct 
experiences. However, I have argued that perdurantist view should be rejected and 
the endurantist view accepted. So, let us work through the consequences of this 
endurantist view. The consequence is that an experience is had by each of us when 
we are related to a particular time. So, right now I am having the experience of a 
computer in front of me because I am related to the current time in which I am sat in 
front of the computer. If O looks at a blue wall at t, then he is related to t and so has 
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a pure blue experience. If O then turns to look at a red wall at t*, he then becomes 
related to t* and has a pure red experience. That is, to have a particular experience 
is to be related to a particular time in which the experience takes place. 
 But now, ask: can the B-theoriest make sense of this endurantist view? I do 
not think they can. To see why note that the above solution only works with regards 
to our experiences if we can make sense of the idea that there is some priviliged 
moment of time that we are related to. If we are related to each moment of time that 
we exist at in just the same way, then this view would still entail that we would be 
having multiple experiential states. That is, it is only if we can suppose that we are 
first related to one time, and then related to another, and so on, that we can make 
sense of the idea that one and only one experience occurs within our consciousness. 
If we exist identically over time, and have different changing experiences, and are 
never to be subject to two incompatible experiences, as is required by endurantism, 
then there must be some sense that our relations to different times changes. And this 
sense can only be provided by the A-theory. According to the B-theory, we bear 
relations to times tenselessly. So, right now it would be true that O bears a certain 
relation to t sufficient to give rise to a blue experience, and a certain relation to t* 
sufficient to give rise to a blue experience. And so, if the B-theory is true, even if it 
adopts the relational account of intrinsic properties, it must still say that O has both a 
blue and a red experience going on. And so, for this reason, I conclude that the B-
theory is incompatible with the endurantist solution to the problem of temporary 
intrinsics, and with enduratism itself. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that endurantism should be accepted, and that the B-
theory is incompatible with it, and so should be rejected. Combined with the 
conclusion of the last chapter, that the B-theory cannot account for the flow of time, 
this gives us a very strong reason indeed to reject the B-theory outright. In fact, it 
should now be clear that the last chapter and this one were interlinked. The primary 
reason why the B-theory fails is that it fails to account for the fact that we 
experiencing agents that persist identically over time, and have a flow of experience 
that changes as we do so. The A-theory, by contrast, can explain this. They can 
account for our existence of time in terms of endurantism, and explain how we, as 
experiencing agents, undergo changes in our experiences. It is the flow of time itself 
that brings us into relations with different times, one after another, and gives rise to 
our rich constantly changing experiential lives. 
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Chapter 4 
Against the Moving Spotlight View 
Introduction 
In the last two chapters, I have demonstrated the flaws in the B-theory when applied 
to the flow of time and persistence over time. I have therefore overthrown the view 
that the B-theory alone can explain time. In chapter 1 I rejected one version of the A-
theory, namely presentism. But this leaves two A-theory views still standing, namely 
the moving spotlight view and the growing block view. In this chapter, I will take a 
close look at the moving spotlight theory which has the roots in both the A-theory and 
the ontological view endorsed by B-theorists, viz. eternalism. I start in section 1 with 
an outline of the traditional version of the moving spotlight view. In sections 2-4 I 
consider objections that have traditionally been against the view, but argue that it can 
overcome all of these. This will prove important in the next chapter, because these 
objections, if successful, also apply to the growing block view. So by showing they 
fail in the context of the moving spotlight view I will also show they fail against the 
growing block view. In section 5 I then turn to an objection that I think does show that 
the moving spotlight view is false, namely the fact that it cannot account for an 
alethically open future, and so the possibility of free will. On the basis of this 
objection, then, I will reject the moving spotlight view. 
Section 1: The Moving Spotlight View Outlined 
The moving spotlight view consists of two parts of reasoning, on the one hand, it 
accepts the eternalist view that all temporal positions, both in the past and the future, 
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are as real as the present, and are arranged by the relations of ‘earlier than...’, and 
‘later than...’, which means that there are eternally fixed B-relations between each of 
these positions; on the other hand, it acknowledges the privilege of the present, that 
is to say, it grants that the dynamics of time is an essential feature of time, as 
claimed by the A-theorist, which means that there is still a dynamical temporal point 
of present forever moving through time.  
With the basic notion of this view explained, the advocate argues that the 
primary reason for the moving spotlight view to be considered as a legitimate theory 
of time, by taking this approach our sensation of the temporal passage can be 
explained in a transparent way, for the fact that it avoids the issue the B-Theorist 
faces that our perception over time’s flow cannot be explained if all the temporal 
relations are eternally fixed (i.e. as argued in the last two chapters). To be more 
specific, according to Curtis & Robson (2016: 69), although this view does not mean 
that the temporal flow is literally true, it accepts that there is this constant dynamics, 
which is very close to the concept of time’s flow being literally true, and explains why 
we find these metaphors apt. What the moving spotlight means in terms of time’s 
flow is that by granting the privilege to the present moment, it indicates an objective 
distinction between the dynamical present, the past, and future, and therefore it can 
justify the idea that the present moves through a B-series of moments. The “now”, as 
it were, moves along the timeline from the past into the future, with successive 
moments becoming the present. 
However, as above-mentioned, we should be careful to note that the term 
‘moving’ should not be understood in a literal sense. It is not as if there is any object, 
or thing, moving along the timeline. Instead, they can understand the present as 
‘moving’ in the following way: 
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[T]he present ‘moves’ along the B-series in virtue of successive B-series 
moments gaining, and then losing, the property of being present. (Curtis & 
Robson, 2016: 69) 
To illustrate, we can imagine a line of light-bulbs that get turned on then off one after 
the other. In this scenario there is actually nothing that moves along the light-bulbs, 
but the fact that each light-bulb gains and then loses the property of lighting up in 
order does show that there is dynamics of the properties that constantly takes place 
along the line. By applying this dynamic feature to the moving spotlight case, it is 
quite explicit that the privileged present, like each light-bulb’s gaining and losing the 
property of lighting up, is gained and lost by every moment in the B-series, in which 
there is a constant shifting of the present’s temporal location, like the movement of a 
spotlight. Therefore, the advocate of the moving spotlight theory can embrace the 
view that time does have a genuine ‘flow’ to it. 
 With this understanding of the moving spotlight view in place, then, I now turn 
to objections. As mentioned, the first three covered in sections 2-4 can be answered 
by the moving spotlight theorist. Also, as mentioned, this will be important, because if 
these objections were to succeed, they would also succeed against the growing 
block view, which I will defend in the next chapter. 
Section 2: The First Objection - Hypertime 
The first objection can be stated as follows: if time consists of all the moments in the 
past, the present and the future, then naturally, one must ask how it possible for 
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change to occur along the moments? The basic trouble here is that, it seems, 
changes are things that occur in time, and so cannot occur to time itself, unless 
another dimension of time is posited in which the changes in the first dimension (i.e. 
the timeline itself) happen. This is to posit what is called ‘hypertime’. As Curtis and 
Robson put this point: 
[I]f there are to be changes with regards to which B-series moment is the 
present moment, then there must be a second-order time series of 
‘hypertimes’ relative to which these changes occur. (Curtis & Robson, 2016: 
70) 
To be more specific, as above-stated, the present moves along the moments of the 
B-series so that there is a constant change that appears in time, and for this reason 
it is seems we must say that such change takes time to happen. And so, then it it 
seems we must assume further that there is supposed to be a second-order time 
series of ‘hypertimes’ regarding which moments are present. 
 This seems strange enough. But Broad (1938: 277-279), when he discusses 
this point, goes even further. He argues that if this second-order dimension of 
hypertime is to be thought of as a genuine time across which changes happen, then 
it must be that for changes to occur across it, there must in fact be a third-order time 
series of hypertimes, and if there is a third-order time series, then there must be a 
fourth-order time series, and so on. Obviously, as this generalises, this hierarchy of 
time series turns out to be infinite. And this, it seems, is very strange indeed, and 
highly counterintuitive. 
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However, despite the fact that Broad himself thought this objection was fatal 
to the moving spotlight view, it is not so clear that it is. The approach is clearly not 
ontologically parsimonious, but many metaphysicians claim that it is not clear why 
such hierarchy of time series is considered as problematic. According to Curtis and 
Robson (2016: 71), it is not clear why defenders of the moving spotlight view can’t 
simply accept this consequence of their view, despite it being counterintuitive. As 
stated above, some argue that there could be an infinite hierarchy of hypertimes for 
each moment, and there could also be hyper-hypertimes and hyper-hyper-
hypertimes, so on and so forth to an endless extent. Despite that this hierarchy does 
not seem to be ontologically parsimonious, some argue that it is unclear why this 
should be a major issue for the moving spotlight theorist to deal with. More precisely, 
there is an argument to justify the infinite hierarchy in this moving spotlight scenario, 
by appealing to the Platonist view on objects and their properties. 
According to the Platonist view, there are two essential features as to how the 
physical objects possess properties, one is that ‘objects possess properties in virtue 
of standing in relation to Platonic universals, viz. immutable and transcendent 
entities.’ (Curtis & Robson, 2016: 71) For instance, all my leather jackets are black, 
so it is a Platonic fact that my jackets possess the property of being black in virtue of 
standing in the relation to the Platonic universal of being black. The other feature is 
that, just like objects, Platonic universals have properties as well. If this is the case, 
then there are second-order universals, which entails the existence of third-order 
universals, which leads to fourth-order universals, to an endless extent. As discussed 
by Curtis and Robson (2016: 71), the Platonists accept that there are infinite 
hierarchies of properties possessed objects and of universals, and do not seem to be 
worried about the commitment to such an infinite hierarchy of universals. In short 
 95
words, the Platonists believe that an infinite hierarchy of universals is the 
‘metaphysical structure of reality’ (Curtis and Robson, 2016: 71) 
By applying this strategy to the moving spotlight scenario, it looks like the 
moving spotlight has now discovered a solution to overcome the hypertime objection 
by claiming that an infinite hierarchy of hypertimes is actually the metaphysical 
structure of reality. Furthermore, the moving spotlight proponents, such as George 
Schlesinger (1980), takes this reply to the hypertimes objection even further, and 
questions its legitimacy as an objection by claiming that, according to Schlesinger 
(1980: 32), first-order times suffice to explain change in terms of their second-order 
temporal locations and second-order times suffice to explain change in terms of their 
first-order temporal locations, and that it is not necessary to include the third-order 
time series in the mix to justify the moving spotlight ontology. If this is so, then 
defenders of the moving spotlight view can avoid a committment to an infinite 
heirarchy of hypertimes, and accept just two levels of time, ordinary time and 
hypertime. This, it seems, is not too much to swallow, and so makes the claim that 
this is just how the metaphysical structure of reality is seem more plausible. 
Furthermore, some moving spotlight proponents claim that there is another 
argument that has newly become an option for developing Schelsingers view, that is, 
primitive tense operators. As discussed in the previous chapters, primitive tense 
operators are first invented by Prior (1967) in order to restrict tense operators in a 
proposition. According to Prior (1967: 8 - 10), there are three different tense 
operators, past-tense, present-tense, and future tense; and among these operators, 
‘primitive’ represents that these three operators are the primary ones, and restricts 
that these operators cannot be explained any further. By applying primitive tense 
operators to the moving spotlight view ontology, it may be able to restrain the 
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commitment to only first-order moments by claiming that flow of time is simply a 
primitive change in the tenses possessed by first order moments (i.e. they can say 
this is what a so-called ‘hypertime’ is). At any rate, it seems clear that this objection 
to the moving spotlight view can be met by the defender of the view and causes no 
significant problems. 
Section 3: The Second Objection - The Rate of Passage Objection 
The second objection usually comes hand in hand with the first one. If we consider 
the possibility of hypertimes, what is not clear is that if the temporal change 
constantly moves along the moments of the B-series like a metaphorical spotlight, 
then such a flow must be constantly in motion at a certain rate or speed, and we can 
therefore ask: at what rate or speed does the spotlight move along the B-series 
moments of time? And to this, it seems at first, the moving spotlight theorist has no 
adequate answer. 
In other words, it seems to be absurd to ask how fast time passes, for this 
appears to ask for ‘a rate of change in terms of units of first-order time and units of 
second-order time.’ (Curtis & Robson, 2016: 72) What appears absurd about this is 
that there is no way to actually know the rate of change in terms of units of first-
second time and units of second-order time without a certain measurement or 
comparison. Therefore, in response to this objection, Markosian (1993: 843) argues 
that the term change in this question appears to be rather ambiguous, for there is no 
restriction on the comparison between two temporal changes. To be more specific, 
when one describes an event, say, that there is a car that is moving at 30 miles per 
hour. In this event, a car endures a change in the spatial location of 30 miles while a 
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moment endures a change in the temporal location of an hour. Based on this 
description of the event, the comparison is restricted between a spatial change and a 
temporal change, therefore one can have a comprehensible outcome of the 
comparison. However, it is a different story comparing a change in time with a 
change in time, for there is not any measurement one can adopt in order to conduct 
such a comparison. Thus, it seems it makes no sense to ask ‘how fast does time 
pass?’, i.e. it seems it is not a legitimate question. 
Regarding the passage rate of time, Maudlin, however, takes a different 
approach. Since the only temporal measurement known to human beings is the 
hierarchy of hours, minutes, seconds and milliseconds etc., the question of how fast 
time passes stands for itself, and it is in fact about how things change temporally 
over a period of time, therefore the answer is simply that time passes ‘at the rate of 
one hour, or one second per second, or 3,600 seconds per hour.’ (Maudlin, 2007; 
112) Maudlin thus suggests that the question is in fact a legitimate one, makes 
perfect sense, but has a trivial answer. He says that the answer is, in fact, a 
necessary a priori truth, and so should cause the moving spotlight theorist no 
difficulty whatsoever. I have to say that, in this regard, Maudlin’s answer seems to 
me to be spot on, and so we again find that this objection causes no difficulties to the 
moving spotlight theorist. 
Section 4: The Third Objection - the McTaggart Argument 
As for the third objection, I intend to go through the McTaggartian argument against 
the existence of an A-series. As mentioned in previous chapters, McTaggart 
introduces the concepts of the A-series and the B-series in his 1908 paper ‘The 
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Unreality of Time’, and attempts to reject the idea that time exists. The tactic adopted 
by McTaggart is to show the fundamentality of the A-series in constituting time first, 
and following this demonstration McTaggart points out the impossibility of time being 
arranged according to an A-series, which, if correct, would disprove all A-theory 
views, and therefore the existence of time. McTaggart’s begins spelling out his 
argument as follows: 
Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must 
be one or the other, but no event can be more than one, If I say that any event 
is past, that implies that it is neither present nor future, and so with the others. 
This is essential to the meaning of the terms.... But every event has them all. 
If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will present and 
past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. Thus all the three 
characteristics belong to each event. How is this consistent with their being 
incompatible? (McTaggart, 1908: 468) 
As stated by McTaggart, it is impossible for a temporal event to have all three 
different A-properties of being past, being present and being future. But, according to 
him, each event does have each of these properties. In response to this assertion, 
the A- theorist might balk, and argues that this is not quite true, because every 
temporal event has these properties successively, and not at once. Therefore, they 
might claim, McTaggart seems confused about M’s temporality, as M is not past, 
present and future at the same time, but successively. However, McTaggart insists 
that there is by no means a mistake in this claim, and goes on to argue: 
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But his explanation involves a vicious circle. For it assumes the existence of 
time in order to account for the way in which moments are past, present and 
future. Time then must be pre-supposed to account for the A series. But we 
have already seen that the A series has to be assumed in order to account for 
time. Accordingly the A series has to be pre-supposed in order to account for 
the A series. And this is clearly a vicious circle. (McTaggart, 1908: 468) 
Clearly, what McTaggart has in mind is to address the problems that he thinks are 
caused by the pre-supposed temporal premise of the A-theory view. To be more 
specific, it is the existence of tense that is in question, but the A-theorist adopts the 
assumption that tense exists in order to explain how events in time can have the A-
properties of past, present and future. When asked as to the existence of tense, the 
A-theorist answers that the A-properties of past, present and future are had 
successively by events, which just means (with regard to a present event for 
example) that it was future, is present, and will be past. But this uses tensed notions 
and so is just to assume that we have already explained the existence of tense. This 
is McTaggart’s famous argument against the possibility of there being an A-series, 
and so against any A-theory of time, including the moving spotlight view (and, as 
mentioned, the growing block view too). As it is notoriously difficult to understand, it 
will be worthwhile spending a little more time spelling it out. 
 Above it is fairly clear what McTaggart means when he calls the attempt to 
explain tense circular. But he also says it leads to vicious regress. Why does he say 
this? McTaggart argues that since an event is past, and was future and present, 
therefore, it is inconsistent to say something that has all three temporal properties 
simultaneously. As stated above, the A-theoretical response to this assertion is that a 
 100
temporal event has these different temporal properties successively, so there is no 
issue here. McTaggart obviously does not agree with this, and argues that: 
If we avoid the incompatibility of the three characteristics by asserting that M 
is present, has been future, and will be past, we are constructing a second A 
series, within which the first falls, in the same way in which events fall within 
the first...... the second A series will suffer from the same difficulty as the first, 
which can only be removed by placing it inside a third A series. (McTaggart, 
1908: 469) 
The intention behind this statement is to show that there can be infinite number of 
sub-moments for every moment. For example, the present moment can be divided 
into the now-now moment, and the now-past moment, etc., thus, if there are 
countless components to form a moment, then there is a vicious regress. 
However, the moving spotlight theorist has an answer to this. In order to see 
what it is I now turn to consider Ross Cameron’s recent development of the moving 
spotlight view in his (2005). McTaggart acknowledges the key point that McTaggart 
thinks that any attempt to define an A-series is ‘...circular, and it leads to vicious 
regress.’ (Cameron, 2015: 53) But, Cameron admits, the scenario McTaggart draws 
about the infinite regress of A-series is not wrong. The A-theorist can accept the idea 
that there can be infinitely many sub-instants to form a moment, but can deny that 
that this is a vicious regress. According to Cameron (2015: 60), there is no problem 
with McTaggart’s claim that there is an infinite regress caused by the A-series, yet, 
what it is to be further discussed is the claim that it is a vicious regress. For 
Cameron, McTaggart seems to be confused as to the distinction between two 
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different kinds of regresses, and therefore to mistakenly think that it is a vicious 
regress. The two kinds of regresses Cameron addresses are benign regress of 
explanation and vicious regress of explanation, respectively.  
The former states that: 
At each stage, n, an instance of a puzzle is posed and explanation offered, 
and this explanation gives rise to a new instance of the puzzle, forming stage 
n+1; but the success of the explanation at stage n does not depend on the 
puzzle at stage n+1 being resolved. (Cameron, 2015: 60) 
Whilst the latter suggests that: 
At each stage, n, an instance of a puzzle is posed and an explanation offered, 
and this explanation gives rise to a new instance of the puzzle, forming stage 
n+1; and furthermore, the success of the explanation at stage n depends on 
the puzzle at stage n+1 being resolved. (Cameron, 2015: 60) 
The difference between the two kinds is that the concept of benign regress indicates 
that the physical world consists of an endless number of puzzles, and each puzzle’s 
being solved leads to the next puzzle, while that of vicious regress denies the 
possibility of a puzzle being solved. To apply this statement to the A-theoretical 
argument, Cameron argues that McTaggart has given us no reason to think that the 
infinite number of sub-instants of a moment in A-series fits in the category of a 
vicious regress rather than a benign one. 
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 I agree with Cameron’s diagnosis of McTaggart’s argument, and so agree that 
it poses no problems for the moving spotlight view (or any other A-theory view, 
including the growing block view). Before I finish this section, however, I spend a little 
more time outlining Cameron’s own version of the moving spotlight view. For he goes 
on to develop a version that he thinks is more plausible than any version developed 
before. 
According to the modified moving spotlight view, reality is considered as a 
spatiotemporal manifold, and in such manifold, all temporal events and objects are 
arranged in permanently fixed temporal relations. Furthermore, as Deasy nicely 
summarises, ‘moments of time are identified with maximal three-dimensional slices 
of the manifold.’ (Deasy, 2016: 2) Now with the basic theoretical structure 
established, Cameron (2015) carries on to state that another key feature of this 
version is the appeal to the notion of distributional properties primarily advanced by 
Josh Parsons (2004), and according to the concept, properties of this sort have a 
feature of cross-time quality. Accordingly, Cameron argues that every object that 
exists in permanently fixed temporal relations has one of those temporary 
distributional properties throughout time. Moreover, Cameron believes that not only 
such are fundamental properties for objects to have, but also they can ensure the 
changes that happen in the fundamental properties of objects through time.  
When applying to the notion of these properties to the view, it allows non-
present objects to exist at present by granting them this type of fundamental 
properties. For example, Socrates and the first human to travel to Mars both exist at 
present in this spatiotemporal manifold. To be more specific, Socrates has this 
distributional property of teaching philosophy to his pupils thousands of years ago 
and now being dead; similarly, the first human to visit Mars has a distributional 
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property of not existing on earth now and of visiting Mars at some point the future. 
That is to say, every state of affairs an object has ever instantiated throughout time is 
temporary. For example, Socrates’s teaching students, and later in time drinking 
poison, and now being dead are all temporary parts of a fundamental temporary 
distributional property that he has. 
Among all the merits Cameron believes this version of the moving spotlight 
has, there are two important advantages that are worth a few words. The first 
advantage is that this view does not have to take tensed facts as necessarily 
fundamental. To be more specific, there are two possible ways to understand this 
statement, one way is to understand this in the sense that there are no such thing as 
fundamental temporary truths. But this seems instantly problematic, as the 
proposition that here I am existing and typing words on the keyboard shows that this 
state of affairs of me temporarily doing things does exist, which Cameron actually 
acknowledges. Therefore, it certainly does not seem sensible to understand the 
statement this way. The other way to comprehend it is to take it in the sense that 
‘Cameron is not committed to the fundamentality of temporal operators like ‘it was 
the case that’’ (Daesy, 2016: 4) However, this path seems equally troublesome as 
the first, as it contradicts with Cameron’s own theory. For the alternative to primitive 
temporal operators are the primitive joint-carving concepts, but Cameron believes 
that such alternative should be rejected, and also he makes it clear that any views 
that associate with primitive joint-carving concepts should be rejected. Until the point 
where Cameron offers a proper explanation for this first virtue, it remains an issue for 
this modified version of the moving spotlight view. 
The second virtue Cameron thinks his view has over the traditional version is 
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that, by endorsing this modified version, one does not have to ‘take [presentness] as 
a primitive feature of reality that some time is present.’ (Cameron, 2015: 151) To be 
more detailed about this claim, in Cameron’s argument, the truthmaker for the 
proposition ‘this time is present’ is the fact that ‘there is a state of affairs of 
everything’s being such that the age it has at this time is just its age 
simpliciter.’ (Daesy, 2016: 5) Although this aspect enables the moving spotlight view 
to avoid commitment to present’s primitive feature of reality, it remains unclear 
whether this is actually an advantage only with Cameron’s approach, because both 
Phillip Bricker (2006) and Daniel Daesy (2016) both offer a version of the moving 
spotlight of their own, what they all share in common is that there is a spatiotemporal 
manifold as the basic foundation for their theoretical models. 
 At any rate, as should be clear, it is rather unclear whether Cameron’s 
development of the moving spotlight has any real advantage over the traditional 
version. Nonetheless, this shall not matter in what follows, because I think there is an 
objection to the traditional view that applies equally as strongly to Cameron’s. It is to 
that objection that I now turn. 
Section 5: The Fourth Objection - The Open Future and Free Will 
In this section, I will argue that despite all the efforts (some are ontologically strong) 
from the advocates of the moving spotlight views discussed above, this view is not 
able to provide a satisfactory explanation about the open future. The general view of 
the moving spotlight in a nutshell is that the past, present, and future are all real, and 
we, at the the so-called present, are only going through times that already exist. But I 
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think, metaphysically and intuitively, this is not an acceptable explanation for it 
cannot account for the open future, and so cannot allow that we possess free will. 
 To begin, I should define what I means when I say that the future is open. I 
should do this because there are a great many different meanings that this term may 
have. First, it may mean merely that the future is epistemically open, i.e. that we 
cannot know what the future will hold. I do not mean it in this sense. Second, it might 
mean that it is causally open, i.e. that our current actions cannot have an effect on 
the future. I do not mean it in this sense either. But third, it might mean that the future 
is alethically open. And it is this sense that I do mean it. This sense was first outlined 
by Aristotle in a famous passage in De Interpretatione, as follows: 
A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not 
necessary that it should take place tomorrow, neither is it necessary that 
it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should 
not take place tomorrow […] One may indeed be more likely to be true 
than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. 
(Aristotle 2006: 33) 
As I understand the notion, I will take alethic openness to be: 
The future is alethically open iff for all propositions p, p is not true now and p 
is not false now. (See Markosian, 1995: 96) 
According to any eternalist view, of which the moving spotlight is one, the future is 
not alethically open, but closed. That is to say, even though we cannot now know 
what the future will hold (i.e. it is epistemically open) and even though our actions 
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now can have a causal influence on the future (i.e. it is causally open), there is still a 
currently existing fact of the matter, for each proposition p about the future, whether 
that proposition is true or false. This is true because the future already exists. It is 
“out there”, as it were, in reality. As the moving spotlight moves along the timeline, it 
merely passes along the times that are already there. As such, the future, just like 
the past, is fixed, according to the moving spotlight view. 
 It is worth reflecting upon how odd this view is. It entails that all future truths 
are just like all past truths. Just as there is absolutely nothing we can do to change 
the fact that World War II happened, because it exists in the timeline, there is 
likewise absolutely nothing we can do to alter the fact (if it is a fact) that World War III 
will happen in fifty years, because it exists in the timeline in just the same way. It is 
granted that our actions can have a causal impact on the future, unlike the past, but 
this does not change the fact that if an event is out there on the timeline already, it 
will happen. That is, it is not that it might happen, but if we try hard to stop it, it might 
not. No, it will, with 100% certainty happen, if it is out there already on the timeline. 
That means no matter what we try to do to alter the fact, and however we exert our 
causal powers to effect the future, all out efforts will invariably lead to the events that 
are already out there on the timeline. 
 The problem with the above view is fairly clear. It means that, in an important 
sense, our free will is limited. To see how the argument for this claim goes, consider 
that it is now true (because the event already exists on the timeline) that World War 
III will happen in fifty years time. Now consider: 
Freedom Argument 
1. It is presently true that WWIII will happen in fifty years time. 
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2. If it is presently true that WWIII will happen in fifty years time, then we are 
not free to prevent WWIII from happening. 
3.If we are not free to prevent WWIII from happening, then our free will is 
severely limited. 
C. Our free will is severely limited. 
One might balk at this argument, and claim that our free will is not severely limited by 
the mere fact that we cannot prevent one event from occuring. But note that this 
event was abitrarily chosen, and the same line of reasoning applies to every 
proposition regarding what will happen in the future, including ones about our own 
actions. For example, I could have run the same argument supposing it to be true 
that I will get married in a year’s time, or that I will become a plumber, or that I will 
die before I finish my thesis. If we take the set S of all true propositions about what 
will happen in the future, we have: 
Freedom Argument 2 
1. S contains all propositions about what will happen in the future. 
2. All the propositions in S about will happen in the future are presently true. 
3. If all the propositions in S are presently true, then we are not free to prevent 
any of the events mentioned in S from happening. 
4. If we are not free to prevent any of the events within S from happening, our 
free will is severely limited. 
C. Our free will is severely limited. 
 
Now, there are some who are happy to admit that we do not have free will (e.g. 
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Strawson (1986) and Pereboom (2001)). But as far as I am concerned, this is again 
such a fundamental tenet of our view of the world and our place within it that I think 
we are justified in rejecting a view that limits our freedom in this way. This is not to 
say that I have a positive account of what it is to have free will either. That is, I do not 
know how to lay down sufficient conditions for having free will. But, I do think I know 
that the ability to actualize more than one possible future for myself is a necessary 
condition. And, for this reason, because the moving spotlight view rules this out, I 
believe we must reject the view. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have considered the moving spotlight view and rejected it. I have 
argued, however, that it can answer some of the objections that have been levelled 
against it. But, I have argued, it must be rejected because there is one objection that 
tells against it. We must retain the possiblity of having free will, and because the 
moving spotlight view does not allow for this, I reject it. In the next chapter I turn to 
the final metaphysical view of time, the growing block view. 
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Chapter 5 
For the Growing Block View 
Introduction 
At this point, I have discussed three metaphysical views in order to find a theory that 
can explain time and temporality, namely, presentism, B-theory eternalism, and the 
moving spotlight view. I have rejected them all. This leaves one view still standing, 
namely the growing block view. It is this view that I will discuss in this chapter. I will 
argue that it succeeds where all the others fails, and so that it is the view of time we 
should adopt. 
 In section 1 I outline the view and explain briefly why it is superior to all the 
others. Then in the following sections I go on to substantiate these claims in more 
detail. In section 2 I consider each objection to the other views and explain how it 
overcomes them. Then in section 3 I outline an objection that is thought to be a 
major one that faces the growing block view. In section 4 I consider a reply to that 
objection due to Peter Forrest and endorse it. Finally in section 5 I consider an 
alternative development of the growing block view due to Michael Tooley, and 
explain why, although I accept the growing block view, I reject his version of it. I thus 
conclude this chapter by endorsing the growing block view outright. 
Section 1: Outline of the Growing Block View 
According to the growing block view, both the past and the present are real while the 
future only comes into existence by becoming the present, before then receding into 
the past as new presents come into existence. That is to say, this view partly accepts 
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the eternalist view, but only with regard to the past, while it clearly grants the idea 
that there is no future and a constant temporal dynamic, which is endorsed by the 
presentist. It is thus a kind of midway position between the two. According to some 
this means it inherits the problems of each of those two views. But, in my view, it 
actually inherets the strengths of each. Firstly, as we will see, it can adequately solve 
the Truthmaker objection unlike presentism. Secondly, it can explain the flow of time, 
unlike B-theory eternalism. And thirdly, it can account for the open future, unlike the 
moving spotlight view. In addition, it has no insurmountable problems of its own. And 
thus, I believe it is by far the most superior view of time and should be adopted. I 
elaborate on all of this in the remainder of this chapter. But before I get to this, I first 
frame the growing block view more fully by briefly consider the history of it. 
The growing block view has undergone some development since it was first 
defended in the 1920s, but charting its development will prove useful to us in what 
follows. According to some, the original and basic notion of the growing block view in 
fact derives from the work of Samuel Alexander (1920), who is credited with first 
mentioning the basic notion of this view in his book ‘Space, Time, and Deity’. It is 
worth pausing over this claim to assess its truth. 
Alexander (1920: 61) claims that since there is diversity in the physical world, 
there must be a co-existent relation between space and time, for, he says, there will 
not be diversity in substance without space or time. To be more specific, he says if 
there is no space, time will solely be a simple ‘now’ that takes place on repeat, which 
provides absolutely no room for the existence of substantial diversity. Following this 
line of reasoning, he says this entails that space must be created by or in time 
because there is no dynamics in space alone either, and time is the source that 
provides movement. This is taken to be expressing the basic idea of the growing 
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block due to the notion that space is created in time, suggesting that space comes 
into existence as time flows. We shall certainly have reason to consider this 
particular aspect of the growing block view, and it is right to say that this does 
express a committment of a defender of the view. But despite this, it is in fact clear 
that Alexander himself did not endorse the growing block view. To see this, consider 
that he goes on to say: 
Space-Time thus consists of what may be called lines of advance connected 
into a whole or system.... In the line of advance c b a we have the 
displacement of the present from c through b to a, so that a becomes present 
while b comes past and c still further past...... The present means as before 
the point of reference. In terms of earlier and later, b having been later and c 
earlier, a becomes later and cb earlier. Now this is the meaning of motion. 
Points do not of course move in the system of points, but they change their 
time-coefficient. What we ordinary call motion of a body is the occupation by 
that body of points which successively become present...... Thus Space-Time 
is a system of motions...... a single vast entity Motion. (Alexander, 1920: 
61-62) 
According to this statement, it seems that although Alexander supports the view that 
time is dynamic, i.e. the A-theory, his description of motions as lines of advance, and 
Space-Time as a system of points in which the points occupied by a body 
continuously turn into the present, suggests he holds an eternalist ontology. 
Therefore, despite sometimes being credited as being the originator of the growing 
block view, it is clear that the metaphysical view he has in mind is rather the moving 
spotlight theory than the growing block view.  
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With this established, I turn to a discussion of its actual first supporter C.D. 
Broad, who had previously been an eternalist but claims in his 1923 book Scientific 
Thought that he adopts a new theory that: 
[A]ccepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is 
simply nothing at all. (1923: 66) 
If the future is not real, he says, then it is a state of nothingness. However, from 
nothingness it comes into existence by becoming the present, therefore temporal 
becoming is the key notion in the position that Broad builds. He holds that temporal 
becoming happens constantly as nonexistent moments come into being as the 
present. Of all the temporal theories examined in this dissertation, this in fact seems 
to me to be the most intuitive one so far. Because, on the one hand, most of us 
humans, if not all, are intuitively willing to believe that time is real, which somehow 
grants certain profound meanings to each of our lives. But more than this, as 
mentioned in the last chapter, we view the past as being fixed, and impossible to 
change, but the future as being open, liably to be shaped by the present, but not yet 
in existence.  
          On the other hand, We also instinctively believe that each and every one of us 
has free will, and so that we are the ones that determine the content of our lives 
based on possibilities. If the growing block view is true, then it would prove that our 
intuition regarding of the physical world is accurate. However, this is also exactly 
where some theorists see the problem with this view lies. Broad recognises all of 
these advantages, and it is in large part the reason why he accepts it. I elaborate on 
this advantage in the next section, where I also consider how the view overcomes 
other objections that have been raised in this thesis so far to other views. 
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Section 2: How the Growing Block View Solves the Problems Other 
Views Cannot 
In this section I consider the problems that have so far beset the other views of time I 
have considered, and show that the growing block view overcomes them all. 
The Truthmaker Objection 
Firstly, remember that according to the Truthmaker objection to presentism, every 
true sentence must have a truthmaker, i.e.: 
Truthmaker Principle: For every true sentence, there must be a state of affairs 
existing in the world that necessitates and/or grounds its truth. 
When we considered presentism, the main example sentence we considered was: 
Past tense dinosaur sentence: Larry the dinosaur did exist. 
The problem for presntists was that the admitted this sentence is true, but because 
they do not believe the past exists, could not adequately account for its truth by 
providing a truthmaker for it. Now, clearly, the growing block does not face a problem 
in this regard. As defenders of the view think the past exists, they can say, just as the 
eternalist does, that this sentence is made true by the existence of Larry the 
dinosaur himself at those past times. 
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 However, we focussed on past-tense sentences when looking at presentism, 
but also noted that the objection applies to future-tense sentences too. So, for 
exampe, consider: 
Future tense Mars sentence: There will be humans living on Mars. 
Of course, we do not know whether this sentence is true or false, because we cannot 
know what the future will hold. But, according to some, it is now either true or false, 
and so still requires a truthmaker if it is true. The growing block view cannot account 
for this, and so there is a version of the truthmaker objection that applies to the view. 
However, it is not a serious objection, because in the case of the future it is very 
plausible to deny that such sentences are either true or false now. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, in fact, I think we we should accept that the future is alethically 
open. And if this is right, then the future tensed Mars sentence is not now true and 
not now false. And as such, it needs no truthmaker. So, although the presentist must 
provide a truthmaker for past tense sentences, and this refutes their view, growing 
block theoriests have no need at all to provide truthmakers for future tensed 
sentences, and so there is no truthmaker objection to their view. 
The Flow of Time and Persistence over Time 
In chapters 2 and 3 I rejected the B-theory on the basis of the fact it cannot account 
for the flow of time and our experience of that flow, and relatedly, it cannot account of 
the the fact that we endure over time by existing literally identically at different times. 
The growing block view is an A-theory view and so can account for these things. But, 
it is worth saying just a few words about how. 
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 On the growing block view the flow of time is constituted by the coming into 
existence of states of affairs at the edge of the growing block, i.e. at the edge of what 
exists. It is therefore plausible to think of the coming into existence of states of affairs 
at that point as what makes that moment priviliged as the present moment. When we 
considered endurantism, I said that the B-theory cannot account for the fact that we 
have one and only one experience and suggested we do so due to the fact that we 
bear a relationship to only one moment of time that keeps changing, giving rise to a 
succession of experiences, as we become related to different moments of time. On 
the growing block view this is captured by the idea that we bear a special privileged 
relation to the moment of time at the edge of the block. As such, defenders of the 
growing block can explain not only the flow of time in terms of the growing of the 
block, but also our experience of that flow. We bear a special relationship to the 
moment that is at the edge of the block, which gives rise to experiences within us, 
and they constantly shift as time flows because we constantly become specially 
related to a new moment, i.e. the one that has just now come into existence. This, in 
fact, as we will see, will be important in what follows. But for now, the point is that the 
growing block theory can perfecfly well account for the flow of time, our temporal 
experiences, and how we endure over time. 
The Open Future Objection 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the moving spotlight view cannot account for the 
open future, and so cannot allow for the possibility that we have free will. I argued 
there that this is a sufficient reason for rejecting the moving spotlight view. The 
moving spotlight view faces this problem because of its committment to eternalism 
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and so the view that the future exists. However, as already mentioned above, the 
growing block view faces no such problem. On the growing block view the future 
does not yet exist, so they can perfectly well allow that it is alethically open, i.e. that 
sentences about the future are not now true or false, but only become true of false 
when the future comes into existence. This, at least, gives us the possibility of having 
free will. Even if we cannot yet give a full account of what our free will consists in, we 
can be be certain that such an account is possible. And so, the growing block view 
overcomes the problem that the moving spotlight view faces too. 
 So, the growing block view is superior in these respects to each of the views 
we have so far considered. However, it does face a problem of its own, to which I 
now turn. 
Section 3: The “How Do We Know It Is Now Now?” Problem 
So, from the above it is clear that the growing block view can solve each of the 
problems the other views faced. But, this does not by itself mean that it should be 
adopted, because it may well face its own insurmountable problems. So, in what 
follows, I consider whether it does so, and argue that it does not. 
 In fact, many of the problems raised for the growing block view have already 
been considered, such as the hypertime objection and the rate objection. However, 
Broad (1938: 280-281) himself does not think that these two objections, which have 
also been raised against the moving spotlight view, can cause any substantial issues 
for the growing block view, which we have already considered in the previous 
chapter. But, as we have seen, those objections can be met by the moving spotlight 
theorist, and they pose no extra problem for the growing block view. That is, the 
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growing block view can simply adopt the solutions to them that the moving spotlight 
theorist adopts. 
 So, what we need to ask is: are there any problems that have been raised in 
particular for the growing block view? And, in fact, there is. This is the “How Do We 
Know It Is Now Now?” problem. 
This problem has been raised in various forms by both Bourne (2002) and 
Braddon-Mitchell (2004). More specifically speaking, both theorists argue that if the 
growing block view is true there should be a match between the mental now and the 
actual present now. The strategy applied in this objection is to first set up the claim 
that we should experience the actual present moment, i.e. our conscious 
experiences should be of the moment at the edge of the growing block. With this 
claim being set up, Braddon-Mitchell then goes further to argue that since past 
people still exist in the past (i.e. in the back of the block) then they will still be having 
conscious experiences where they are located. And because of this, he argues, we 
cannot know on the basis of the fact that we are having conscious experiences that 
we do indeed exist in the present moment at the edge of the block rather than in the 
past in the back of the block. 
To go further here, Braddon-Mitchell argues that if this is the case, then it 
entails that every experiencing being in the past can perceive the present moment of 
their time. For instance, according to the four-dimensional view, Robin Hood in the 
past is still real, and for this reason, Robin Hood firmly believes that he is now 
robbing the rich and saving the poor. Furthermore, I also have this firm belief that I 
am now typing at my keyboard, thus, obviously, both Robin Hood and I believe that 
we are in the present time, respectively. The necessity to demand a distinction 
between Robin Hood’s belief and my belief is where Braddon-Mitchell’s argument 
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strikes, for there is no way to differentiate Robin Hood’s belief from my belief in terms 
of being present. He then concludes that just as Robin Hood believes he is present, 
but is not, I may well believe that I am present even thought I am not. And so 
concludes that there is no way for anyone to know that they are ‘now’ (understood 
indexically) in the genuine ‘now’ (understood as picking out the edge of the block). 
And this undercuts our reason for believing in the growing block view in the first 
place. 
 This then is currently considered to be the major problem that the growing 
block view faces. However, I do not believe it to be a major problem, or indeed any 
problem at all. In order to explain why I first draw upon an intuitive reply made by 
Forrest (2004). 
Forrest says that both the past and Robin Hood are dead, that is, although 
Robin Hood exists in the back of the block, he is not having any experiences at all. 
Therefore, he says, there is no Robin Hood thinking that he is currently in the 
present moment, and this is what he calls ‘the Past is Dead’ hypothesis. This reply 
seems like an easy way out for the growing block theorist but the problem with this 
reply is obvious, since the growing block view suggests that the past is as real as the 
present, accordingly, why deny that things in the past, if they are real, are 
conscious? 
Regarding this objection, Braddon-Mitchell comes up with a potential solution 
on his own but also claims that such solution requires a high ontological price. He 
says: 
Suppose that the hyperplane that is the objective present is the only one that 
contains consciousness...[and]... consciousness is some by-product of the 
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causal frisson that takes place on the borders of being and non-being. 
(Braddon-Mitchell, 2004: 201) 
By adopting this definition of consciousness, it does show that the objective present 
and the human consciousness of it can be successfully integrated with each other, 
and that being said, it then solves the “How Do We Know It Is Now Now?” objection, 
for if the consciousness is the by-product of the causal frisson that occurs constantly 
at present moment at the edge of the block, then there is no difference between the 
objective now and the subjective now.  
However, Braddon-Mitchell (2004) rejects this solution as he believes that 
there will be too much of an ontological price that comes with this approach, as 
mentioned above. According to Braddon-Mitchell (2004: 202), to explain the 
simultaneity of the objective now and the subjective now in this fashion is to face a 
serious issue. His strategy to demonstrate this is to assume that there is an objective 
now and that he exists in it at first, and then to show that there is no way for him to 
know what else is in the same reality.  
To be more specific, say I believe that I am in a dynamic temporal reality 
which I think is real and has an objective present that constantly moving towards the 
future, and that there are other physical beings that also exist in the same temporal 
reality, such as other humans and objects. However, if this should be the case, 
according to Braddon-Mitchell, I then have to explain which frame of reference the 
hyperplane of simultaneity depends on.  
But, before I do that, it is necessary to briefly explain what the concept of the 
hyperplane of simultaneity is. The view that the theorists, such as C.D. Broad (1923) 
and Michael Tooley (1997) among others, support entails that the past does exist, 
whereas the future does not, and the present is regarded as the hyperplane that 
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expands the reality of being; moreover, simultaneity, in the discussion of physics, is 
considered as something that is not absolute, rather, it is something that depends on 
the observer’s frame of reference. That being said, the hyperplane of simultaneity is 
the notion that describes the present in a relativistic sense.  
Now back to the discussion of which frame of reference it is for the hyperfine 
of simultaneity to depend on, this relies upon a fact about one of our best physical 
theories, i.e. special relativity. According to that view, there are as many frames of 
reference as there are conscious beings, and for this reason I should not take the 
simultaneity of the present for granted, for it is necessary to clarify which frame of 
reference is preferred in order to determine whether the other physical and 
conscious beings are simultaneously existing with me in this temporal reality. 
Braddon-Mitchell takes advantage of this issue of uncertainty over frame of 
reference, and claims that since there is no way to know that every conscious 
individual experience the past or the present simultaneously, therefore it is 
impossible to know whether each of us is conscious of the same objective now.  
Following this objection, Braddon-Mitchell goes further to argue, although 
without providing a detailed account over it, that there is another problem that the 
advocate of the growing block view should be concerned about, namely, how to 
understand the different meanings of the ‘now’s in the question ‘how do we know 
that it is now now?’ According to Braddon-Mitchell (2004: 202), despite the fact the 
‘now’s are both coherent, they should be understood differently: one now represents 
a metaphysical sense of the present time, while the other now is used solely as an 
indexical. Furthermore, the first now, which is understood in a metaphysical sense, is 
supported by the presentist; as for the other indexical now, its definition offers a clear 
explanation over ‘how we know it is now ‘now’’. However, Braddon-Mitchell argues 
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that the growing block view inherits all the issues of both ‘now’s yet fails to obtain 
any advantages of both ‘now’s. 
His sense of humour in calling the growing block view a ‘growing salami’ view 
apparently reveals that he is not the biggest advocate of such view, but such a sense 
of humour is unfortunately based on his misunderstanding over the growing block 
view, therefore, his conclusion that the growing block view has to pay a sky high 
ontological price is not true.  
Section 4: Peter Forrest’s Response to Braddon-Mitchell 
In response to Braddon-Mitchell’s objection and self-reply to it, Peter Forrest (2004) 
offers a different approach over how each now in Braddon-Mitchell’s enquiry should 
be interpreted, as each now represents different meanings in Forrest’s statement. 
Instead of asking ‘how do we know it is now now?’, Forrest thinks that the more 
adequate way to pose this question should be ‘How do we know nowi that it is nowb?’ 
(Forrest, 2004:358) To start with, his argument in reply to Braddon-Mitchell’s 
objection is to distinguish one now from the other. The nowi represents an indexical/
token-reflexive meaning of ‘now’, that is, the moment where the token of the ‘now’ is, 
while nowb rather indicates the time that is constantly at the boundary of temporal 
realms, which is the present. That being said, Forrest goes on to agree with 
Braddon-Mitchell that merely saying this explains how it is possible for us to know if 
we are in the same state as a past conscious entity, such as Caesar, or Robin Hood, 
currently is in, as explained above, Caesar or Robin Hood might well believe that he 
is in the present moment as well.  
Forrest, however, further develops his position by claiming that there is a 
distinction between activities and states in temporality. According to Forrest (2004: 
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359), things such as life and sentience belong in the spectrum of activities, and 
activities’ occurrence merely happens on the edge of temporal reality. At the same 
time, states are something that only exists in the past. Now recall Braddon-Mitchell’s 
claim that ‘consciousness is some by-product of the causal frisson that takes place 
on the borders of being and non-being.’ (Braddon-Mitchell, 2004: 201), Forrest has a 
different perspective on how to understand this. He believes that the interaction of 
the cause and the effect do not happen simultaneously, rather, if the cause happens 
in one moment, then its effect only happens in the next moment. Specifically 
speaking, he says: 
If x causes y then in the normal case y is after x. If there is a precise moment 
at which x ends then y begins only after that moment, not at it. At the precise 
moment of the end of the cause there is as yet no effect. (Forrest, 2004: 359) 
In this statement, the end of the cause x and the beginning of the effect y do not 
happen at the same time, but rather happen in a sequel order, that is to say, as 
stated by Forrest (2004: 359), the cause x’s causal property has a certain tendency 
of producing the effect that belongs in the type of Y, in this case, the effect y. 
Moreover, Forrest (2004: 359) carries on to argue that such causal activities 
and causal relations should not be considered as a provisional feature of the growing 
block view, instead, they are 
[A] consequence of combining that theory with the innocent enough 
supposition that causes precede effects.’ (Forrest, 2004: 359) 
If this is the case, then it is reasonable to suggest that life and sentience ought to be 
categorised as causal activities. Following this line of reasoning, that causal states 
only belong in the past and causal activities only happen on the boundary of 
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temporal reality entails that entities in the past, such as Caesar and Robin Hood, can 
only be in causal states rather than have causal activities. Given the distinction 
between the past beings and the present beings, it is reasonable therefore to say 
that Robin Hood, despite existing in the past, is in a causal state but not undergoing 
any causal activity, and so isn’t having any conscious experiences, and so is in that 
sense ‘dead’. 
Although Forrest makes ‘the Past is Dead’ hypothesis seem like a legitimate 
response, there is still Braddon-Mitchell’s point about special relativity to answer. 
Forrest acknowledges Braddon-Mitchell’s concern but answers is quite simply. He 
states that Braddon-Mitchell can only make a case out of the combination of the 
growing block view and ‘the Past is Dead’ hypothesis when the temporal boundary in 
question is assumed to be flat. In other words, without the assumption that the 
boundary is flat, it is not necessary for the advocate of the growing block view to 
commit to ‘a privileged relativistic frame of reference.’ (Forrest, 2004: 360)  
It seems, at this point, that Forrest’s accounts over the growing block view 
and the Dead Past hypothesis provide reasonable answers to Braddon-Mitchell’s 
enquiries. However, another metaphysician Heathwood (2005) disagrees with 
Forrest over his conduct of defending the growing block view, and claims that the 
manner in which Forrest combines the Dead Past hypothesis with the growing block 
view actually undermines the advantages the growing block view has over other 
rivals of temporality. For instance, as claimed by Heathwood (2005: 250), compared 
to presentism, the growing block view is supposed to have the upper hand in 
providing the solid truth grounding for the propositions as to the past. Nevertheless, if 
combined with the Dead Past hypothesis, Heathwood (2005) believes that the 
growing block view will have to confront the same problems all over again. In order 
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to support this claim, Heathwood (2005) brings up a few propositions regarding the 
past, and asks for the uniform account for these propositions. The first two 
propositions are: 
(CC) Caesar was conscious when he crossed the Rubicon. 
(SA) Socrates was alive when he was sentenced to death. (Heathwood, 2005: 
250) 
Clearly, these propositions about Caesar and Socrates being alive and sentient 
during their temporal events in the past are true. However, Heathwood (2005) goes 
on to offer two more propositions, which seem to be made true in the same manner 
the above two are made true, but Heathwood (2005) argues that it is not the case. It 
follows as: 
(CW) Caesar was wet when he crossed the Rubicon. 
(SF) Socrates was fat when he was sentenced to death.  (Heathwood, 2005: 
250) 
Naturally, I, as a reader, would think that these two sequent propositions are made 
true the same way as the first two. As to this idea, Heathwood (2005:250) argues 
that it may seem so on the face of it, but by using the Dead Past hypothesis as the 
growing block view’s defensive strategy it then generates issues for what makes 
each of these sentences true. The problem is, he says, either there is nothing to 
make the first two propositions true, or they are made true in a different way the 
sequent two propositions. More specifically speaking, the problem arises because 
the growing block view advocate defends the theory by saying that the past is dead 
and the sentient beings in the past are now zombies, and so cannot find truthmakers 
for the first two sentences. Heathwood (2005) believes that this directly leads to the 
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contradiction in which the first two proposition are not made true by past objects, 
while the sequent two propositions are made true by past objects. For this reason, 
the conclusion he draws is that the Dead Past hypothesis leads the growing block 
view into a situation in which: 
[S]ome of the semantic and metaphysical gymnastics Presentists train for but 
G r o w i n g B l o c k T h e o r i s t s t h o u g h t t h e y c o u l d a v o i d [ . . . i s 
required]’  (Heathwood, 2005: 250 - 251). 
Nevertheless, Forrest firmly believes that there is a response here. So in response to 
Heathwood’s (2005) concern, Forrest (2006: 161) claims that offering a uniform 
account for these propositions is not difficult at all as long as the subject/predicate 
form of these propositions is understood appropriately. It is obviously true that the 
subject and predicate form for the propositions ‘Caesar is conscious’ and ‘Caesar is 
wet’ are almost identical, however, Forrest (2006: 161) admits that it is also true that 
for these two propositions in the present tense there are different types of truth-
conditions, which are applicable to the past-tensed propositions as well. In short, he 
brings in his notion of a causal state versus a causal activity again, and argues that 
present tense sentences about consciousness are made true by the existence of 
causal activities rather than causal states, However, he then also thinks that the truth 
of past tense sentences about what beings did undergo causal activities is made true 
by the fact they are, in the back of the block, in causal states. That they are in such 
causal states implies that, when the were present, they underwent causal activities, 
and thus this is sufficient to ground the truth of the past tense sentences. As such, it 
is not at all clear why such so-called presentists’ semantic and metaphysical 
gymnastics necessarily play a significant part in the growing block theorists’ training, 
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for Forrest (2006) believes that consciousness has its roots deep in the temporal 
causation. 
 This more or less completes my discussion of this objection to the growing 
block view. I think Forrest’s reply to it is convincing, and so that there are no good 
objections to the growing block view. But, before I finish with this section I want 
briefly to return to a point I raised in section 2 when discussing how the growing 
block view explains the flow of time and how we endure over time. There I said: 
On the growing block view this is captured by the idea that we bear a special 
privileged relation to the moment of time at the edge of the block. As such, 
defenders of the growing block can explain not only the flow of time in terms 
of the growing of the block, but also our experience of that flow. We bear a 
special relationship to the moment that is at the edge of the block, which gives 
rise to experiences within us, and they constantly shift as time flows because 
we constantly become specially related to a new moment, i.e. the one that 
has just now come into existence. 
As such, it turns out that the arguments I have already given in favour of 
endurantism and the A-theory already entail that something like Forrests view must 
be true. That is, for reasons entirely independent of the “How Do We Know It Is Now 
Now?” objection, I came to the conclusion that consciousness and experiences only 
take place at the edge of the block, and so that the past is dead. This is important, 
because one might view Forrest’s response as being an ad hoc move, designed 
merely to overcome the “How Do We Know It Is Now Now?” objection. But, this is 
not so. We have good independent reasons to believe that his response is right. And 
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so, this bolsters Forrest’s argument, and shows even more strongly that the growing 
block view is the best account of time available. 
 This basically completes my overall argument in favour of the growing block 
view. But, before I finish, I wish to consider one alternative account of the growing 
block view due to Michael Tooley. His view is interesting because he develops a 
tenseless version of the view. Clearly, due to the fact that I have argued for the 
necessity of tense in reality, and so for the A-theory on this grounds, I should reject 
this view. And indeed I do. So, I finish by explaining why. 
Section 5: Michael Tooley’s Tenseless Growing Block View 
Tooley develops his view in his 1997 book ‘Time, Tense, and Causation’. He argues 
that: 
The metaphysical hypothesis that the world is a static one does entail that 
there are no irreducible tensed facts, and therefore that tensed concepts 
cannot be semantically basic. But, on the other hand, the hypothesis that the 
world is a dynamic one does not entail that tenseless temporal concepts 
cannot be semantically basic… not only is a dynamic world perfectly 
compatible with the view that tenseless temporal concepts are semantically 
basic; it is also compatible with the thesis that tensed concepts, rather than 
being semantically basic, are analysable in terms of tenselss temporal 
concepts, together with the general concept of a dynamic world.’ (1997: 
19-20)  
This attempt on the reconciliation of tensed and tenseless theories sacrifices some 
of the features that the tensed theorist emphasises most, and not surprisingly, such a 
statement stirs up quite a controversy among both tensed and tenseless theorists. 
Admittedly, this combination of complete opposite reasoning appears to be very odd 
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on the face of it, for Tooley’s theory rejects the idea that the theory of dynamic 
temporality necessarily needs any irreducible and tensed propositions or facts, 
rather, it accepts the claim that reality amounts to solely irreducible tenseless events 
and propositions. Regarding Tooley’s relatively strange assertion, I plan to go 
through three valuable objections against this line of reasoning, brought up by Storrs 
McCall (1994), Nathan Oaklander (1999), and Quentin Smith (2001), respectively, 
and by examining Tooley’s replies to each of them, it helps to demonstrate an explicit 
layout of this theory, and will decide whether Tooley’s approach is plausible or not. 
To briefly introduce McCall’s position in the debate, in his 1994 book A Model 
of the Universe, McCall embraces the idea that there is an essential feature of 
dynamic that exists within temporality, which means McCall leans towards the tensed 
theory’s side on this matter, however, contrary to the majority of tensed temporal 
theories, McCall carries on to argue that instead of growing, the reality in fact shrinks 
over time. To be more specific, the tensed theorist usually supports the idea that the 
reality changes over time by adding temporal events and facts to the past through 
the present; but McCall believes that the reality changes over time by deleting the 
possibilities in the future that have not been actualised, which seems to be 
compatible with the concept of the open future.  
Tooley (2001), however, in his response to McCall (2001) states that they 
agree with each other on a number of matters, such as the acceptance of a dynamic 
temporality, the open future, and the idea that ‘the history of the world consists of 
tenseless states of affairs, with tensed facts being logically supervenient up what 
tenseless facts are actual as of different times.’ (Tooley, 2001: 32) Therefore, 
according to Tooley, his view and McCall’s are in agreement about many matters. 
However, there are two things on which they cannot agree with each other. One is 
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whether one is able to semantically distinguish truth simpliciter from truth at a time; 
the other is whether one should appeal to quantum mechanics in order to argue for 
absolute simultaneity.   
According to Tooley (2001: 32- 33), McCall and he mutually agree that the 
concept of actual simpliciter and that of actual as of a time are both essential to the 
interpretation over the nature of time, yet McCall accepts that the concept of truth 
simpliciter is the only legitimate one, while Tooley (2001) doubts if one can 
semantically tell the difference between the two. The point Tooley (2001: 33) tries to 
make here is that if the idea of being true at a time is to be acknowledged, then the 
concept of truth at a time should be recognised as well. 
The second dispute is on the appeal to quantum mechanics for the sake of 
absolute simultaneity. Traditionally, there has been a well-known collision between 
the theorist of dynamic temporality and the advocate of Special Relativity, for the 
former defends the idea of absolute simultaneity, whereas the latter is not compatible 
with the idea that there is ‘a relation of absolute simultaneity that holds between 
events.’ (Tooley, 2001: 33) Before going any further, there are two points that I would 
like to make here: first is that it is not necessary for the growing block theorist to 
commit to absolute simultaneity, as mentioned earlier in the discussion over Peter 
Forrest’s argument, each one of us could be at different points on the edge of the 
expanding block depending on our frames of reference; which entails the second 
point, that is, that the theorist of this dynamic temporal view can actually avoid the 
collision between the growing block view and Special Relativity. That being said, 
Tooley’s approach appears to be compatible with Forrest’s line of reasoning. 
However, that is just not the case in reality, for Tooley (2001) chooses to go down a 
different road where he claims that the future is non-branching instead of open-
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branching, which he believes enables him to rightfully argue for absolute simultaneity 
by adopting quantum mechanics. At this point, it is not clear to me whether Tooley’s 
argument here is a successful one. 
Similarly, McCall (2001) is not that impressed by Tooley’s way of conducting 
his argument, and argues that this line of reasoning is contradicting the traditional 
way in quantum mechanics when conducting a measurement. To be more specific, 
according to the traditional Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics: 
definite values of physical quantities such as spin cannot be assigned to 
quantum systems unless a ‘measurement’ of that quantity is made” ...... even 
after a measurement has been made of the spin of the first electron, the 
second electron does not really have a spin until a measurement is made on 
it. (Tooley, 2001: 34) 
In response to this objection, Tooley (2001) states that he finds it problematic to 
conduct measurements this way for the reason that, according to Tooley (2001: 34), 
once the measurement on the spin of the second electron would be determined once 
the measurement on the first electron is made. In other words, the possibility that the 
second electron will have the spin is determined to happen and therefore will happen 
at some point, equal to one. Nevertheless, what seems interesting in Tooley’s reply 
is that he also admits that he does not possess the solid knowledge base as to the 
field of quantum mechanics as McCall does, therefore, he is not very confident with 
his judgment regarding the validity of his argument. Since I personally support the 
way Forrest explains absolute simultaneity and dodges the objection from Special 
Relativity, I do not see any progress that is made by Tooley here, and for this reason 
I do not think it is a good argument against Special Relativity.  
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The second main objection against Tooley’s combination of tenseless facts 
and dynamic temporality is suggested by Oaklander. As stated above, Tooley’s 
version of the dynamic world comprises a number of significant features many other 
theorists of dynamic temporality actually cherish, therefore, it would be quite unusual 
for any of those advocates of the theory of dynamic temporality to accept Tooley’s 
position easily. To be more particular, in Tooley’s approach, ‘one can refer to 
moments of time either by tenseless expressions or by tensed expressions; ......and 
it is not the case that reference by means of tenseless expressions must, or even 
can, be analysed in tensed terms......’ (Tooley, 2001: 35) These two features of 
Tooley’s ontology clearly contradicts what the majority of tensed theorists believe, 
despite this, Tooley claims that this contradiction does not change the fact that 
‘dynamic accounts of the nature of time require a temporally-indexed notion of 
actuality.’ (Tooley, 2001: 35) As discussed earlier in the examination over Braddon-
Mitchell’s ‘is it now now?’ argument, according to the theorist of dynamic temporality, 
it is true and necessary that one of the ‘now’s functions as indexical in the 
proposition. However, what Tooley intends to adopt for his ontology that consists of 
tenseless and tensed facts is not solely ‘the temporally-indexed notions of what is 
actual as of a time, and of truth at a time’, but also ‘the absolute notions of what is 
actual simpliciter, and of truth simpliciter.’ (Tooley, 2001: 36) Having these two 
different kinds of notions explained, it is clear to see that the theorist of dynamic 
temporality is willing to accept the former but the latter appears to be one too difficult 
for the theorist of dynamic temporality to embrace. 
As mentioned above, Tooley claims to be a tensed theorist and supports that 
there is a dynamic world, then it is obviously contradicting to accept both ideas, 
therefore, it is also obviously confusing as to why Tooley would choose such a 
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position. In response to this confusion, Tooley (2001) explains that it is a commonly 
accepted principle that ‘semantically basic concepts must apply in virtue of the 
presence of properties or relations with which one can be directly 
acquainted...’ (Tooley, 2001: 36) and by applying this principle to this specific case, it 
entails that one is unable to be directly acquainted with the future facts, therefore, 
there is no way one can be directly acquainted with the property of futurity, and 
following this line of reasoning, it sums that ‘the concept of the future cannot be 
taken as analytically basic...’. (Tooley, 2001: 36) In order for the concept of the future 
to be further semantically analysed, Tooley (2001: 36) believes that what one needs 
in this situation is quantifiers that cover up all things that exist at any time, and that 
one cannot understand these quantifiers without understanding the concept of what 
is actual simpliciter.  
Having explained these notions, Tooley carries on to argue that ‘What is 
actual simpliciter is identical with the totality of everything that exists tenselessly; [it is 
also] identical with the totality of everything that is actual as of some time or 
other.’ (Tooley, 2001: 37) Given Tooley also supports the view of dynamic world, 
again, it seems baffling how the total of temporal reality is static when its temporal 
parts change constantly. And this is exactly where Oaklander’s objections take place. 
Although I am not too keen on Oaklander’s advocate of the tenseless theory, and on 
his objections that suggest that views of a dynamic world should be abandoned, I 
think some parts of his argument against Tooley’s combination of a dynamic world 
and tenseless facts are fairly valuable to this discussion. What Oaklander (2001) 
considers as problematic on Tooley’s approach is that there is a contradiction 
between the total of temporality that does not change and its temporal parts that 
change their existential status constantly.  
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More precisely, Oaklander (2001) adopts an objecting strategy that begins 
with the assumption that the sum total of temporal reality always remains the same, 
which Tooley (2001) claims to be true in the light of his tenseless view. At the same 
time, Tooley (2001) states that every future event or state of affairs constantly 
change their existential status by coming into reality at some point, and the totality of 
temporal reality absolutely covers every single future event at all times, following this 
line of reasoning, it obviously entails that the totality of temporal reality contains 
temporal parts that constantly come into existence and change their existential 
status. Furthermore, it is also reasonable to say that if a totality contains some parts 
that constantly change by coming into existence, then it is impossible for this totality 
to remain exactly the same, if following this line of reasoning, then it entails that such 
totality cannot always remain the same. Clearly, the result of this deduction is 
conflicting with the primary assumption that the totality always remains the same. 
Accordingly, some of these statements above must be false.  
In reply to this counter argument, Tooley (2001: 38) states that the totality of 
temporal reality cannot change, for it is not temporally indexed. Now, this response 
seems a little blurry to me as whether it is temporally indexed or not does not change 
the fact that there is a change in future events’ existential status, and as long as the 
change exists, there is a change within temporal reality. Tooley (2001) then goes on 
to argue that there is a misunderstanding as to the expression ‘existential status’, 
which causes the problem. According to Tooley (2001: 38), such an expression 
obscures the difference between the totality of what is actual simpliciter and the 
totality of what is actual as of any given time. However, it is also his claim that ‘the 
totality of what is actual as of any one time is necessarily different from the totality of 
what is actual as of any other time.’ (Tooley, 2001: 38) Despite that he explains that 
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this does not mean that there is also a different between actual simpliciter at one 
time and that at any other time, this necessary difference does indicate a change in 
the existential status or property. For this reason, I think Tooley needs to offer a 
further explanation.  
The last main objection against Tooley’s ontology I would like to go through 
focuses on whether Tooley’s ontology is in fact a tenseless view at its core, rather 
than a tensed theory. Quentin Smith (2001), in his paper ‘Actuality and Actuality as of 
a Time’, offers his insights on Tooley’s 1997 book ‘Time, Tense, and Causation’ and 
suggests that despite that Tooley appears to be an advocate of views of dynamic 
temporality, his temporal ontology is in fact a tenseless one. Smith (2001) starts his 
discussion by giving his fairly straightforward opinion on few significant features of 
the tensed theories that Tooley gives up in order to make his argument ontologically 
work in a tenseless sense. Since Tooley (1997) believes that temporality consists of 
tenseless events, facts, and states of affairs, while the tensed theorists believes the 
opposite, the first tensed feature Tooley (1997) compromises, according to Smith 
(2001: 20), is that tenseless concepts can be semantically reduced to tensed 
concepts, namely, the past, the present, and the future. Furthermore, as above 
mentioned, Tooley does not believe that the concept of the future is semantically 
basic, so the second feature he decides to give up is fairly obvious, that is, that the 
concepts of past, present and future are semantically basic; thirdly, due to the 
advocate of tenseless facts, Tooley (1997) rejects the idea that ‘familiar tensed 
sentences do not include indexicals and express the same proposition at different 
times of utterance.’ (Smith, 2001: 20) Moreover, as demonstrated earlier, Tooley 
explicitly appeals to quantifiers that cover all things at any times in order to save the 
concept of the future, for this reason, he clearly considers the quantifiers more 
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valuable than tensed facts; and last but not least, since he claims that the sum 
totality of temporal reality is not temporally indexed, it is fair to say that he rejects 
temporally indexed concept of truth. 
Having listed the important aspects of tensed theories, Smith (2001) takes on 
the phrase ‘actual as of a time’ adopted in Tooley’s argument to pose the question 
that it is rather blurry as to what this phrase actually means. He suspects that Tooley 
himself does not even know how to explain and that is precisely why he claims that 
‘this phrase expresses a primitive, unanalysable notion,’ (Smith, 2001: 22), just in 
order to avoid giving any further explanation.  
Smith (2001) then claims that there are several argument Tooley (1997) offers 
in hope of establishing his tenseless/tensed ontology that appear to be invalid. The 
first argument is that ‘propositions, numbers and uninstantiated universals do not 
exist in time and therefore that a distinction is needed between actuality simpliciter 
and actuality as of a time.’ (Smith, 2001: 22) The point I intend to make over 
throughout this discussion is that I do not think there is a necessity for a distinction 
between actuality simpliciter and actuality as of a time, for I do not believe that 
everything in our temporal reality is tenseless, the distinction between the two 
actualities seems redundant to me. The second argument is Tooley’s explanation 
(1997: 40) regarding why the distinction between the two actualities is required: apart 
from the ability to understand what is actual as of the present, one also needs the 
ability to understand propositions regarding the totality of what is actual at some time 
or other. Again, I do not think there is a need to distinguish actuality as of a time and 
actuality simpliciter, the required ability here is not really necessary. Smith (2001: 22) 
thinks that this argument begs the question because one of its premises assumes 
that there is necessity for two different notions of actuality and the conclusion 
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proceeded from this premise backs it up, which is not legitimate. 
I have now examined the objections from all three metaphysicians, and it 
seems like that Tooley does not have an upper hand on this combination of a 
dynamic temporality and tenseless facts. Therefore, Tooley’s version of a non-
dynamic growing block view must be rejected. 
Conclusion 
This chapter completes my survey of the metaphysical view of time. I have rejected 
presentism, the B-theory, and the moving spotlight view, and argued that the growing 
block view solves all the problems that these views face whilst facing no 
insurmountable problems of its own. I therefore conclude that growing block view is 




For the Humean Theory of Causation and Law 
Introduction 
So far in this thesis I have argued in favour of one particular metaphysical view of 
time, namely the growing block theory. I now turn my attention to a different topic, 
that of causation and the laws of nature. Whilst it took five chapters to establish 
which view was correct with regards to time, it will take only one chapter to establish 
which view is correct with regards to causation and the laws of nature. This is 
because I think there is a profound and compelling argument that tells directly in 
favour of one particular view. And that argument was given more than three hundred 
years ago, by David Hume. Hume argues, in effect, that there is no productive power 
in nature, i.e. that causation is mind-dependent, and that the laws of nature are thus 
not things in the world that make things happen. Rather, on Hume’s view, a law of 
nature is simply a regularity that we suppose, for psychological reasons, will continue 
to hold in the future. I think that Hume’s argument for this conclusion is entirely 
compelling and I accept it. 
In this chapter, after briefly discussing some background issues in section 1, I 
then outline Hume’s view of induction in section 2. I then build upon this to give his 
account of causation and law in section 3. I consider an objection in section 4 due to 
Mackie, and then consider a development of Hume’s basic view, due to Lewis, in 
section 5. Finally, I consider an alternative account of causation in section 6, the 
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powers view, and reject it. I conclude by endorsing a Humean view of causation and 
laws. 
Section 1: Background: Aristotle’s Influence 
Modern philosophers’ attempts to interpret the phenomenon of causes and effects 
trace back to as early as Aristotle’s era (384 - 322 BC) where he initiated a 
distinction between knowledge and opinion. To be more specific, Aristotle believes 
that knowledge is about what is necessarily true while opinion is about what can be 
true and false. In other words, knowledge represents what is always true, while 
opinions are all about changes in truth-value. Following this line of reasoning, it 
entails that ‘truth is the first point of distinction between knowledge and 
opinion…’ (Olesiak, 2011: 172) What is more, since opinion implies that there are 
possible changes in the truth-value of objects, but knowledge entails necessity in the 
truth value of objects, so it is fair to say that the actual difference between knowledge 
and opinion lies in necessity. That being said, Aristotle claims that scientific 
knowledge: 
 is commensurately universal and proceeds by necessary connections, and 
that which is necessary cannot be otherwise [while opinion is] things which 
can be true and real and yet can be otherwise. (APo 88b32) 
Despite the fact that the contemporary discussion in terms of causation has not 
adopted his account of causation, his distinction in the sequent later development 
has been adopted as the default distinction between scientific knowledge and 
 139
opinion in their own discussions upon causation, therefore, such distinction has 
gradually become part of the traditional metaphysical view on causation.  
Section 2: Hume on Inductive Inference 
However, one of Hume’s signature moves when he joins the conversation of 
causation is that he ignores Aristotle’s distinction, and introduces a new one that 
categorises all human knowledge into two distinctive kinds, namely, ‘relations of 
ideas and matters of fact.’  (EHU, 4.1.20) Regarding our casual inferences from the 
external world, it is natural to ask what kind of connection there is between the 
existing facts and our inferences from these facts, and how such connection is 
established. Given the two sorts of human knowledge mentioned above, if there is 
such connection between our reasoning and events/objects in the external world, 
then it is established by either of these two kinds of knowledge. Yet, Hume (EHU, 
4.1.23) goes on to state that relations of ideas cannot be involved in the process of 
our causal inferring, which means that matters of fact are the only kind of knowledge 
that is approved by Hume, and therefore responsible for our causal inferences from 
the external world. According to Morris, The philosophical rivals of Hume apparently 
disagree with him on this brutal approach to causality, and therefore call Hume’s 
distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact Hume’s Fork, which is 
tinged with their sentimentality for the loss of relations of ideas.  
 More precisely, Hume (EHU, 4.1.23) does not consider relations of 
ideas as the foundation upon which our inferences of causality are based for two 
main reasons generally. One is that reasoning derived from relations of ideas only 
generates a priori knowledge, which, to Hume, do not apply to empirical matters of 
fact and is therefore unacceptable; and the other is that it leads to a contradiction 
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when negated. In regard to the first reason, a priori knowledge is not capable of 
providing a legitimate base for our causal inferences, for a priori knowledge, as 
Morris puts it, is: 
[D]iscoverable independently of experience by “the mere operation of 
thought”, so their truth doesn’t depend on anything actually existing. (Morris, 
2001) 
For instance, the fact that it is commonly known that a Euclidean triangle’s interior 
angles are 180 degrees in total does not entail any actual existence of Euclidean 
triangles. Nevertheless, it is also contradictory for one to suggest otherwise. In other 
words, the lack of the existence of Euclidean triangles does not enable one to 
suggest that the interior angles can be 179 degrees or 182 degrees. Therefore, there 
is a contradiction when one attempts to negate such proposition, which explains the 
second reason.  
Contrary to a priori knowledge, Hume believes that one can only depend on a 
posteriori knowledge in order to generate causal inferences from what one observes. 
When describing human perceptions over causal phenomenon in the natural world, 
Hume states that: 
[W]e always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like 
secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those we have experienced, 
will follow from them. (EHU, 4.2.1/33) 
Following Hume’s description, it shows that one can only get causal inferences as to 
objects and events from what is repeatedly experienced. For instance, I take myself 
to know for a fact that the glass in front of me will be filled with water if I pour some 
water into the glass steadily, because I have done this before and had experiences 
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of it in the past. These experiences are the source for me to gain a posteriori 
knowledge that there is a causal relation/order between me pouring water steadily 
and the glass being filled with water. 
Let’s take a closer look at this example. In regard to the event of me pouring 
water into a glass, there are two propositions that can be made here: (i) a glass 
being filled with water always follows my pouring water into the glass steadily; and 
(ii) my current action of pouring water steadily into the glass is similar to these 
actions I have performed before and will cause the glass in front of me now to be 
filled with water. According to Morris (2001), the logical connection between these 
two propositions does not appear to be intuitive, therefore, by providing the chain of 
reasoning between these two propositions, we can demonstrate Hume’s reason to 
embrace matters of fact as the source of causal connection, rather than relations of 
ideas. Like the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, there is also 
a distinction between demonstrative reasoning and probable reasoning due to 
Hume’s view: 
All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative 
reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral [probable] 
reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. (EHU, 4.2.18) 
As mentioned above, a priori knowledge leads to a contradiction when 
negated, yet, there is no contradiction in thinking that the glass might not be filled 
with water when I pour the water in for there is a possibility that the glass just might 
break due to a crack I did not notice. Hume therefore rejects the possibility that 
demonstrative reasoning could be the one that helps fill the gap between the two 
propositions.  
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Despite that relations of ideas related demonstrative reasoning does not meet 
Hume’s standard, one should not feel too optimistic about probable reasoning at this 
point, for Hume does not think probable reasoning alone is capable of playing this 
fundamental role either. According to Morris (2001), one will end up running in a 
vicious circle if one attempts to infer proposition (ii) from proposition (i), because it 
will eventually get to the point where it involves the question one intends to answer in 
the first place. With demonstrative reasoning entirely rejected, probable reasoning 
remains as the only means one has to connect the propositions, and therefore needs 
some extra aid in order to make sense. To be more precise, proposition (i) indicates 
events in the past, while proposition (ii) shows something that is most likely to 
happen in the future, and there needs to be some principle to be the source for 
probable reasoning and to ensure that the past is connected with the future causally.  
Some suggest that such aid should be what is called uniformity principle. 
According to this principle, the future will resemble the past. Although this principle 
appears to be able to enable one to fill the gap between proposition (i) and 
proposition (ii) with probable reasoning, Hume (EHU, 4.2.18) claims that this 
principle is neither intuitive nor demonstrable, and therefore could only be supported 
by the probable argument. However, a problem arises when applying this principle to 
the probable argument. That is, that if one intends to establish an argument using 
the uniformity principle, then at some point the argument will have to include the 
principle itself as part of it, which spells a vicious circle. For this reason, it is neither 
the uniformity principle nor probable reasoning that has what it takes to link 
proposition (i) with proposition (ii), and the gap between them is still to be filled. 
In effect, at this point, Hume has argued that reason cannot fill the gap. But, 
the question remains: if we do not infer proposition (ii) from proposition (i) by the use 
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of reason, why do we infer proposition (ii) from proposition (i). With regard to this lack 
of faith in reason, Hume considers his own view as giving rise to sceptical doubts, 
which, according to Hume, are not a ‘disagreement, but rather an incitement, as is 
usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to 
the public.’ (EHU) With the sceptical doubts revealed, Hume carries on to offer his 
sceptical solution. 
If not reason, then there still needs to be a principle that explains why we are 
lead to make causal inferences. Instead of reason, Hume insists that it is custom or 
habit that enables us to form causal inferences from the natural world, as Hume 
states: 
This principle is Custom or Habit. For whenever the repetition of any particular 
act or operation process a propensity to renew the same act or operation, 
without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we 
always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. (EHU, 5.1.5/43) 
Having defined this, Hume claims that one forms a certain propensity from repeated 
experiences. Take my pouring water into a glass scenario for an example again, if I 
apply the notion of custom to this process, then it entails that custom is my 
propensity to form the judgment there is a causal process here because in the past I 
have experienced pouring water into a glass and the glass being filled subsequently. 
Therefore, it is commonly agreed that custom and habit in Hume’s description are 
actually not something new, rather, they are only different names for the principles of 
association. To be more specific, Hume’s definition over the principles of association 
is that: 
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…there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, 
Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.’ (EHU, 3.2/24) 
As above-mentioned, in Hume’s argument, one forms a certain propensity from 
repeated experiences, and propensities from custom and habit, which obviously 
represent the same thing as these three principles of connections among ideas. That 
being said, it is fair to claim that the principles of association are the more detailed 
description of custom and habit.  
         Thus, it is safe to say that Hume in his theoretical conduct values custom 
greatly and believes that custom on its own can provide the supporting explanation 
of why we believe certain future events will go down the way similar events have 
gone down in the past, and for this reason, it can also be the source of the uniformity 
principle above-mentioned.  
However, many believe that causality is without a doubt an objective 
phenomenon in the natural world, and that causal relations between events and 
objects take place all the time regardless of whether any of us are there to observe 
them or not. In response to this conventional impression, Hume suggests a 
distinctive way to understand causality. His explanation is that the tendency to 
believe in causality is a mental feature of human nature, while causality in fact only 
exists in our custom formed by our repeated experiences. In other words, it is our 
belief that leaves an inaccurate impact on the perception of causes and effects.  For 
this reason, It is rather necessary to explain belief the Humean way, and also clarify 
why a person believes that she can expect and perceive an effect whenever a cause 
takes place, given belief is described to be of inaccurate impacts. 
With regard to this request, Hume offers his interpretation over belief by 
asking what is supposed to be involved in forming one’s belief that there will be a 
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certain causal relation between two objects or events during the interaction between 
the two objects/events. Take the glass being filled with water again for an instance, 
what is it that grants me this belief that when I pour some water steadily into the 
glass in front of me, the glass will be filled with water correspondingly? Hume 
responds to this question by first noting that human minds are capable of freely and 
randomly combining, merging, splitting and separating any ideas. Given this, it is 
clearly not the case that our imaginiative use of ideas that invariably leads us to the 
belief that the glass will be filled with water, for a human mind can add any ideas. 
With ideas alone being ruled out, Hume goes on to state that it is our emotions that 
help in our formation of beliefs. To be more specific, Hume claims that ‘belief must be 
some sentiment or feeling aroused in us independently of our wills, which 
accompanies those ideas that constitute them.’ (Morris, 2001) As to this statement, 
there are two obvious enquiries that need to be posed here. One is that although 
Hume claims that it is sentiment or feeling that help to form beliefs, he still needs to 
offer an accurate definition of sentiment and feeling in the context of this argument. 
The other enquiry is what kind of role that ideas, combined with emotions, play in the 
process of forming a belief.  
Regarding the first enquiry, Hume thinks that it is not possible to define 
sentiment or feeling, but it is entirely possible to define what belief is. According to 
Hume, my believing that the glass in front of me will be filled with water is as 
unavoidable as other sentiments, such as feeling delightful when a good thing 
happens, or feeling confident when a challenge takes place. It seems that these 
sentiments and feelings come into one’s mentality without any interruptions of 
reasoning. Therefore, he says: 
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All these operations are species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or 
process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to 
prevent. (EHU, 5.1.8: 46-47) 
In other words, just like the ability to have sentiments or to feel, belief is also 
something that exists in human nature which closely associates with sentiments and 
feelings. Nevertheless, Hume never gets the chance to discuss and explain belief in 
full detail. What he does describe in terms of belief is that beliefs are lively, vivid 
conceptions of an event: 
which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than 
fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior 
influence on the passions and imagination. (EHU, 5.2.12: 49) 
Based on this description, Hume obviously recognises the ontological significance 
belief has, but since there is not a full discussion of belief in Hume’s account, it is 
uncertain what exactly Hume would say as to belief in more detail. Despite the lack 
of description, when it comes to belief having a ‘superior influence’ on the passions 
and imagination, I believe it is compared to either ‘sentiments or feelings’, or the 
ability to have sentiments or to feel. 
Section 3: Hume on Necessary Connection and Laws of Nature 
There is another significant aspect of Hume’s approach to causality that I need to 
address here, that is, his attitude towards necessary connection between a cause 
and its effect. Many hold the traditional view that there is necessary connection 
within causality to ensure that the effect not only happens, but also happens in a 
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certain way after its cause takes place. And, to make sure the causal interaction 
between a cause and its effect happen in a certain way, there is definitely a demand 
for necessary connection in between, and some attempt to maintain this causal 
connection. Hume, on the other hand, thinks otherwise. He does not think that there 
is such thing as necessary connection nor any supporting sources whatsoever. 
Furthermore, he also identifies three different kinds of sources needed for necessary 
connection, and denies them all. So, it is sensible to start with the three sources and 
then move onto the discussion of necessary connection, for if these sources are not 
legitimate and useful as they should be, then the legitimacy of necessary connection 
between a cause and its effect will also be reconsidered. 
According to Locke, we obtain the idea of necessary connection by having 
impressions regarding the interactions with the natural world and with our own 
mental awareness, and accordingly, these impressions are to be categorised into 
external and internal. To be more specific: 
[W]e get our idea of power secondarily from external impressions of the 
interactions of physical objects, and primarily from internal impressions of our 
ability to move our bodies and to consider ideas. (Morris, 2001) 
Notice the term ‘power’ in the quote. Some may ask what this ‘power’ represents. 
Since there is a common belief that there must be some kind of force or energy that 
necessarily brings a cause and its effect together, so such energy or force is also 
known as necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Back to the 
discussion, according to Hume, external and internal impressions are the first two 
kinds of sources required by necessary connection, and the third source is what 
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Malebranche calls the ‘occasion for divine action’. Clearly, the third source is 
attributed to God’s will, which seems already dubious to me, as I believe that the 
existence of God needs to be proved to be true before one can attribute anything to 
God’s will. Anyhow, Hume does not think any of these sources are actually qualified 
to maintain an idea like necessary connection, and therefore, rejects them all. 
I start with external impressions. As stated above, we obtain this kind of 
impression by having interactions with objects in the physical world. Hume argues 
that these impressions cannot really enable us to form the idea of necessary 
connection. For example, when seeing someone play during a billiards game, many 
would assume that the sequent motions of the balls are caused by the balls the 
player hits, and some would thus naturally believe that these motions are the 
evidence that there is a necessary causal connection between the motions of these 
billiard balls, but Hume does not think that this is the case. It is not connection of any 
sort we observe when we see the motions of billiard balls, rather, it is a constant 
conjunction of these billiard balls we observe.  
As for internal impressions, we get this kind of impressions by being able to 
have bodily movements and to process information and ideas. Nevertheless, Hume 
rejects the idea that these physical and mental actions are caused by internal 
impressions. More precisely, although it is true that our bodily movements operate 
based on what brain signals they receive, Hume insists that the intentions to have 
the bodily movements do not derive from the internal impressions of our mental 
awareness, rather, according to Morris (2001), these actions should be considered 
as matters of fact which each of us learn through repeated experiences. More 
specifically speaking, when one takes some actions, such as opening the window, 
one just moves the hand onto the window handle and rotates it, during this process, 
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one is not aware of exactly how every mental action takes place the way they do and 
have control over limb movements, and accordingly, one is not aware of the internal 
impression of the will power.  
Furthermore, Hume maintains, the mere ability we have to exert apprent 
influence over our thoughts and actions doesn’t give us an impression of power, or 
necessary connection, either. That is to say, like bodily movements, we know that we 
are capable of forming ideas but we do so without knowing exactly how we form 
these ideas. For example, nearly every human being with a functioning brain and 
mentality has experienced some occasions in their lives where they have negative 
thoughts and ideas they do not want to experience, and yet these ideas still keep 
occurring. On these occasions, each human being is perfectly capable of forming 
ideas but none of us knows exactly how or why these ideas are formed. That is also 
to say, there are limitations upon our control over our thoughts and ideas, that being 
said, Hume claims that we can only learn these limitations by experiencing them 
repeatedly. Correspondingly, internal impressions are considered as ambiguous as 
external impressions in Hume’s view. 
The third and final source Hume considers is the notion of occasion for divine 
action, derived from Malebranche’s occasionalist view. According to his view, ‘every 
detail of nature is willed by God.’ (Dreher, 2017: 344) Clearly, his appeal to God’s will 
in order to explain causality is not going to sit right with Hume, as the former rely on 
God for the explanations of absolutely everything, while the latter emphasises the 
significance of experience. If one attempts to understand or prove something 
inconclusive by attributing it to something else that is even more inconclusive, then it 
is fair to say that one begs the question. And I think this is exactly what 
Malebranche’s strategy is. Some may disagree with me on this matter, and argue 
 150
that there is a great deal we know about God, such as the fact that God has created 
everything on this planet and is aware of absolutely everything that has been going 
on. In response to this, I think it is entirely necessary to conduct all discussions and 
arguments strictly with scientific and philosophical methods; and I believe that 
Newton agrees with me on this, as he ‘correctly insists that appeals to God are 
expressions of religious faith and are not part of scientific theory.’ (Dreher, 2017: 342) 
Therefore, appealing to God’s simply does not solve the issue here. 
Nevertheless, some still believe that Malebranche’s position cannot be given 
away this easily, there must be more that can be said regarding the rejection of this 
view. If the problem with its method is not enough to rule this view out, then the 
problem of specificity within Malebranche’s view is something which cannot be 
overcome, not even by God’s will. To be more specific then, it is commonly known in 
the philosophical world that Malebranche and Hume hold different views on 
causality, as stated by Dreher (2017: 332), for Malebranche, there are necessary 
causal connections, whereas Hume only believes that there is nothing but 
contingenct constant conjunction. However, it is also believed that the more 
fundamental difference between Malebranche’s view and Hume’s is about their 
different opinions on scientific explanation.  
When one attempts to provide a genuine scientific explanation with regard to 
a certain natural phenomenon, this explanation should demonstrate all the specific 
details regarding the circumstances in which the phenomenon takes place. Take 
Dreher’s (2017: 332) cannonball phenomenon for an example, when one tries to 
scientifically explain the event of a cannonball falling to the ground, it requires more 
than merely a plain account over why it happens, instead, this explanation should 
cover other significant aspects, such as the time it will take to fall, and the velocity of 
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its falling, etc. Clearly, Malebranche’s view of God’s will does not contain these more 
detailed evidence/statistics, and therefore cannot be viewed as evidently trustworthy. 
Accordingly, this incapability with Malebranche’s occasionalist view is what Dreher 
(2017) calls the problem of specificity. 
Hume also weighs in on this matter by giving another example: the 
explanation over the fact that food nourishes. It is not the question of why food 
nourishes, far more than that, it is the questions of exactly what it is in food that 
nourishes and of how the process is supposed to work. Take bread for an instance, 
according to Dreher (2017: 333), if one intends to scientifically explain the 
phenomenon that bread provides one’s body with certain nourishments, then it is 
necessary for one to explain the process of how the proteins in the bread turn to 
amino acid in one’s digestive system. In other words, ‘it is the specificity of natural 
science that integrates all the events into a unified whole that explains more general 
phenomena.’ (Dreher, 2017: 333) Compared to the scientific explanation, 
Malebranche’s view of God’s will obviously lacks of the precision required for 
scientific and philosophical conducts, therefore, this third source is proven to be 
unadoptable.  
With these three sources being disproven, Hume argues that without these 
sources, there cannot be any necessary connection between an event and its 
sequent. Hume’s argument for this claim takes three steps. The first step is to pin 
down the natural phenomenon in which, according to Hume (EHU, 7.28), one event 
is constantly conjoined with another, we begin to expect the one to occur when the 
other does. As mentioned above, there is a tendency in human nature to believe in 
causality. Intuitively then, we assume that there is some kind of connection between 
these events, and in order to define this very connection, we call the earlier event the 
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cause and the later event the effect; and the second step is that by repeatedly 
experiencing the constant conjunction, we also discover that these repeated cases 
took place in almost identical fashion, therefore, custom/habit allows us to foresee 
the effect when its cause takes place; the third and final step is Hume’s conclusion 
that ‘our awareness of this customary transition from one associated object to 
another...... is the source of our idea of necessary connection.’ (Morris, 2001) In 
other words, necessary connection, in Hume’s understanding, is nothing more than 
what he calls constant conjunction.  
One point that follows immediately from the above discussion regards the 
laws of nature. As a necessary connection is simply a constant conjunction, it follows 
that what we think of as being laws of nature are simply constant conjunctions that 
do in fact continue to hold universally, i.e. for all times. Thus, it follows that 
something is a law of nature, for Hume, if as a matter of fact it is a regularity that fails 
to have an exception. Of course, regularities that have held up until now may not 
continue to hold, and we have no reason to think they will. But, if as a matter of fact, 
we discover a regulatity that we have never known to fail, despite countless 
instances of occurance, then we will think of this, for psychological reasons as being 
something that hold universally across all time. And if, as a matter of fact it does so 
continue to hold, we may rightly call this a law of nature. The important point to note 
about this is that laws of nature, so conceived, are derived from the regularities we 
observe, and so do not (and cannot) produce those regularities. Thus, laws of nature 
are not themselves built into the fabric of the world in any fundamental sense. 
Rather, they supervene upon what regularities, as a matter of fact, continue to hold. 
 153
Section 4: Mackie’s Objection: INUS conditions 
To continue with the discussion, I now turn to an objection to the Humean view, given 
by Mackie in his 1965 paper Causes and Conditions. His objection focuses on the 
notion of there being an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but 
sufficient condition, also known as an INUS condition. In short, his objection to Hume 
is to say that we need not appeal to the notion of necessary connection in order to 
explain causation. As such, his argument is that Hume attacks a straw man, and that 
as such, we have no reason to accept, for the reasons Hume gives, that we cannot 
explain causation as being mind-independant. In other words, if the notion of 
causation does not involve the notion of necessary connection, then Hume is barking 
up the wrong tree in attempting to explain causation, and therefore we do not need 
to follow him and agree that out concept is based on nothing more than that of 
constant conjunction. However, obviously this depends on the plausibility of Mackie’s 
own account, to which I now turn. 
For the purpose of saving objective mind-independent cause and effect, 
Mackie starts his argument by posing a case in which a house is half burned down, 
and after a thorough investigation, the investigators announce that it was an 
electrical short-circuit that actually caused the fire. Regarding this case, Mackie 
(1965: 245) states that the short-circuit is actually neither sufficient nor necessary for 
the fire, and yet, it is the very cause of it. To be more particular, it is not sufficient 
because the short-circuit alone would not have caused the fire, there needed to be 
other conditions for the fire incident to happen, such as the malfunction of the 
sprinklers, and the flammable goods close by; also, the short-circuit is not necessary 
for the fire either, for something else, such as fireworks, could have caused it as well. 
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However, Mackie (1965: 245-246) also argues that since it is the short-circuit, the 
malfunction of the sprinklers, and the flammable objects close by that caused the 
fire, therefore, the short-circuit is part of a sufficient condition for the fire incident to 
happen; furthermore, the malfunction of the sprinklers and the flammable objects 
would not have caused the fire without the short-circuit, for this reason the short-
circuit is a necessary part of this sufficient condition. Having explained this case, 
Mackie (1965) then goes on to conclude that the short-circuit is an insufficient but 
necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) condition for the fire. 
Furthermore, Mackie also offers his definition of this condition, which follows as:  
A is an INUS condition of a result P if and only if, for some X and for some Y, 
(AX or Y) is a necessary and sufficient condition of P, but A is not a sufficient 
condition of P and X is not a sufficient condition of P. (Mackie, 1965: 246) 
With regard to this definition, Mackie (1965) predicts some potential issues that 
might be pointed out, and accordingly adds some additional description to it. 
Although this account of INUS condition is an attempt to explain causation, Mackie 
(1965) points out that there are some causes that are non-INUS conditions. More 
precisely, besides INUS conditions, there are independently sufficient conditions. 
Take an example to explain independently sufficient conditions, say I got waken up 
very early this morning by a passing by truck which was particularly loud. In this 
case, the passing loud truck is an independently sufficient condition for my waking as 
the effect; furthermore, there are also causes that are necessary parts of necessary 
and sufficient conditions, a perfect example for this kind of causes is, according to 
Duxbury (2016), if one cracks eggs in boiling water, then one will end up with some 
poached eggs. In this example, cracking the eggs is the necessary part of a 
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necessary and sufficient condition for the making of the poached eggs. So at this 
point, it seems like that there has to be an expansion on the spectrum of INUS 
conditions.  
In response to this demand for an expansion, Mackie (1965: 247-248) states 
that this category of conditions does not exclusively include INUS conditions, also, it 
includes independently sufficient conditions as well as necessary parts of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. Correspondingly, Mackie (1965: 249) claims that A is a 
cause of P if and only if A is at least an INUS condition of P; also, A is at least an 
INUS condition of P if and only if (1) A is an INUS condition of P, or (2) A is an 
independently sufficient condition of P; or (3) A is a necessary part of a necessary 
and sufficient condition of P.  
On the face of it, by expanding the range of INUS conditions, it successfully 
solves the potential problems the independently sufficient conditions and the 
necessary parts of necessary and sufficient conditions may cause. Yet, it is not 
enough to cover all the other conditions that might play a role in influencing an effect. 
Back to the house fire case for an example, although the short-circuit is the cause of 
the fire, it would not have happened without oxygen in the house, therefore, one can 
argue that the fact that there was oxygen in the house also played a significant role 
in influencing the effect which is the house being on fire, but this condition is not 
included in Mackie’s INUS condition category. To take this case even further, one can 
argue that the fact that the planet earth is not being destroyed is also a condition for 
the fire, so one can say that it is the fact that the planet earth is not being destroyed 
actually caused the fire. Due to this reason, it seems like Mackie has to either 
expand the INUS condition archive even further or explain the conditions like oxygen 
in the house fire case.  
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I think that it is obviously pointless to keep expanding the list of INUS 
condition, for there would not be an end to it, and at this point, the only solution for 
this problem is to find a way to explain all the other factors that also contribute to the 
effect of a causal relation. The solution Mackie (1965) offers is a notion called a 
‘casual field’, which restricts and determines what conditions should be considered 
as causes and what should not. To be more specific, Mackie (1965: 249) explains 
this notion by first stating that the question ‘What causes influenza?’ is incomplete 
and indeterminate, for this question can be interpreted in two ways, one way focuses 
on what generally causes influenza in human bodies; the other way is to understand 
it as ‘given the fact that influenza is present, what it is that makes some people fall 
victim to it but others do not?’ Also, since these two questions concentrate on 
different aspects of influenza, the causal fields for these two questions are therefore 
different as well. According to Mackie (1965: 249), for the former way to understand 
it, the causal field is simply human beings, while the causal field for the latter is 
human beings in conditions where influenza viruses are present. Having explained 
these two ways to understand the question about influenza, it is now clear what a 
causal field is: 
In all such cases, the cause is required to differentiate, within a wider region in 
which the effect sometimes occurs and sometimes does not, the sub-region in 
which it occurs: this wider region is the causal field. (Mackie, 1965: 249) 
By setting up the restrictions of the causal field, Mackie (1965) asserts that the so 
called background conditions can be seen as part of the causal field, and thus a part 
of the causal paradigm. 
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What is more, another important aspect of the background conditions Mackie 
(1965) holds is that they are fixed. For example, in the house fire case, the facts that 
there is oxygen in the house, and that the planet earth is not being destroyed are all 
fixed background conditions, that is to say, A is a cause of P if and only if A is at least 
an INUS condition of P relative to the causal field C. Following this line of reasoning, 
since these conditions are fixed, Mackie (1965) thinks that naturally these conditions 
should be seen as part of INUS conditions by default. At this point, it seems that 
Mackie’s strategy of the causal field successfully explains the background conditions 
in the context of INUS conditions, However, one issue arises here, that is, that 
Mackie is obliged to offer an explanation as to what actually fixes these background 
conditions.  
There are two replies that can be made here to this enquiry, it is the context of 
discussion that fixes the background conditions or the causal field, or it is something 
else. Mackie (1965) neither says that it is the context of discussion nor does he 
specify anything else that could fix the background conditions. Therefore, it seems 
as if only the context of discussion can fix the background conditions, but then a 
problem occurs: if it is the context of discussion that fixes the background conditions, 
then it makes causation potentially subjective, which then means it is mind-
dependent. Again, mind-dependence is something Mackie wants to avoid, because it 
will entail that causation is generated by habit, which exists only in human minds. 
One could reply to this by saying that the background conditions are fixed by the 
context in an objective way, but without any supporting evidence, this assertion itself 
is considered subjective. Therefore, this attempt by Mackie to preserve causation 
from Hume’s view does not work out. What Mackie’s (1965) theory lacks is the 
feature of mind-independence for the causal field, but at this point, it seems too 
 158
difficult for the advocate of mind-independant causation to obtain such independence 
and  to also offer a convincing account over it. And so I conclude that Hume’s 
argument survives Mackie’s attempt to offer an alternative account. 
Section 5: Lewis’s view 
I now turn to David Lewis’s development of Hume’s view. Lewis’ (1973, 1986) 
development is a modal realist view on causal dependence that relies upon 
counterfactual theory. His approach to explaining causation is different from Mackie’s 
(1965), and for Lewis (1986), something is a cause because if the cause had not 
happened, the effect would not have taken place. In order to explain the truth of 
these counterfactual sentences Lewis argues that we must make use of the notion of 
possible worlds, and the idea that some worlds are closer to ours than others. The 
basic idea is that such counterfactual sentences are true iff in the closest possible 
world to ours in which it is true that the cause does not happen, the effect also does 
not happen. But, crucially, Lewis argues that we must appeal to the idea that our 
world has laws of nature that are given in terms of constant conjunctions. In short, 
the simplest system of regularities that hold within a world are taken to constitute the 
laws of nature, and a large part of what makes a world is closer to ours if the same 
regularities hold (i.e. if if has the same laws of nature). Such claim certainly looks 
familiar, because it is compatible with Hume’s claim that that necessary connections 
are not part of the world, but that all there is is constant conjunction. The laws of 
nature, on this view are nothing other than regularities, and what causes what is 
based upon what regularities hold. Accordingly, one significant feature of Lewis’ 
theory is that this approach is derived from Hume’s ontology of mind-dependent 
causation, and therefore, a Humean view.  
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To be expand on Lewis’ view, the first thing to notice is that Lewis’ (1986) 
claim that if the cause had not happened, the effect would not have taken place is 
slightly different from the standard ‘if... then’ form of indicative conditionals, and this 
is generally counterfactual conditionals’ trademark for it means what would have 
been or what might have been. For example, say if it had snowed, the local council 
would have put some salt on the road. According to Lewis (1986: 22), counterfactual 
conditionals are represented as ‘A□→C’, which means if it were the case that A, it 
would be the case that C. Introducing counterfactual conditionals is the first step of 
Lewis’ (1986) argument, and the second step he takes is to make the statement that 
there are various concrete possible worlds besides ours. More precisely, Lewis 
(1986) believes that there are other concrete worlds that actually exist like the one 
we are living in, and that they are similar to ours but contain what might have been.  
To be more detailed about the notion of possible worlds, although the majority 
of current philosophers, such as Plantinga (1974), who takes possible worlds to be 
an abstract notion, it is not the case in Lewis’ realist argument. According to Lewis 
(1986: 81), all these possible worlds and the individuals in them are concrete. 
Furthermore, given we happen to live in the actual world and possible worlds are 
what thing might have been, there is a relation of comparative similarity between 
possible worlds, and of all these possible worlds, some worlds are closer to actuality 
than the others. That is to say, if one possible world is more similar to the actual 
world than the another possible world, then the first possible world is closer to 
actuality than the second. Also, regarding similarity, as above mentioned, some 
possible worlds are more similar to actuality than the other, which means that there 
is a relation of similarity between these possible worlds, as well as that they can be 
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put in order based on their relative similarities to actuality. Last but not least, each 
possible world is the closest to itself.  
Moreover, since Lewis’ causal account originates from Hume’s causal theory, 
it means that Lewis is as sceptical about necessary connection between a cause and 
its effect as Hume is, and in his argument, such connection is what he calls causal 
dependence. Having said that, Lewis (1973b, 559) believes that despite that causal 
dependence between real events is sufficient for causation, it is actually not 
necessary. And as stated above, the claim that if the cause had not happened, the 
effect would not have taken place indicates that there is a causal dependence 
between a cause and its effect. Specifically speaking, ‘We think of a cause as 
something that makes a difference, and the difference it makes must be a difference 
from what would have happened without it. Had it been absent, its effects - some of 
them, at least, and usually al - would have been absent as well.’ (Menzies, 2001) 
Thus, Lewis aims to explain causation in terms of causal dependence, and also to 
explain causal dependence in terms of counterfactual dependence. 
With the notions of counterfactual conditionals, possible worlds, and similarity 
established in the argument, Lewis claims that a counterfactual formula ‘A □→ C’ is 
true if and only if in the closest possible worlds in which A is true, C is also true; 
therefore, a counterfactual formula ‘A □→ C’ is true if and only if one of the following 
conditions is satisfied: 
(1) there are no A-worlds. 
(2) the actual world is an A-world, and a C-world. 
(3) the closest A-world are C-worlds. 
Following Lewis’ line of reasoning, ‘if it were the case that A, it would be the case 
that C’, or the simplified version ‘A □→ C’, it is natural to suggest that A causes C 
means that if it were not the case that A, it would not be the case that C, which is 
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represented as ‘¬A □→¬C’. That is to say, in order to state that C is causally 
dependent on A, we can put this in the form of a counterfactual conditional. Consider 
the house fire case again, a short-circuit takes place in a house and after a while the 
house is on fire, if one intends to determine whether there is causal dependence 
between the short-circuit and the house fire incident, one can apply these 
conditionals to the case and determine the truths of these conditionals, it follows as: 
(a) short circuit □→ fire incident 
(b) ¬short circuit □→ ¬fire incident’ 
In conditional (a), the short-circuit and fire incident take place in actuality, and as 
stated earlier, each world is the closest to itself, which means this actual world is the 
closest to actuality, so it is true that the short-circuit possible world is also the fire 
incident possible world. Therefore, conditional (a) is true. As for conditional (b), in 
order for it to be true, there needs to be the closest possible worlds where every 
condition is exactly the same as the actual world except that the electrical short-
circuit does not take place. In this scenario, Lewis holds fixed the laws of nature, 
given in terms of refularities, and so notes that in the nearest world to ours in which 
the short circuit didn’t take place is a world in which the fire doesn’t take place. He 
thus believes that without the short-circuit, the fire incident would not have taken 
place, and correspondingly, conditional (b) is true. Lewis then draws the conclusion 
that the fire incident is causally dependent on the electrical short-circuit. On the face 
of it, it seems as if Lewis successfully explain causal dependence in terms of 
counterfactual conditionals, and so given a full account of causation. 
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Nevertheless, I do not agree with Lewis on his account of conditionals (a) and 
(b) examined in the last paragraph. To be more specific, conditional (a) is clearly 
true, yet conditional (b) should not be left alone so soon. As mentioned above, if it 
were not for the electrical short-circuit, the house fire might still happen, one simply 
cannot deny the possibility of it, because there are also some possible worlds where 
there is not a short-circuit but instead someone lights up some fireworks near the 
house which causes the fire incident. In this case, the fire incident still happens 
without an electrical short-circuit. Notwithstanding, the possibility that other factors 
might have been the cause of the fire incident instead of the electrical short-circuit 
does not affect Lewis’ argument that causal dependence between actual events is 
sufficient, but not necessary.  
That being said, there are two important objections against Lewis’ account of 
causation I intend to discuss here. Firstly, I would like to address the same obstacle 
that Mackie’s theory (1965) fails to overcome, that is, the theory of context-sensitive. 
Take the house fire case again for an example, there being oxygen in the house is 
an INUS condition for the fire incident, which entails that there is also a causal 
dependence between the fire and oxygen in the house, in other words, one can say 
that the fire is causally dependent on there being oxygen in the house, if there were 
not any oxygen, there would not have been a fire. In short, the theory of context-
sensitivity suggests that ‘causation is an absolute relation whose nature does not 
vary from one context to another.’ (Menzies, 2017) To be more specific, recall Lewis’ 
account: if the cause c had not happened, then the effect e would not have taken 
place. To this the advocate of necessary causal connection replies by saying that if 
the cause c* had happened instead of c. then the effect e* would have happened 
instead of e. And it seems that the argument has reached an impasse now. 
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Lewis acknowledges this concern and in reply he states that: 
[W]e haven’t made up our minds: and if we presuppose sometimes one 
answer and sometimes another answer, we are entirely within our linguistic 
rights. This is itself a big problem for a counterfactual analysis of causation... 
(2000: 186) 
Clearly, this is not an satisfying answer to the question. However, I think the reply to 
this concern can be established in a better form. Firstly, since to make a decision on 
a causal relation is entirely within our linguistic rights, it entails that it is our mental 
perception that has the determining power over such relation, which indicates that 
such causal relation is still mind-dependent. Secondly, the rival of the counterfactual 
analysis claims that if the cause c* had taken place instead of c, then the effect e* 
would have happened instead of e, but this attempt to argue for necessary 
connection looks absurd to me, for e or e* or e** or even e*** would have randomly 
happened as the effect of the cause c or c** or c** or even c***. What I am trying to 
say is that there is a possibility that the cause c could also have caused the effect e* 
or e** or even e***, there is no guarantee that the cause c can only generate the 
effect e when it is possible for it to cause other effects, such as e*, or e**, and this list 
can go on endlessly, the point being made here is that it is up to our minds to decide 
what the cause actually is, and it directly entails mind-dependence of causation. 
Therefore, this objection is moot. 
 Finally, in this section, it is worth once more considering the status of laws of 
nature on Lewis’s view. As his is a Humean view, he does not consider the laws of 
nature to be fundamental facts about a world, but rather they supervene upon the 
regularities that hold. He is a B-theorist eternalist, and as such, the past, present and 
future exist and form the subvenient base upon which the laws supervene. In short, if 
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there are, as a matter of fact, fundamental regularities that hold across the entire 
span of spacetime within a world, then those regularities constitute laws of nature. Of 
course, I have rejected B-theory eternalism (and A-theory eternalism, i.e. the moving 
spotlight view, too). And as we shall see in the next chapter, it is the issue of how to 
combine a Humean view of causation and law with the growing block issue that will 
concern us. 
Section 6: Dispositional Analyses of Causation 
We have been driven to a Humean account by a consideration of Hume’s argument 
that we cannot account for existence of necessary connections in the world. We 
have already rejected Mackie’s objection, and seen that the Humean view can be 
developed in an elegant and convincing way in a Lewisian fashion (except, of 
course, that he develops it within an eternalist framework). But before I finish I will 
discuss one further attempt to reject the Humean view. This rejection comes from the 
powers theory of causation, which derives from medieval philosophical discussion 
and is embraced mainly by Jacobs (2010), Mumford and Anjum (2010) in the 
contemporary philosophical debate. 
According to this theory, there certainly is some kind of determining power 
between a cause and its effect that should be considered as a natural phenomenon 
even if this power is not necessary connection. To be more specific, there are two 
important features of this theory that make it a rival of Hume’s or a Humean empirical 
view of causation, one is that instead of causal necessity, it is dispositionality of a 
cause that exists within a causal relation, and the other is that such dispositionality 
cannot be reduced to causal necessity. In other words, ‘Causes do not necessitate 
their effects: they produce them but in an irreducibly dispositional way.’ (Mumford & 
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Anjum, 2010: 143) Furthermore, regarding the notion of constant conjunction derived 
from Hume’s argument, the advocate of the dispositionalist view disagrees and 
claims that such a view is problematic for the reason that ‘there can be accidental 
cases that were not genuinely causal,……[and] a true dispositionalism… is one in 
which a cause only tends towards its effect.’ (Mumford & Anjum, 2010:144)  
Moreover, the dispositionalist distinguishes general causal claims from 
particular causal ones. For example, according to Mumford & Anjum (2010 144), the 
dispositionalist argues that, in general causal claims, smoking cigarettes causes 
cancer, and there does not need to be any constant conjunction for this causal 
relation; however, in particular causal claims, even if smoking cigarettes caused 
cancer, it does not necessarily entail that it is this cause that necessitated cancer, 
instead, it could be something else that actually caused it. To be more specific, for 
general causal claims: 
[A] cause should be understood…… as something that disposes towards a 
certain effect or manifestation…… [and] In many particular causal claims, 
however……. A cause is something that disposes towards an effect and 
succeeds in producing it. (Mumford & Anjum, 2010: 144) 
My understanding of the description of this distinction is that a cause is supposed to 
have some kind of properties that has the determining power as to how the effect will 
turn out to be, and such determining power forms the causal disposition from a 
cause towards its effect. 
What is more, with regard to how this dispositional causation functions, the 
dispositionalist offers an explanation known as the threshold theory, which entails 
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that ‘an effect occurs when its causes have accumulated to reach the requisite 
threshold.’ (Mumford & Anjum, 2010: 145) And this threshold can be explained in 
terms of powers. In short, with this threshold theory explaining causal relations, the 
dispositionalist argues that without constant conjunction or necessary connection, 
there can still be causal relations, and accordingly, Hume is wrong to suggest that 
there is only constant conjunction.               
Conclusion                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 I find this view utterly puzzling, for a very simple reason. Powers theorists 
claim that they can do without the notion of necessary connection. And yet, as stated 
above, in order to explain the dispositional nature of powers they maintain that a 
power operates to produce an effect when its causes have accumulated to reach 
some threshold. However, what does this mean if not that once that threshold has 
been reached, the effect follows with necessity? I simply cannot see what else it can 
mean except for this, and so I cannot understand why they think their view does not 
involve necessary connections. For this very simple reason, then, I conclude that the 
powers theorist does not provide an alternative non-Humean account of causation. 
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Chapter 7 
Combining the Growing Block View with the Humean Theory of 
Causation and Law 
Introduction 
Having accepted the growing block view of time, and a Humean account of 
causation and laws, in this chapter I will examine how we might combine them. I 
draw upon the work of Benjamin Smart (2018), who is, so far as I have been able to 
determine, the only person to have attempted such a combination before. In section 
1 I outline his argument, the NOLAW argument, which is supposed to provide a set 
of problems for the growing block Humean (or, as Smart calls the view, “no future 
Humeanism”). In section 2 I consider Smart’s own solution, Hypertemporal 
Humeanism. In section 3 I then signal my agreement with some of what Smart says 
about how his view solves the problems given by the NOLAW argument. Then in 
section 4 I criticise Smart’s view, discuss how Humeanism should be combined, and 
provide my own alternative account of how the growing block view, namely, the 
theory of potential laws. Finally, in sections 5 and 6 I make some more speculative 
comments, which I hope to develop further in future work. And that will lead me to 
the conclusion of my thesis. 
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Section 1: Smart’s NOLAW argument 
However, before I undertake the task, it is necessary to have a discussion over a 
different approach recently advanced by Benjamin Smart (2018), for I believe that 
although his approach does cast a new light upon the current debate, it is in fact 
problematic, and by demonstrating the problems with it I will argue that my 
alternative solution for the growing block view can overcome them.  
According to Smart (2018: 99), there are four doctrines that necessarily 
constitute what he calls ‘open future Humeanism’: the first one is that truth 
supervenes on a four-dimensional block of local particular states of affairs; the 
second doctrine is that there is no such thing as necessary connection between 
temporal events; the third is the familiar notion that there is a privileged dynamic 
present; and the last one is that there is an absence of future facts (i.e. that they 
have indeterminate truth-values until they are actualised). As should be clear, the 
view I have argued for in this thesis has all of the features, and so my view is an 
open future Humean view. 
Regarding these doctrines, Smart (2018: 99) points that if there is an absence 
of future facts, then some have thought that the Humean theorist is unable to either 
provide laws of nature or validate our ordinary inductive inferences from the external 
world. This is said, according to Smart, because the Humean notion of laws 
suggests that all truths supervene on an omnitemporal block of local particular states 
of affairs (i.e. of the sort the eternalist thinks there is). Drawing upon Hutterman 




P1. The explicans for uniformities in nature allow one to make inductive 
inferences. 
P2. The only explicans for uniformities in nature are natural laws. 
P3. The Humean requires a complete supervenience base in order to provide 
nomological facts about a world w. 
P4. According to open-future Humeanism, w is incomplete, as w’s 
supervenience base ends with the objective present moment. 
C1. There are no nomological facts about w for the open-future Humean. (P3, 
P4) 
C2. Open-future Humeanism can provide no explanation for uniformities in 
nature. (P2, C1) 
C3. The open-future Humean cannot justify inductive inferences. (P1, C2) 
(Smart, 2018: 101)  
Smart goes on to outline the key concepts that feature in this argument. According to 
the Humean view, ‘worldly facts are determined by a four-dimensional mosaic/block 
of fundamental property instantiations, and the fundamental spatiotemporal relations 
between them.’ (Smart, 2018: 99) That is to say, laws of nature do not play a 
significant role in determining the patterns of fundamental property instantiations. 
Instead of that, it is the patterns of fundamental property instantiations that have an 
upper hand in determining the laws of nature. Moreover, the Lewisian Humean 
theorist holds a view that ‘all facts about the universe are fixed by a complete 
supervenience base: a four-dimensional mosaic comprising every event that will ever 
be.’ (Smart, 2018: 100) If this is true, then it is clear that this view is a closed-future 
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view. Furthermore, the Lewisian theorist also believes something similar, that is, that 
‘all contingent propositions (including future contingents and natural laws) have 
determinate truth-values.’ (Smart, 2018: 100) All of these concepts were outlined and 
explained in the previous chapter where we saw how Lewis develops his Humean 
view. 
It is because the Lewisian way of developing Hume’s view has been seen as 
the standard way of developing Humeanism, i.e. in eternalist terms, that the 
NOLAWS argument gains traction. As soon as one moves to an open-future (i.e. 
growing block) view a problem instantly arises with explaining the supervenience of 
the laws on future facts and events, for the open future theorist holds the view that 
the future is not fixed and the truth-values in future events are indeterminate. In other 
words, as above-mentioned, not only is the Humean incapable of determining how 
future events will unfold. More importantly, according to Smart (2018), if the 
supervenience on future facts is absent, then it entails that there is a missing 
component of the supervenience base required for explaining nomological truths. As 
Hüttermann (2014) argues, the growing block view seems to entail lawlessness if 
applied to the Humean view. This problem is the main component of the NOLAW 
argument, as primarily advanced by Hüttermann (2014), and it is this very problem 
that the proponent of the growing block view needs to overcome in order to establish 
a strong and complete ontology.  
Section 2: Smart’s Hypertemporal Humeanism 
Reflecting upon the above, it is clear that a legitimate growing block view with an 
ontology of the open future is obliged to explain and clarify three aspects of the 
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current debate, the first is that there needs to be an explanation as to what laws of 
nature actually are if there are any at all; and the second aspect is that it requires an 
answer to the question of whether anything can supervene on non-existent future 
facts if not laws of nature; and the last one is that given the open future, it is 
necessary to explain what nomologically guarantees that worldly facts will remain the 
way they have held in the future. With the Hypertemporal Humean view, Smart 
(2018) attempts to explain exactly these three features. However, this approach to 
an ontology of the open future is also considered tentative for it compromises certain 
Humean features in order to overcome the objections embodied in the NOLAW 
argument, and I think it is likely that such compromise is one step too far and ends 
up paying an ontological cost too high. 
Here is the view of Hypertemporal Humeanism as Smart defines it: 
All truths (including nomological truths) at a time t supervene upon the mosaic 
of local particular matters of fact, and the spatiotemporal relations between 
them, in the hypertime at which t is (temporally) present; that is, where t is on 
the brink of the block. (Smart, 2018: 103) 
Explicitly stated in the description, this approach allows all truths to supervene on all 
times up until the edge of the hypertemporal present (i.e. the edge of the growing 
block), and also grants that there is a whole and complete supervenience base for 
the existing facts within the spectrum of the hypertemporality, which means that 
future facts are not included in the supervenience scope, and therefore are not 
necessary for nomological truths. Accordingly, this answers C1 of the NOLAW 
argument. It does so by rendering future facts unnecessary for nomological truths. In 
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exchange, this approach adopts a slightly modified version of the Humean view 
According to the standard Humean view, there laws of nature are the regularities that 
have held up until now and will continue to hold in the future (whether or not we 
know they will). These are defined in terms of regularities, as we have seem instead, 
which take the canonical form of all Fs are Gs (∀x(Fx→Gx)). Compared with this, 
Smart puts a limiter on the modified version of the Humean view, that is, that ‘All Fs 
are Gs until t’ (Smart, 2018: 106), and the t represents the edge of the hypertemporal 
block, which is the present. 
 Now, the fundamental feature of Smart’s Hypertempral Humeanism that I will 
shortly take issue with is his claim that laws of nature only hold up until the current 
moment. The view entails that, if has thus far (in 2019) been true that all Fs and Gs, 
then it is a law that All Fs and Gs until 2019. But, if in the next instant a a non-G F 
comes into existence, it will not be a law that All Fs are Gs until 2020. The question I 
will pose regarding this, is: have, therefore, the laws changed, or have they not? As 
we will see, Smart’s view faces some difficulties in answering this question.  
      Furthermore, the fact that the Hypertemporal Humeanism has difficulties in 
providing a satisfactory answer to this question is exactly where I believe I can make 
a breakthrough, by adopting the theory of potential laws. As described above, the C1 
of NOLAWS states that there are no nomological facts about w for the open future 
Humean, but I do not believe that this is true, and therefore, I reject this conclusion. 
More precisely, I think this conclusion is false because one of its premises is false, 
and that is P4, which states that according to open-future humeanism, w is 
incomplete, as w’s supervenience base ends with the objective present moment. In 
my argument, there are nomological facts about w, because the supervenience base 
is actually complete, and it is the potential laws that guarantee that the worldly facts 
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will in the future remain the way they have been. But before I come to this discussion 
in more detail, I wish to consider his treatment of C2 and C3, with which I am in 
agreement. 
Section 3: Smart’s Treatment of C2 and C3 
Smart makes short work of C2 and C3, and I agree that he should. First, with regard 
to C2, the claim is that open future Humeans cannot explain the uniformities in 
nature. His answer, in short, is: nor should they! He argues that any view that allows 
us to explain such regularities is not a “true-to-Hume” view because (and as we have 
seen in the previous chapter) Hume does not think that the laws of nature explain the 
regularities at all. Rather, the regularities explain the laws of nature (this is because 
the laws supervene on the regularities and not the other way round). (Smart, 2018: 
106) A similar story applies to C3. According to to the objection, the no future 
Humean cannot justify indution. And Smart’s answer, again in short, is: nor should 
they! As he explains (and again as we have seen in the last chapter) Hume does not 
think that induction can be “justified” (if that is taken to mean rationally justified), 
because Hume thinks reason is not strong enough to do so, and instead he rests 
content with explaining our practice of using inductive inferences via custom and 
habit. So, once more, if any account of the laws of nature were to justify induction, it 
would not in the end be a “true-to-Hume” account. 
 As I have said, I am in complete agreement with this aspect of Smart’s view. 
As a consequence, I take it that in criticising his view further, and developing my own 
version of open future Humeanism, I have no reason to answer C2 and C3 either. 
However, C1 still poses a serious issue. 
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Section 4: Potential-Laws 
I now return to the question I posed earlier. According to Smart, canonical laws of 
nature are of the form “All Fs are Gs until t”. Now, we supposed earlier that until 2019 
it has indeed been true that in the universe all F’s have been Gs, but that it will 
happen that next year a non-G F will occur. On Smart’s view, then, in 2019 it will be a 
law that “All Fs are G until 2019” but that in 2020 it will not be a law that “All Fs are G 
until 2020”. My question was: have, therefore, the laws of nature changed, or not? 
Now, Hume himself never explicitly considered whether the laws of nature can 
change, but his implicit position was they cannot. This is because his implicit view, as 
mentioned, is that the laws of nature are those regularities that have held up until this 
point and that will continue to hold in the future (whether we know they will or not). 
And so, on Hume’s view, if “All Fs are Gs” were true up until 2019, although we might 
think that this is a law of nature (again, due to custom or habit), when in 2020 a 
nonG F occured, we would then have to admit that it not only isn’t a law of nature in 
2020, but that it never was a law of nature at all. But Smart himself cannot allow this. 
This is because on his view, it seems, when 2019 is present he must say it is a law 
of nature that “All Fs are G until 2019”. And in fact, the fact that when 2020 comes 
along and a non G F occurs, does not stop this from being a law of nature, for it is 
still true in 2020 that “All Fs are Gs until 2019”. And so, it seems, Smart must admit 
that laws of nature are all of them relative to times. That is, there is one set of laws 
that are true relative to 2019, and another set relative to 2020, and so on. 
Indeed, if “All Fs are Gs until 2019” is a law, when it was 2018 it would have 
ben true that “All Fs are Gs until 2018” was a law. But, this law, as it contains the 
temporal qualifier 2018, is a distinct law from the later law that contains the temporal 
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qualifier 2019. As such, Smart is committed to there being a different set of laws for 
every moment of time. Each of these sets of laws comes into existence as the time it 
refers to does (“All Fs are Gs until 1999” came into existence in 1999 when this year 
came into existence, “All Fs are Gs until 2000” came into existence in 2000 when 
this year came into existence, and so on). But each of these laws will continue to 
hold no matter what happens in the future too, for nothing that can happen after a 
certain time t can have any influence over what happened until t. 
All of the above is quite difficult to square with Hume’s view itself. After all, 
Hume did not think that there were laws that are relative to times, or that laws could 
continue to hold even if the regularities they mention cease to hold (for, on his view, 
then they wouldn’t have been a law at all). So, Smart’s view turns out not to be as 
“true-to-Hume” as he thinks it is. In what follows I develop an account that I believe is 
truer-to-Hume’s. 
My basic idea is that, if the growing block view is true, then because the future 
has not yet happened, we should not admit that there are any laws at all. Now, Hume 
himself never considered the open future, or the idea of there being a growing block. 
But it seems likely that if were to accept that there are no facts about the future, i.e. 
that it is alethiclly open, then he would have admitted that there is no truth about 
whether any regularity will continue to hold or not either. And as a consequence, he 
would have held no regularity that has occured up until now can possibly be a law. 
Of course, the above does not prevent us from defining a weaker notion, 
something that we might call a ‘potential-law’. A potential-law, as we might think of it, 
is a regularity that has held up until the current moment, and so can supervene on 
the four dimensional mosaic that currently exists (i.e. up to the edge of the growing 
block). It might then be that “All Fs are Gs” is indeeed a potential-law, even if it is not 
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law. We do not want to build any temporal qualifiers into these potential-laws 
because we will want to say that the if a regularity has held up until the current 
moment, then the very same potential law has held up until now. However, what we 
will want to say is that, if the regularity breaks down, and a non G F occurs (again, 
say, in 2020), then the potential-law will break down at that point to. Thus, we will 
say: 
A statement of the form “All Fs are Gs” is a potential law at t iff all Fs have 
been G up until t. 
That is, we build the temporal qualifier not into the statement of the potential-law 
itself, but into the conditions of its holding. This will then enable us to say that “All Fs 
are Gs” was a potential-law from the beginning of time up until 2020, when it stopped 
being a potential-law. 
 That, then, is my proposal. I believe this account, in terms of potential-laws, is 
a genuine “true-to-Hume” account of the laws of nature, for if Hume had accepted 
the open future, he would have denied that the regularities that have held up until 
this point count as being laws at all. But, it still enables us to recognise the 
importance of regularities in our causal thinking. There are single potential laws that 
hold until the regularities they embody break down (if they do break down). The 
potential-laws supervene on the currently existing extent of the growing block, and 
do not require there to be a more extensive subvenient base.  
      Moreover, as above mentioned, Lewis (1973: 75) defines the theory of 
counterfactuals by saying that it is a matter of comparative similarities. More 
precisely, one world is considered to be closer to the actual world than the other if 
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the first world shares more similarities with the actual one than the second. That 
being said, by adopting the concept of potential laws to the discussion of temporality, 
it enables one to also explain how we measure closeness of possible worlds the way 
Lewis would intend, and so it is consistent with his account of causation in terms of 
counterfactual conditionals. And finally, if the end of time ever comes, and a 
regularity has held throughout all of time, then a potential law will finally become a 
genuine law, in agreement with how Hume thought of them. 
 That completes my discussion of my positive view of how to combine the 
growing block view with Humeanism. Before finishing, in what follows I discuss some 
further issues in light of this proposal in a more speculative manner. 
Section 5: the Big Bang (and Before) 
I start this section by asking: what were the potential-laws before the Big Bang, if 
there were any? In fact, there might not be any of nature itself at all before the Big 
Bang happened. Nowadays, we know that there are four general forces existing in 
nature: gravitational, electromagnetic, weak and strong nuclear forces, which are 
believed by many to be the fundamentals of this world, but it looks highly possible 
that before the Big Bang there were not any of those forces. Subsequently, there 
was the happening of the Big Bang, and space and time thereafter came into 
existence. There are two points to be made here, one is that the Big Bang was a 
singular event or even an accident, so it should not be considered as part of any 
potential-laws; the other is that there was a shift in the state of nature from void or 
nothingness to the existence of particles, which means that the potential-laws only 
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started existing at some point. Accordingly, there is an asymmetry. A potential-law 
can cease to be a potential-law if it fails to hold in the future, but it does not fail to be 
a potential-law if it fails to hold in the past, so long as it has held since potential-laws 
came into existence. 
As to this statement, some may disagree and claim that if neither potential-
laws nor nature existed before the Big Bang, then there were not regularities in 
nature either. I partially agree with this statement, but this does not do any harm to 
the existence of regularities in nature since then. That being said, there could be 
regularities in the state before the Big Bang - regularities in some kind of void or 
nothingness, that demonstrated the way that kind of void was. Perhaps the regularity 
here was “No Fs are Gs (or Hs, or Js, etc.)” Then, we are perhaps best positing 
epochs of potential-laws. This was a potential laws until the Big Bang, whereby a 
new epoch of potential-laws came into existence. 
 Now, since regularities allow singular accidental events to take place, thus it 
can explain the happening of the Big Bang without having to appeal to causation, 
after which, there has been a different set of regularities that demonstrate the way 
the current universe is. Also, these regularities may well will stick around as long as 
this universe exists. Following this line of reasoning, space and time are the two 
most fundamental components of the universe, that is to say, the regularities that 
demonstrates the way time and space are in this current universe will exist as long 
as time and space exist, in other words, the existence of spatiotemporality is 
potential-law in itself. 
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Section 6: More on the Growing Block View and Necessary Connections 
With the enquiry of why laws of nature are reducible to regularities in nature 
thoroughly answered, it is time to get the growing block view back in the picture. I 
believe that not only is it necessary to combine the growing block view with the 
Humean view of causation, it is also a more convincing explanation for the 
supervenience base for future facts as the temporal block expands. But before 
investigating this approach, I would like to briefly go through the approach of laws of 
nature in order to make clear of why exactly it is not worth giving regularities in 
nature up and taking necessary connection in. 
As discussed in the last chapter, when adopting necessary connection to our 
ontology, a problem arises in terms of the explanation of accidents or non-causal 
chain of events. To be more specific, on the cause end, one can never be sure what 
a cause actually is for the effect to happen, take the house fire caused by the short-
circuit of electricity for an example, the connection between the short-circuit and the 
fire is sufficient not necessary, it could have been some other causes, such as 
fireworks being lit up outside the house. There is always a randomness or openness 
in such relations. On the effect end, there is no such thing as absolute necessity 
between a cause and effect, even if regularities hold, for there could always be some 
unforeseen factor playing a sufficient but unnecessary role in the process of a causal 
relation, and the outcome is different from the empirical ones obtained before 
regardless of how small the chances are. Mental events, for example, can be 
completely non-causal at times. One does not need other mental events as a cause 
to have a specific mental event.  
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Furthermore, when one refers to laws of nature, automatically there is always 
a sense of permanency or even of reliability in such terms, as we tend to believe 
these laws have never changed and will never change. But I believe that this is 
actually not the case, i.e. I believe that the potential-laws will break down at some 
point. And so if there are no permanent laws of nature, then they cannot be 
considered as the permanent standards for how the universe functions. The fact that 
the Big Bang was the start of the universe indicates that there was a different state 
before the Big Bang, that means there was a fundamental shift of states before and 
after the event, which by the way was also a singular accident.  
In short, the no laws of nature can have existed before, and if they did not get 
to determine the way the universe was, then there is no reason to have the belief 
that they get to determine the way the universe is now. In some sense, even the 
universe may be temporary, for there was indeed a start and it is always possible 
that there will be an end. Accordingly, no law of nature can possibly be as reliable as 
it appears to be after all. I think it is clear now that it is not worth adopting laws of 
nature just to avoid a problem with regard to the supervenience base for future facts, 
which can be solved by the Regularity Theory. This leads back to the discussion why 
the Humean view is a better option for the growing block theorist to escape the 
supervenience dilemma. 
Recall the three conditions for a causal relation stated above, according to the 
Regularity Theory, C causes E if and only if there is a regular association between 
things similar to C and things similar to E, and C happens before E, and there is a 
spatiotemporal continuity between C and E. Despite that there is no necessary 
connection involved here, these three conditions suffice for a causal relation to take 
place. The problem the growing block theorist is obliged to overcome is the 
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supervenience base for future facts as temporal block expands into the future 
territory. In this regard I think it may be possible to defend the idea that regularities in 
nature can make worldly facts remain the way they are at the edge of block without 
necessary connection being involved in the process. There are three main reasons I 
would like to discuss here to show the Humean view can actually lend a helping 
hand to the growing block theorist. The first reason is that the Regularity Theory is 
ontologically more parsimonious than laws of nature; the second reason is that 
regularities in nature have the existence of time and space as their existential 
foundation; and thirdly, regularities ensure the openness of the future. 
As discussed in the last chapter, every participant of this debate, the 
necessitarian, the power theorist, and the dispositionalist theorist, has attempted to 
establish some kind of guaranteed connection between a cause and its effect. 
Nevertheless, the defect that commonly exists in all their arguments is that with such 
connection comes a heavy ontological redundancy. It is so for two reasons, one is 
that there needs to be an explanation in terms of what triggers singular events and 
accidents to take place in the first place, if necessary connection between a cause 
and its effect is considered as fundamental; and the other is that there can be a 
whole set of numberless causes for a single effect to happen, every single cause of 
the set is a sufficient but not necessary condition, to identify the causal relation 
between a specific (and sometimes unobservable) cause and an observable effect is 
an unnecessarily expensive price to pay.  
Furthermore, Even if such causes could be identified (which I do not think is 
true), an explanation is instantly required for what it is that determines a causal 
relation take place in a certain way, if such determination is causal powers, then 
there is a need to explain what guarantees such powers and why they are not 
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reducible to dispositions; and also, if such determination is disposition, then it is 
necessary to explain why dispositions are not mind-dependent because they 
certainly appear to be. 
Compared to these views of causation, Hume’s Regularity Theory elegantly 
avoids these explanations by stating that there are only so many essential 
regularities in nature, we can experience and observe how they cooperate with one 
another in different environments but such cooperation is purely contingent since it 
can be reduced back to essential regularities. Nevertheless, regularities in nature are 
able to ensure causal phenomenon in nature while still preserve some room for 
accidental and singular events with a more economical theoretical structure.  
Specifically speaking, I think there are presumably three different states of the 
universe, the first is the state of ‘pre-existence’, which is probably void or 
nothingness, as described above. Also, in such state there is a singular regularity, 
because nothingness itself is a regularity. Then, an accident known as the Big Bang 
turns this nothingness into an existence of the universe with space and time in it, and 
regularities with regard to the spatiotemporality are generated simultaneously. During 
the course of the universe, the existence of time and space assure regularities in 
nature, which means that, unlike laws of nature, to explain what is going on in this 
universe is these regularities’ only responsibility, the concerns as to the states before 
and after the existence of the universe are not questions for which regularities in 
nature need to provide answers.  
Thirdly claiming that there is a third state is a risky but sensible proposal, it is 
unlikely the forever expanding universe will ever end, but it is always plausible that at 
some point it may stop expanding and cease to exist, but such is not a worry for 
regularities in nature, because if that actually happens, there will be a different set of 
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regularities to explain the way that state is. Furthermore, in this universe, as long as 
time and space exist, regularities in nature exist, and according to the Regularity 
Theory, there is a causal relation between C and E when things similar to C and 
things similar to E happen in the right temporal order and a spatiotemporally 
continuant way, so in other words, the existence of time and space guarantee that 
causal relation C and E will remain the same. This leads to the second reason the 
Humean Regularity Theory is better approach. 
The problem that causes the growing block theorist’s struggle is to justify that 
there is a supervenience base for all nomological facts, when future facts are non-
existent and therefore have indeterminate truth-value. I argue that this will no longer 
be the case when appealing to the Regularity Theory, according to which, the 
existence of time and space is the supervenience base for all truths. To be more 
detailed about this, all the temporal relations between events within the block are 
fixed, and these fixed relations are the evidence that, empirically speaking, if things 
similar to E have always spatiotemporally followed things similar to C in the past, and 
as long as the spatiotemporality stays the same, these causal relations will always 
stay the same at the edge of the dynamic present. 
Furthermore, some believe that Hume personally accepts some of laws of 
nature, but in his theoretical works he seems to be very persistent on denying 
necessary connection all together. However, this does not mean that he denies that 
there can be a sort of reliability (‘tendency’ would be a strong term for it vaguely 
implies necessity to some extent) within a causal relation, because : 
Yet [Hume] does not deny the sufficiency of the cause......more subjectively. 
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He does not deny that the cause is a sufficient condition for its effect in the 
sense that such effects do always follow... (Bigelow & Pargetter, 1990: 91) 
I think it is not hard to explain this reliability or the sense in which such effects do 
always follow, it is regularities in nature that allow this reliability to exist in a causal 
relation from the cause towards its effect, since regularities are co-existent with time 
and space, and if spatiotemporality exists, then these regularities about them exist; 
and if these regularities exist, then this reliability exists. Therefore, this reliability is 
purely contingent based on the existence of time.  
Since one of four tenets of the growing block view states that ‘there are no 
future facts; that is, contingent propositions about the future obtain truth value only 
when their referents are actualised.’ (Smart, 2018: 99), the concern about this is that 
the Humean view is unable to either provide laws of nature or validate most common 
inductive references. Worse than this is the worry that regularities may stop holding 
at any time. In response to these enquiries, I think it is true to say that regularities 
may stop holding at any time, there is no doubt about it. However, that does not 
mean that the Humean view cannot provide potential-laws, as I have outlined, and 
explain our daily inductive inferences.  
Conclusion of Thesis 
This concludes my thesis. I have argued for the growing block view of time, and a 
Humean view of causation and law. I have then showed that they can mesh together 
 185
in a satisfactory way via the notion of a potential-law. In this chapter (in sections 5 
and 6) I have also entertained some more speculative ideas, that I hope to pursue 
further. But, for now, I am content to have provided what I consider to be a strong 
case for a unified view of time and causation. The onus, at least, is certainly upon my 
opponents to show where my view goes wrong. 
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